Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

Doyce Allen v. Utah Department of Health,
Division of Health Care Financing : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General of Utah; Douglas W. Springmeyer; Assistant Attorney General;
Attorneys for Appellee.
Steven Elmo Averett; Utah Legal Services, Inc.; Michael E. Bulson; Utah Legal Services, Inc.;
Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Doyce Allen v. Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing, No. 920197.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4141

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

AH

BRIEF

U

.9
}

)CKET NO.

JJt

€

/ f/>

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH
\

In Re:
DOYCE ALLEN,

]

Petitioner-Appellant,

i
i
i

No. 920197
910287-CA
91-067-01

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

i

Category No. 14

v.

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This is an appeal from the "Final Agency Action and Order on
Review" of the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care
Financing, Rod Betit, Director, dated April 29, 1991, in Case No,
91-067-01 and the "Response to Request for Reconsideration" of
the Utah Department of Health Care Financing, Rod Betit,
Director, dated June 6, 1991, in Case No. 91-067-01, and from the
decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the agency's order.
Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, Div. of Health Care Fin., 829 P.2d
122 (Utah App. 1992).

R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General of Utah
Douglas W. Springmeyer #3067
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
(801) 538-1019

Attorneys for Appellee

Steven Elmo Averett #5373
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
455 N. University Ave., #100
Provo, Utah 84601
Michael E. Bulson #0486
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
550-24th Street, #300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Appellant

FILED
JUL 3 1 1992
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH
In Re:
DOYCE ALLEN,

]

Petitioner-Appellant,

]i
|
i

No. 920197
910287-CA
91-067-01

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

i
]

Category No. 14

v.

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This is an appeal from the "Final Agency Action and Order on
Review" of the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care
Financing, Rod Betit, Director, dated April 29, 1991, in Case No.
91-067-01 and the "Response to Request for Reconsideration" of
the Utah Department of Health Care Financing, Rod Betit,
Director, dated June 6, 1991, in Case No. 91-067-01, and from the
decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the agency's order.
Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, Div. of Health Care Fin.. 829 P.2d
122 (Utah App. 1992).
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General of Utah
Douglas W. Springmeyer #3067
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
(801) 538-1019

Attorneys for Appellee

Steven Elmo Averett #5373
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
455 N. University Ave., #100
Provo, Utah 84601
Michael E. Bulson #0486
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
550-24th Street, #300
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

, • . . • .

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS .

- -

STATEMENT-1 i- I 'I- i SSUES
STANDARD OF REVIEW

. . . . .

.....

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
. . . . . . . . . . . .
S'T'A I'KMh'NT nil-" TUP PARC"

. ,

iii

Mature or

u

Course of Proceedings

r

1 'i sposition at the Trial Court

d,

Relevant Facts

. ..

t n e LCLSH

.

- . . . . . . . . . .

......

.

.

.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT

......

THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING AND THE PRESIDING OFFICER FAILED TO
DECIDE ALL OF THE ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION—
I.E., PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPEND
DOWN W T S ASSETS SO AS TO QUALIFY FOR A MEDICAID
CARD,

- -.

A.

w-. , ^-. ,

• "oar

B.

DHCF "was Required to Implement a Resource Spend Down
in Order to Fulfill the Purpose of the Medicaid
Program. , , , ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Allowing Of A 90-Day Retroactive Applicati oi i
Shows Congressional Intent to Include a Resource
Spend Down

CON^

D.

Federal Law Requires State Medicaid Plans to
Include Reasonable Standards
. . ..

E.

An Income Spend Down Imp! ;i es the Adoption of a
Resource Spend Down
.
»
..
. . . . . . . . . . . .
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
ADDENDUM:
DECISIONS
Notice of Decision, February 19, 1991.
Final Agency Action and Order on Review, Case No. 91-06701, April 29, 1991.
Response to Request for Reconsideration.
[see also: Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, Div. of Health
Care Fin., 829 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1992).]
RULES AND REGULATIONS CITED
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 29(b)(14).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1216 (1990).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1218 (1990).
42 C.F.R. § 435.301 (1990).
42 C.F.R. § 435.840 (1990).
42 C.F.R. § 435.841 (1990).
42 C.F.R. § 436.100 (1990).
Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-1 (1991).
Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-11 (1991).
Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-17 (1991).
Utah Administrative Code § R810-304 (1991).
Utah Administrative Code § R810-304-403 (1991).
STATUTES CITED
42 U.S.C. § 1382b(2)(A) (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992).
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (ADDENDUM CONTINUED1
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r) (1992).
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-1 et sea. (1989).
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1989).
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989).
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (Supp. 1991).
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1992).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1992)
SENATE REPORT
Sen. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943.

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health. Div. of Health Care Fin.. 829 P.2d
122 (Utah App. 1992)
1, 18
Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare. 476 N.E. 2d 572 (Mass.
1985)
11, 16, 17
Harrison v. Commissioner. 595 A.2d 1053 (Me. 1991)

12

Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Public Aid. 129 111. 2d 535, 544
N.E.2d 751 (1989)
12, 17
Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 527
(Utah 1988)

2

Kempson v. North Carolina Dept. Human Resources, 100 N.C. App.
482, 397 S.E.2d 314 (1990), aff'd fbv equally divided courts. 328
N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 (1991)
12, 15
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37, 69 L.Ed 2d 460, 101
S.Ct. 2633 (1981)
8
Schweiker v. Hoqan. 457 U.S. 569, 571, 73 L.Ed 2d 227, 102 S.Ct.
2597 (1982)
8
Walter O. Boswell Hospital, Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz.
385, 714 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1986)

16

Westmiller bv Hubbard v. Sullivan. 729 F. Supp. 260 (W.D.N.Y.
1990)

12

RULES AND REGULATIONS CITED
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 29(b)(14)

1

20 C.F.R. § 416.1216 (1990)

9

20 C.F.R. § 416.1218 (1990)

9

42 C.F.R. § 435.301 (1990)

9

42 C.F.R. § 435.840 (1990)

2, 9

42 C.F.R. § 435.841 (1990)

2, 9

42 C.F.R. § 436.100 (1990)

8

Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-1 (1991)

9

Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-17 (1991)

9

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-17 (1991)

15

Utah Administrative Code § R810-304 (1991)

10

Utah Administrative Code § R810-304-403 (1991)

10, 18

STATUTES CITED
42 U.S.C. § 1382b(2)(A) (1992)

2

42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992)

2, 8, 11, 16

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992)

8

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1992)

2, 8, 9

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992).

. . . 2, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19
2, 15

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992)
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r) (1992)

2, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-1 et sea. (1989)
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1989)

13
9, 13

Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989)

13

Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (Supp. 1991)

9

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1992)

1

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-4 (1992)

1

SENATE REPORT
Sen. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943
16, 17, 18

v

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
This is an appeal from the "Final Agency Action and Order on
Review" of the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care
Financing, Rod Betit, Director, dated April 29, 1991, in Case No.
91-067-01 and the "Response to Request for Reconsideration" of
the Utah Department of Health Care Financing, Rod Betit,
Director, dated June 6, 1991, in Case No. 91-067-01, and from the
decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the agency's order.
Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, Div. of Health Care Fin., 829 P.2d
122 (Utah App. 1992).

Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1987), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2 and
78-2a-4 (1992).

(This is an appeal of an administrative agency

order having the priority of argument designated under Rule
29(b)(14) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health
Care Financing ("Department"), erred in finding that Appellant
could not "spend down" his assets to become eligible for Medicaid
and whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming this ruling?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is whether, on the basis of the
agency's record, the Appellant has been substantially prejudiced
by the agency's action.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989);

The correction-of-error standard of judicial review applies to

1

agency decisions involving issues of law and no deference is
extended to agency rulings. Agency findings of fact are accorded
substantial deference and will not be overturned, if they are
based on substantial evidence. Hurley v. Industrial Commission,
767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
42 C.F.R. § 435.840 (1990).
42 C.F.R. § 435.841 (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 1382b(2)(A) (1992)
42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992).
42 U.S.C.

s

1396a(a)(10)(c) (1992).

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992).
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r) (1992).
(See Addendum for copies of these provisions.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a denial of Medicaid assistance dated
February 19, 1991. Record, at 113 (hereinafter "R").

A

prehearing conference was held on March 12, 1991. R. 108. A
hearing was held on April 3, 1991. R. 97. Appellant, Doyce
Allen (hereinafter "Allen") appeared in person and was not
represented by counsel at his administrative hearing.

2

R. 97.

Course of the Proceedings
On April 29, 1991, Allen, received an unfavorable "Final
Agency Action and Order on Review," which found that Allen was
over the asset limit for Medicaid coverage.

R. 94-106. A

"Response to Request for Reconsideration," dated June 6, 1991,
upheld this decision.

R. 78-80.

Disposition at Agency and Court of Appeals
Medicaid assistance having been denied at the agency level,
an appeal to the Court of Appeals followed.

R. 88-91.

The Court

of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the agency.
Relevant Facts with Citations to the Record
Allen was 64 years old at the time of the hearing.
98.

R. 7,

He was ineligible for Medicare because he was not 65 years

of age.
1991.

R. 9-10.

He suffered a heart attack on January 23,

R. 5.

Allen had worked for years at Intermountain Farmers and had
been covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield medical insurance.

R. 98.

After retirement Allen continued to receive this insurance
coverage for eighteen months under "COBRA".1

R. 34, 36. As the

end of his period of COBRA coverage approached, Allen worked
part-time at Intermountain Farmers to save up enough money to pay
the necessary premiums to maintain his Blue Cross/Blue Shield
insurance coverage beyond the COBRA period.

R. 33-37.

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
which allows continuing private insurance coverage.
3

He filed an application for insurance with Blue Cross/Blue
Shield.

R. 33, 124-28.

It is apparent from the fact that Allen

saved this particular amount (i.e., the amount necessary to pay
his insurance premium until he would be eligible for Medicare)
and from the correspondence which accompanied his application
that he fully expected to be given this continued coverage.

See

R. 33, 36, 37, 124. However, his application was denied on
account of previous heart surgery.

R. 5, 6, 33-34.

Allen appealed his denial but only succeeded in obtaining
the names of additional insurance companies.

R. 37. Allen

contacted these companies but considered the price of any other
insurance to be prohibitive.

R. 37.

It was apparent that the

amount of money he had saved would not provide coverage for the
desired period because of the high monthly premiums.
37.

See R. 33,

It also appeared that these other insurance company may have

denied coverage regardless of the amount of the premium he would
have been willing to pay.

R. 98.

Allen went without coverage for approximately six months and
was less than a year from his sixty-fifth birthday (when he would
have become eligible for Medicare) at the time of his heart
attack.

See R. 5, 37, 101. He applied for Medicaid benefits on

February 4, 1991. R. 11, 98.
Allen's Medicaid application included a request for
retroactive benefits for January, 1991, to cover approximately
$40,000.00 in medical bills resulting from his heart attack.

R.

11-13, 98. By the time he was admitted to Utah Valley Regional
4

Medical Center for open-heart surgery, Allen was already
obligated for $4,997.55 to Air Evac for air ambulance services
rendered on January 26, 1991, in Phoenix, Arizona; $554.00 to Dr.
Nudelman for critical care given on January 23-26, 1991; and,
$9,649.10 to Havasu Samaritan Regional Hospital for
hospitalization from January 23-26, 1991. R. 133-37, 140.
Thereafter he incurred medical bills in the amounts of $304.50 to
Valley Ambulance, Inc. for life flight on January 26, 1991;
$1,495.00 to Dr. Frischknecht for hospital treatment from January
26-February 1, 1991; $1,872.00 for the anesthesiologist;
$5,025.00 to Dr. Smith for treatment on January 27, 1991;
$23,626.58 to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for
hospitalization from January 26, 1991 to February 1, 1991. R.
138-39, 141-44.
In order to qualify for Medicaid, Allen and his wife could
not have assets in excess of $3,000.00. A review of their assets
by the Medicaid office found that Allen and his wife held
$3,029.00 in a savings account and $100.00 in a checking account
as of the first moment of each of the months of January and
February, 1991. R. 98.

It was also found that Allen owned a

1983 Ford pick-up truck worth approximately $2,500.00, which
could be excluded as exempt, a $600.00 Lincoln automobile and a
$7,000.00 1981 travel trailer.

R. 98.2

2

Allen's wife Lilly, age 62, is currently on Social Security
Disability and requires continuous oxygen for chronic bronchitis,
as well as trips to warmer climates during the winter time as a
medical necessity. R. 6, 98, 114-23. When Mrs. Allen received
her award certificate from the Social Security Administration,
5

Allen was denied Medicaid by the Office of Family Support,
since his assets totaled $10,745.90. R. 113. Following a fair
hearing, the Department affirmed the decision of the Office of
Family Support, finding that Allen's savings account exceeded the
limit.

R. 99. The value ascribed to Allen's motor vehicles and

travel trailer were not considered necessary to sustain a denial.
R. 99.3 However, it was argued and left undecided whether the
truck and travel trailer could be excluded as medical necessities
for Allen's wife.

R. 52-59, 67-68, 98.

An issue was also raised as to whether the savings account
fund was being held for burial expenses.

R. 68-69.

In Allen's

will he had specifically listed the savings account as being for
burial expenses.

R. 82.

An additional issue was raised that Allen should have been
allowed to "spend down" his assets in order to qualify for
Medicaid.

R. 130. At the hearing it was found that a spend down

is only permitted with regard to income, not assets.

R. 16-19.

He also incurred many medical bills in January prior to his
surgery, which he could have spent down to become eligible for
Medicaid in February.

R. 135-38, 140-44.

for $7,844.00, she used it to purchase the travel trailer to
travel to more suitable climates during the winter. R. 7-9, 114.
3

. It appears that there is no "scope of service" problem
and that Appellant's open-heart surgery would be paid for by
Medicaid, if he were found eligible. R. 22.
6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Allen should have been permitted to spend down his assets so
as to be eligible for medicaid.

A resource spend down is

necessary to fulfill the purpose of the medicaid program.
Allowance of a 90-day retroactive application shows congressional
intent to include a resource spend down.

Federal law requires

state medicaid plans to include reasonable standards and failure
to include a resource spend down violates this requirement.

An

income spend down implies the adoption of a resource spend down.

7

ARGUMENT
THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
AND THE PRESIDING OFFICER FAILED TO DECIDE ALL OF THE
ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION—I.E., PETITIONER SHOULD
HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO SPEND DOWN HIS ASSETS SO AS TO
QUALIFY FOR A MEDICAID CARD.
A.

Overview of the Medicaid Program
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program designed to meet

some of the medical needs of low-income persons.

42 U.S.C. §

1396 et seq. (1992); Schweiker v. Hocran, 457 U.S. 569, 571, 73
L.Ed 2d 227, 102 S.Ct. 2597,

(1982).

States are not

required to participate in the Medicaid program; however, once
they choose to do so, they must comply with the Medicaid statute
and implementing regulations.

Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453

U.S. 34, 37, 69 L.Ed 2d 460,

, 101 S.Ct. 2633,

(1981).

A

state participating in Medicaid must designate the state agency
responsible for administering its program and must file a state
plan with the federal agency stating, among other things, the
coverage it intends to provide.

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992).

The respondent in this case is the designated Utah Medicaid
agency.
Eligibility for Medicaid is divided into two categories:
categorically needy and the medically needy.
(a)(10)(A)(i) & (ii) (1992).

42 U.S.C. § 1396a

Those persons receiving

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Aid to Families with
Dependent children (AFDC) are considered categorically needy and
the statute mandates that they receive Medicaid coverage.
U.S.C. § 1396 a(a)(10) (1992); 42 C.F.R. § 436.100 (1990).

8

42
Under

the medically needy program, persons who would be considered
disabled for SSI purposes but who have income and resources
exceeding an established standard are permitted to incur bills
which bring them within the set limits for eligibility.

42

U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (1992); 42 C.F.R. § 435-301 (1990)-

In

determining Medicaid eligibility for a disabled person, a state
participating in Medicaid must apply resource eligibility
criteria which are no more restrictive than those applied in the
SSI program.

42 U.S.C. § 1396 a(a)(10)(C)(III) (1992); 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396a(r) (1992); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.301(a)(2), 435.840 & 435.841
(1990).

In this case, the SSI resource criteria found at 20

C.F.R. §§ 416.1216 & 416.1218 (1990) are directly applicable.
See addendum.
Utah has opted to participate in the Medicaid Program and
has established the Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF) to
implement, organize, administer and maintain the program.
Code Ann. §§ 26-18-2.1, 26-18-3 (1989 & Supp. 1991).

Utah

As a

condition for receipt of Medicaid funds, Utah submitted a State
plan for the medical assistance program and agreed to administer
the program in accordance with the provisions of the State plan,
the requirements of Titles XI and XIX of the Social Security Act,
and all applicable Federal regulations and other official
issuances of the Department.
(1991).
program.

Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-1

As part of its plan, Utah adopted a medically needy
Utah Administrative Code § R455-1-17 (1991).

promulgated some of its resource criteria in the Utah
9

Utah has

Administrative Code § R810-304 (1991).

A more complete and

current version is published in Volume III of Utah's policies and
procedures.

The asset level for two persons applicable in this

case is $3000.00. Utah Administrative Code § R810-304-403
(1991).
At the Court of Appeals, Allen argued that the Utah
Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing ("the
Department"), erred in counting his savings account as an
available asset.

That issue was decided against him by the Court

of Appeals and is not before this Court.

However, the Department

further erred in finding that Allen could not spend down his
assets to become eligible for Medicaid.

This is the sole issue

before the Court.

B.

DHCF was Required to Implement a Resource Spend Down in Order

to Fulfill the Purpose of the Medicaid Program
The "spend down" concept is an integral part of a medically
needy program.

The federal statute, in setting out the

requirements of an acceptable state plan provides, in part:
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must
....

(17) ... include reasonable standards ... for
determining eligibility for and the extent of medical
assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with
the objectives of this subchapter, (B) provide for
taking into account only such income and resources as
are ... available to the applicant or recipient... (C)
provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or
resources, and (D) ... provide for flexibility in this
application of such standards with respect to income by
taking into account ... the costs ... incurred for
10

medical care or for any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992).
Under subsection (17)(D), an income spend down must be
applied.

The argument for a resource spend down is based on the

purpose of a medically needy program, which is to provide needed
care to individuals while exempting certain asset levels.
There is no dispute between the parties that the purpose of
the Medicaid program is to provide for the medical needs of those
lacking the means to provide their own care.

Thus, the Medicaid

statute provides that its purpose is "to furnish....medical
assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of
aged, blind or disabled individuals, whose income and resources
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services..." 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1992).

By refusing to implement a

resource spenddown in this case, DHCF defeats that purpose.
The parties are in agreement that a resource spenddown is
permitted under the Medicaid statute but do not agree whether it
is required in order to carry out the purpose of the Medically
needy program.

A number of courts that have considered this

issue have concluded that a resource spend down is a necessary
part of a medically needy program.

In Haley v. Commissioner of

Public Welfare, 476 N.E. 2d 572, 579 (Mass. 1985), the court
concluded that a resource spend down was intended, since the
legislature had provided that "up to $2000 of personal property"
was exempt.

The court concluded:

11

The Department's policy of determining
eligibility without the application of a
resource spend down does not comply with the
requirement that an individual be allowed to
retain a certain level of resources. Id.
In Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Public Aid, 544 N.E. 2d 751, 75758 (111. 1989), similar reasoning was applied.

The court noted

that Illinois had chosen to provide medically needy coverage and
had exempted "at least $1500 in assets when determining Medicaid
eligibility."

Because of this expressed intent to preserve a

certain level of assets for medically needy individuals, the
court found that a failure to apply a resource spend down would
defeat legislative intent.

Finally, in Kempson v. North Carolina

Dept. of Human Resources, 397 S.E. 2d 314, 318 (N.C. App. 1990),
aff'd (by equally divided court), 403 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. 1991), use
of a resource spend down was found to be required in order to
carry out the purpose of North Carolina's medically needy
program.

Again, this conclusion was based on the fact that a

medically needy program by definition protects a certain level of
assets for persons who cannot afford their own medical care.

See

Westmiller by Hubbard v. Sullivan, 729 F.Supp. 260 (W.D. N.Y.
1990); Contra, Harrison v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me 1991).
The Utah Court of Appeals majority panel mistakenly read
these cases as requiring a "specific legislative directive" in
order for a resource spend down to be applied.4
4

Its attempt to

The Court of Appeals reads footnote 9 of Haley v.
Commissioner far too broadly in concluding that the Illinois
court "found a statute Nexplicitly' appl[ying] a resource spend
down..." The Illinois statute concerned transfer of assets cases
which are a less common category of cases. While suggestive of
12

resolve the issue by looking to the Utah Medical Assistance Act,
Utah Code Annotated § 26-18-1 et. seq.

(1989), to determine

whether the Utah legislature had "adopted" a resource spend down
was misguided.

Such a focus is inappropriate and guaranteed to

produce a fruitless result, since the Utah legislature, in
enacting the Medical Assistance Act, was silent on the issue.
Not only did the legislature not address resource spend down, it
makes no mention of the medically needy program at all. The
Court of Appeals majority panel's focusing on what it
characterized as "a legislative concern for economy and
efficiency in the Medicaid program" (Utah Code Annotated § 26-182.3(1) (1989) is misleading, since it bears no relationship to
the specific question at issue.

The general statement regarding

the need for economy in administering the Medicaid program could
apply to any aspect of the program and does not evidence any
intent to preclude use of a resource spend down.
Rather than mentioning the medically needy program, the
Medical Assistance Act simply creates the DHCF and delegates to
it authority for carrying out the Medicaid program.
Annotated § 26-18-2.1 (1989).

Utah Code

It is DHCF that then decides which

optional programs it wishes to provide in the state of Utah.
DHCF's discretion is not absolute, however, since the Utah
legislature must annually budget the amount of state dollars to

the need for a resource spend down, the Illinois statute did not
expressly authorize this mechanism in all cases as the Court of
Appeals seems to conclude.
13

be allocated to the Medicaid program.

Should the Utah

legislature wish to restrict the Medicaid program, it could
refuse to allocate funds to optional programs such as medically
needy.

The legislature has approved of the medically needy

program in recent years, despite increasing demands on the
Medicaid budget.

By continuing to fund the medically needy

program, the Utah Legislature has unequivocally expressed its
support of the purpose of the program:

to provide medical care

to needy individuals while allowing them to preserve a certain
level of personal property.
It is DHCF which implements the medically needy program and
expresses in published regulations the Federal requirement that
certain assets are exempt.

Utah Adm. Code § R810-304-411 (1991).

Included in the exempt assets are the applicant's home, a burial
space, a $1500.00 burial fund and up to $3000.00 in personal
property for a couple such as the Aliens.

Implicit in the

approval of the medically needy program by the Utah legislature
is a statement that low income Utah citizens in need of medical
care must be allowed to preserve at least these minimum asset
levels.

If the purpose of the medically needy program is to be

carried out, a resource spenddown must be allowed.

C.

The Allowing Of A 90-Day Retroactive Application Shows

Congressional Intent to Include a Resource Spend Down
Congressional intent to include a resource spend down in the
Medicaid Act is also found in the provision allowing retroactive
14

application to establish eligibility for the three months before
the month of application.

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34) (1992); Utah

Administrative Code § 455-1-11 (1991).

By this provision,

Congress intended to make medical assistance available to
applicants who were unable to apply at the time they became ill,
due to the severity of their illness or because of other factors.
Those potentially eligible for medically needy coverage but who
are unaware of the restriction on resource spend down, or who are
unable to spend down in time, are denied coverage. As the court
in Kempson, 397 S.E. 2d at 318 observed, "Medicaid applicants are
blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply because it is
so illogical."

It is consistent with congressional intent to

allow an applicant both the right and some time to spend down
excess assets so as to become eligible for medical assistance.
If Allen had been informed of the spend down requirements
before applying for Medicaid, he could have spent down his excess
assets, prior to application, thereby making himself eligible for
medical assistance.

He was already obligated for over $15,000 of

medical bills (far in excess of his non-exempt assets) by the
time he arrived in Utah for open-heart surgery.

R. 133-37, 140.

However, in the present case, Allen was in no physical condition
to spend down his assets prior to his release from the hospital,
just as he was in no condition to apply for Medicaid prior to
that time.

The only fair way of resolving Allen's dilemma was to

allow a retroactive spend down of his excess resources.

15

D.

Federal Law Requires State Medicaid Plans to Include

Reasonable Standards
Federal law requires state medicaid plans to "include
reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and
the extent of medical assistance under the plan which are
consistent with the objectives of this title [42 U.S.C. §§ 1396
et seq. (1992)]."

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992).

A standard

for determining eligibility is not reasonable unless it includes
the opportunity to offset excess resources against incurred
medical expenses.

See Sen. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,

reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943, 2019
(states are not allowed to require the use of income or resources
which would bring the individual's income below the amount set as
the test of eligibility under the state plan because this would
reduce the person below the level determined by the state as
necessary for his maintenance).

A person who is unable actually

to spend down his assets would become liable to the full extent
of his resources, including resources which Congress intended to
be retained by the applicant.
In Haley the court said:
The department's policy of determining eligibility
without the application of a resource spend down does
not comply with the requirement that an individual be
allowed to retain a certain level of resources.
Haley,, 476 N.E.2d at 579.

See also Walter 0. Boswell Hospital,

Inc. v. Yavapai County, 714 P.2d 878, 881 (Ariz. 1986) (a case
concerning a county health program, where the court analogized to
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Medicaid law, interpreting the Medicaid Act under Haley as
requiring a resource spend down in order to comply with the
requirement that an individual be allowed to retain a reasonable
level of both resources and income).
The Illinois Supreme Court, reached the same result in
Hession;
By failing to consider an individual's incurred
medical expenses as well as his or her assets, the
Department defeats the legislature's intent. Under the
Department's policy, a Medicaid applicant possessing
resources in excess of the asset disregard is found to
be ineligible for medical assistance despite the fact
that the applicant may have incurred medical expenses
which far exceed his or her resources. Because the
applicant is not eligible for assistance, he or she
becomes personally responsible for paying these bills
and is required to deplete the assets which the
legislature intended to be disregarded.
In contrast, by allowing an applicant to spend
down the assets above the disregard with incurred
medical expenses the applicant is entitled to Medicaid
benefits once the medical expenses exceed the excess in
assets. Thus an individual is allowed to retain a
certain level of assets and is personally liable for
his or her medical expenses only to the extent that his
or her resources exceed permissible limits.
Considering the legislature's intent that the medically
needy be allowed to retain some of their assets, we
conclude that the Department must employ resource spend
down methodology when determining Medicaid eligibility
for these individuals.
Hession, 544 N.E.2d at 758.
The Medicaid Act also requires a "reasonable evaluation" of
resources for purposes of eligibility for medical assistance.
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(C) (1992).

42

"[Reasonable evaluation" means

that "the States will not . . . overvaluate income and resources
which are available."

Sen. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
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reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943, 2018.
Allen's medical expenses far exceed his resources.

Failure to

consider his excess medical expenses against his resources
overvalues his resources and is unreasonable.
As stated in the dissenting opinion by Judge Bench, a policy
not to allow a resource spend down is unreasonable "since
eligibility is determined by when the medically needy applicant
applies for benefits." Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health, 829 P.2d
122, 128-29 (Utah App. 1992) (Bench, J., dissenting).

An

applicant who is "savvy enough to spend down his or her assets
before applying for medicaid would be eligible, while the
applicant who applies for benefits before spending down is not
eligible."

Jd. at 129. Therefore a resource spend down should

be allowed before eligibility is determined.

E.

Id.

An Income Spend Down Implies the Adoption of a Resource Spend

Down
A resource spend down is impliedly adopted in the existence
of an income spend down.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (1992)

(income spend down recognized); Allen v. Utah Dept. of Health,
829 P.2d 122, 125 n.9 (Utah App. 1992) (cases recognizing an
income spend down).

This is because resources are merely income

which continues to be "held on the first moment of a calendar
month."

Utah Administrative Code § 810-304-403.12 (1991).

In

other words, money which was income on December 31st becomes an
asset the next day, on January 1st, if it is not spent prior to
18

that time.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (1992), such money

would be eligible for a spend down on December 31st, as income.
It is unreasonable to think that Congress intended the mere
passage of time to make such money ineligible for a spend down.
It is logical to assume that Congress intended an income spend
down to cover "saved income" as well as current income.
Otherwise people will be motivated not to save and not to invest
their saved income in assets which, if they exceed the exempt
assets, could arguably be used to decrease the government's
burden of providing part of their health care.

CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the decision of the Department and
Court of Appeals.

The case should be remanded for a finding that

a resource spend down applies and that Allen should have been
allowed to spend down his assets so as to become eligible for
medicaid.
Dated this

3 0 f U day of

J M 1v

1992.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By Steven Elmo Averett
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NOTICE OF DECISION
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

CASE NUMBER: 0016671
HAILING DATE:
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ALLEN
6<39 CAtfYON DRIVE
SPHINGVILLE
UT

1
3A1-1
84663

DENY - ASSETS EXCE-ED LIHITS
DEAR DOYC£ ALL£N
YOUR APPLICATION FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, RECEIVED ON FEBRUARY 04,
1991, HAS 3EEN DENIED. THIS IS BECAUSE THE VALUE OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD'S
TOTAL RESOURCES IS MORE THAN OUR POLICY ALLOWS.
YOUR RESOURCES
atSOSRCE LIMIT

510,745.90
$3,000.00

IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE, PLEASE CALL US AT
801 374 7800. COLLECT CALLS HILL BE ACCEPTED.
THIS ACTIO:* IS BASED ON VOLUME IIIF, SECTIONS 503 AND 361, VOLUME
H I D , SECTION 503, AND VOLUME H I M , SECTION 502.

State of Utah
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
Norman H. Bangerter
Governor

Suzanne Dandoy. M.D.. M.RH.
Executive Director
RodBttit
Director

286 North 1460 West
PO. Box 16580
Salt Lake City. Ulan 84116-0580
(801)538-6151

D0YCE ALLEN,
Petitioner,

FINAL AGENCY ACTION
AND ORDER ON REVIEW
Case No. 91-067-01

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A RECONSIDERATION
FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A
PETITION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR
A RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISIx. IF YOU HAVE
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6151.
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section
63-46b-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review Procedure," and Department of Health Administrative Rule R454-14, entitled
"Division of Health Care Financing Administrative Hearing Procedures for
Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and Providers."

ISSUE
WAS THE OFFICE OF FAMILY SUPPORT (OFS) CORRECT IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS OVER THE ASSET LIMIT?

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Findings of Fact entered by the presiding officer in Recommended Decision
No. 91-067-01 are hereby incorporated by reference.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Conclusions of Law entered by the presiding officer in Recommended
Decision No. 91-067-01 are hereby incorporated by reference.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, Recommended Decision No. 91-067-01 is hereby AFFIRMED.

REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION
The rules regarding asset limits are set forth in Assistance Payments
Administration (APA) Volume III, Section 503. Section 503-1 states in
relevant part:
To be eligible for medical assistance, a client's
countable assets must be less than the applicable asset
limits....
Section 503-2 states in relevant part:
Use assets held on the first moment of a calendar month
to compute eligibility for that month. The case is
ineligible for the entire month if countable assets
exceed limits on the first moment of the month....
The table in Section 503-3 indicates that the Medicaid asset limit for a
household of two individuals is $3,000.
In this case, the petitioner and his wife held over $3,000 in a savings
account at the first moment of the month for the months of January and
February, 1991. Therefore, the decision of 0f5 to deny Medicaid disability
benefits because of excess assets was correct.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Action and Order
on Review is issued, you may file a written request for reconsideration with
the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing. Any request for
reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking
judicial review.
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of
Appeals within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action
and Order on Review or, if a request for reconsideration is filed and denied,
within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the
specific grounds upon which review is sought. Failure to file.such a petition
within the 30-day time limit may constitute a waiver of any right to appeal
the Final Agency Action and Order on Review.
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A copy of this Final Agency Action and Order on Review shall be sent to
Petitioner or his representative at the last known address by certified mail,
return receipt requested.

DATED this

^ 9 ^

day of April, 1991

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director

Rod Betit, Director
Division of Health Care Financing
Her Designated and Authorized Representative

0414H/115-117
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
STATE OF UTAH
00O00

DOYCE ALLEN,
RECOMMENDED DECISION

Petitioner,
vs.

CASE NO.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,

91-067-01

DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

Pursuant to Rule R454-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah
Administrative Hearing Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-l et seq., Utah Code
Annci-atcd. 1953 as amended, a formal administrative hearing for the above
captioned case was held on the 3rd day of April, 1991, at the Office of Family
Support located at 150 East Center Street, Provo, Utah, at 10:00 o'clock in
the A.M., Cornelius W. Hyzer, Hearing Officer, presiding. The petitioner
appeared in person. The Office of Family Support/Utah Medical Assistance
Program ("UMAP") was represented by Jon Wood and Patti Richards. This hearing
was scheduled verbally and without written notice. Neither party was
represented by counsel.

ISSUE
WERE THE ASSETS OF THE PETITIONER ABOVE THE ASSET LIMIT FOR THE MONTHS OF
JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1991?
The petitioner, Doyce Allen, age 64, and his wife, Lilly, have severe medical
problems. She is receiving Social Security disability benefits for chronic
bronchitis. She is on continuous oxygen for this disorder. She also has to
be transported to a warmer climate in the winter time when an inversion takes
place in the Utah County because of her condition. To accomplish this
purpose, her husband, Doyce Allen, purchased a 1983 Ford pick-up truck and a
travel trailer. They paid $8,000.00, for the travel trailer two years ago.
He and his wife used the cash from her Social Security disability hearing to
do that. The hearing process to obtain Social Security disability required
them to go to the administrative law judge, and by the time benefits were
granted, the retroactive benefits exceeded $8,000.00.

Doyce Allen worked at Intermountain Farmers Co-op for many years and was
covered under Blue Cross/Blue Shield medical insurance. In 1990, he obtained
a part-time job with his former employer and reapplied for Blue Cross/Blue
Shield benefits. He was covered under COBRA benefits until July 1, 1990. A
letter was sent by his employer with the application on June 15, 1990. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield denied his application for benefits for medical insurance.
He looked for other insurance and determined that it would cost between
$400.00 or $500.00 a month for medical insurance, and therefore, he never
applied. He testified at the hearing that an application to one of these
other companies may have been denied regardless of the amount of the premium
he would have been willing to pay.
In January, 1991, the petitioner suffered a heart attack and had heart-bypass
surgery. This medical bill remains unpaid.
The petitioner applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991. His income
was not evaluated, but at the hearing it was determined there would be a
substantial spendown required in the range of $400.00 to 450.00. The asset
limit for a family of two is $3,000.00, and the Office of Family Support
determined that he exceeded that on the basis of his savings account alone.
The savings account contained $3,029.86 throughout the month of January and up
to February 6, 1991, at which time Mrs. Allen withdrew the entire balance of
that account.
The petitioner was informed at the hearing that the rule for asset
determination requires that the evaluation take place on the first moment of
the first day of each month and, therefore, because the funds in his checking
and savings account were in excess of $3,000.00, the case was properly
denied. Considerable discussion was also entertained on tiie use of the truck
and travel trailer for medical purposes, but the amount of the money in the
savings account alone exceeded the limit, and therefore, the issue of medical
necessity was moot.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The petitioner, Doyce Allen, age 64, and his wife Lilly, age 62, applied
for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991.

2.

The application of the petitioner included a request for retroactive
benefits for January, 1991, to cover approximately $40,000.00 in medical
bills incurred at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for open-heart
surgery.

3.

Lilly Allen, the petitioner's wife, is currently on Social Security
Disability "and requires continuous oxygen for chronic bronchitis, as well
as trips to warmer climates during the winter time as a medical necessity.

4.

The petitioner and his wife held $3,029.00 in a savings account and
approximately $100.00, in a checking account the first moment of each of
the months of January and February, 1991.

5. The petitioner owns a 1983 Ford pick-up truck worth approximately
$2,500.00, which could be excluded as exempt,- a $600.00 Lincoln automobile
and a $7,000.00, 1981 travel trailer.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The assets of the petitioner and his spouse exceed the $3,000.00, asset limit
as set forth in APA Volume H I D .

REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION
The petitioner was unable to demonstrate his assets were below the asset limit

and, therefore, he failed

to meet his burden of proof.

Many alternatives

were

explored to try to determine that a correct decision was made by the Office of
Family Support. After careful review with the petitioner of regulations
requiring that his assets be determined as of the first moment of each month,
the petitioner understood that his savings account alone exceeded the limit.
Therefore, the value ascribed to his motor vehicles and the travel trailer
were not necessary to sustain a denial.

RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION
The decision of the Office of Family Support to deny Medicaid benefits because
of excess assets is hereby AFFIRMED.

RIGHT TO REVIEW
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of
Health, Division of Health Care Financing, prior to ius release. Both the
Recommended Decision and a Final Agency Action, which represent the results of
that review, will be released simultaneously by the Department of Health,
Division of Health Care Financing.

DATED this

( '

day of April, 1991.

CORNELIUS W. HYZER
HEARING OFFICER
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EXHIBITS

The following exhibits were

admitted into evidence:

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT //l

Medicaid application of the petitioner,
Doyce Allen

RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT #2

Checking account and savings account
bank statements

0404H/105-108/amh

State of Utaft
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
Norman H Bangcrter
(kwrnor

Suzanne Dandoy. M D„ M P H
Excrumr Dim-tor
RodBetit
Oirrrtor

266 North 1460 West
PO Box 16580
Salt Lake City Utah 84116-0580
(801)538-6151
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D0YCE ALLEN,
Petitioner,

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION

v.
Case No. 91-067-01

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

-00O00-

This request for Reconsideration has been reviewed pursuant to 63-46b-13 Utah
Code Ann. 1953, as amended.

FACTS
The Facts set forth in Recommended Decision No. 91-067-01 are hereby
incorporated by reference.

DISPOSITION
The above-captioned Request for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION
The petitioner, age 64, became uninsurable and had a heart attack on January
23, 1991, while visiting in Arizona. The petitioner and his wife had enough
money to return to Utah for bypass surgery. Throughout January, 1991, and up
to February 6, 1991, the petitioner and his wife had $3,029 in a savings
account and approximately $100 in a checking account. After applying for
Medicaid on February 4, 1991, the petitioner's wife immediately withdrew all
the money in the savings account and closed the account. Medicaid regulations
require that the assets of an applicant be examined at the first moment of the
month to determine whether or not they exceed the asset limit. The asset
umit for the type of Medicaid requested was $3,000.00, leaving excess assets

In addition to the excess assets in the checking and savings account, there
were other potential excess assets
an unencumbered trailer home worth
approximately $7,000.00, and an automobile worth $600.00. At the formal
hearing, the petitioner contended that the trailer was a medical necessity.
The hearing officer's Recommended Decision correctly denied the petitioner's
claim solely on the amount of cash available to him, without reaching the
medical necessity issue.
The Utah Medicaid Program is funded by a combination of state and federal
funds. Unfortunately, federal regulations do not allow consideration of
individual circumstances in the application of income and asset limits. A
Medicaid agency must use a methodology for the treatment of resources that is
uniform for all individuals in a covered group. When income eligibility is
the issue, a Medicaid recipient may spenddown excess income each month to
"buy" a medical card. However, no such provisions exists to reduce assets.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of
Appeals within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Response to Request
for Reconsideration. The petition shall be served upon the Director of Health
Care Financing, Utah Department of Health and shall state the specific grounds
upon which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the
30-day time limit may constitute a wavier of any right to appeal this decision.
A copy of this Response to Request for Reconsideration shall be sent to the
petitioner or his representative at the last known address by certified mail,
return receipt requested.

DATED this

JA
^^2

day of June, 1991

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director

Rod B e t i t , Director
Division of Health Care Financing
Her Designated-and Authorized Representative

0448H/43-44
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correct copy of the foregoing Response to Request for Reconsideration, postage
prepaid, to the following parties:
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Doyce Allen
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Brian Farr
Office of the Attorney General
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Uteft Court ci Appeals
OPINION
(For P u b l i c a t i o n )

Petitioner,
Case No. 910287-CA

v*
Utah Department of Health,
Division of Health Care
Financing,

FILED
(March 17, 1992)

Respondent.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Steven Elmo Averett, Provo, for Petitioner
R. Paul Van Dam and J. Steven Mikita, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Doyce Allen (Allen) appeals from a final order of
respondent Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care
Financing (DHCF) denying him Medicaid benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 23, 1991, Allen suffered a heart attack while in
Arizona. He was subsequently transported to Utah where he
underwent heart bypass surgery, resulting in medical costs
exceeding $40,000.00. At the time of his heart attack, Allen had
no health insurance and was ineligible for Medicare assistance
because he was not sixty-five years old.
Allen applied for Medicaid benefits on February 4, 1991,
seeking retroactive coverage to include medical bills incident to
his heart surgery in January, 1991. Utah Medicaid guidelines
require that Allen's assets be less than $3,000.00, on the first
of each calendar month, to qualify for medical assistance. In
both January and February, Allen owned a savings account in the

amount of $3,029.86, a checking account in the amount of $100.00,
a Lincoln automobile valued at approximately $600.00, a 1983 Ford
pickup truck valued at approximately $2,500.00, and a 1981 travel
trailer valued at approximately $7,000.00.
On February 19, 1991, the Office of Family Support denied
Allen's Medicaid application, finding his resources exceeded the
$3,000.00 limit. Allen requested a formal hearing, after which a
DHCF hearing officer sustained the denial on the ground that
Allen's "savings account alone exceeded the limit." On April 29,
1991, the DHCF issued a Final Agency Action and Order on Review,
adopting the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer.
Allen then filed a Request for Reconsideration which was denied.
On appeal, Allen alleges the DHCF erred in denying his
Medicaid application because: (1) The savings account funds are
designated for burial expenses and, thus, exempt from
consideration for Medicaid eligibility; (2) the travel trailer,
modified to accommodate his wife's disabilities, is a medical
necessity or personal effect and, thus, exempt from consideration
for Medicaid eligibility; and (3) he should have been permitted
to "spend down" his assets, by applying them to medical bills, in
ord«=»*r to become eligible for Medicaid.
I.

THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT AS A BURIAL FUND

Allen contends that his $3,029.86 savings account should not
be included for purposes of Medicaid eligibility because it is
exempt as a burial fund.1 In support of this claim, Allen points
to a statement in his will directing that the savings account be
used "to bury Doyce Allen and Lilly Allen." Allen alleges the
will is properly before this court on appeal because it was
submitted to the DHCF with his Request for Reconsideration. The
DHCF responds that it is inappropriate for us to consider Allen's
will as part of the record on review because it was never
introduced as evidence at Allen's formal administrative hearing.
A review of the record reveals that a copy of Allen's will
was first presented to the DHCF as an attachment to a letter from
Allen's counsel, dated June 3, 1991, requesting a transcript of
1. Under the Utah Administrative Code, "a $1,500 burial or
funeral fund exemption for each eligible household member" is
permitted only if these funds "are separately identified and not
commingled with other funds. They must be clearly designated so
that an outside observer can see that these funds are
specifically for the client's burial expense." Utah Code Admin.
P. R810-304~411(9)(e)(1) (1991).

Allen's administrative hearing. The DHCF did not receive the
will until June 10, 19912, after the hearing officer's
Recommended Decision, the DHCF's Final Agency Action and Order on
Review, and the DHCF's Response to Request for Reconsideration
had already been signed and dated. Because there is no
indication that Allen's will was ever included as evidence before
the DHCF, it is not properly a part of Allen's record on appeal.
However, even if we were to consider the general language in
Allen's will, the result would not be different. Allen clearly
and unequivocally testified the account was to pay for insurance
premiums, not burial expenses. Allen did not specify the account
as a burial fund on his original Medicaid application. During
his formal administrative hearing, Allen did not argue or present
any evidence indicating his savings account was designated for
burial expenses. In fact, when the hearing officer specifically
asked if the savings account might be a burial fund, Allen
replied that "we earned it last summer for our insurance
premiums, and they didn't go through, so we had this money for a
nest egg, you might say. You have to have a little bit of
something in case—. "3 Therefore, considering only the savings

2. Allen argues the will "was submitted at a time when the
record was still open," pointing out that the letter to which the
will was attached was mailed on June 3, 1991. The letter,
nevertheless, clearly bears a "Received June 10, 1991" stamp.
3. Allen testified that, after the DHCF denied Medicaid
benefits, Allen, in fact, did not maintain the account as a
burial fund. The following exchange occurred at the
administrative hearing:
HEARING OFFICER: What did you do with the
$3,000 in February which you pulled out of
the pavings account?
MR. ALLEN: Well, we paid bills that was
accrued during our heart attack deal here,
and transportation to and from.
HEARING OFFICER: So, that money was spent on
medical things?
MR. ALLEN: Bills again.
Contrary to his argument, Allen apparently neither
considered nor used the savings account as a fund "separately
identifiable" which was set aside "specifically" for burial
expenses.

account for purposes of affirming on appeal4, Allen's savings
account alone surpassed the $3,000.00 Medicaid limit.
II.
A.

MEDICAID

,f

SPEND DOWN"

An Overview of the Medicaid Program

Allen alternatively argues that he should have been
permitted to spend his assets on medical bills in order to
qualify for Medicaid. We look to both federal and Utah Medicaid
regulations to resolve this question.
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program as Title
XIX of the Social Security Act.5 Medicaid is a cooperative
federal-state program providing federal funds to assist
individuals "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(1992). States choosing to participate in this optional program
are reimbursed for a portion of their costs in providing medical
treatment to needy persons. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154,
156-57, 106 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1986); Weber Memorial Care Ctr.,
Inc. v. Utah Dept. ^ Health, 751 P.2d 831, 832 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
Participating states must develop a plan that complies with
all federal Medicaid regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396; Atkins,
477 U.S. at 157, 106 S. Ct. at 2458; Weber Memorial, 751 P.2d at
832. Each state must also select a single agency "to administer
or to supervise the administration of the plan." 42 U.S.C.
§ I396a(a)(5) (1992). In determining eligibility for its
program, a state must provide benefits to the "categorically
4. Allen also argues that his travel trailer, equipped with
oxygen, and his truck, both used to transport Allen and his wife
to a warmer climate during winter because of his wife's ill
health, should be excluded from Medicaid eligibility
consideration because they are exempt either as personal effects
or medical necessities. See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411(4),
(5)(b) to (d) (1991). Furthermore, Allen asserts that, because
his wife requires the truck and travel trailer for health
reasons, neither vehicle is "available" to him, as contemplated
by federal statutory Medicaid requirements. See 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(17)(B) (1992). We find it unnecessary to reach these
issues in view of our determination that Allen's savings account
alone exceeded the Medicaid eligibility limit.
5. Pub. L. No. 89-97, as amended, 79 Stat. 343 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396, et seq. (1992)).

needy"6 but may provide benefits to the "medically needy"7 at its
discretion.8
B.

The Concept of "Spend Down" in Federal Medicaid Statutes

When a "medically needy" applicant's income or resources
exceed the applicable state's Medicaid eligibility limits, the
"spend down" rule may apply. Under this rule, the applicant may
be able to "spend down" excess income or assets, by applying them
to outstanding medical bills, to become eligible for Medicaid.
In determining whether the federal Medicaid program requires
states to adopt the "spend down" rule, courts have focused on the
following portion of the Medicaid statutes:
(a) A State plan for medical assistance must

(17) . . . include reasonable standards
. . . for determining eligibility for and the
extent of medical assistance under the plan
which (A) are consistent with the objectives
of this subchapter, (B) provide for taking
into account only such income and resources
as are . . . available to the applicant or
recipient . . . (C) provide for reasonable
evaluation of any such income or resources,
6.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i).

7.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii).

8. The United States Supreme Court explained this distinction in
Schweiker v. Hoqan, 457 U.S. 569, 102 S. Ct. 2597 (1982):
Congress has differentiated between the
categorically needy—a class of aged, blind,
disabled, or dependent persons who have very
little income—and other persons with similar
characteristics who are self-supporting.
Members of the former class are automatically
entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter
class are not eligible unless a State elects
to provide benefits to the medically needy
and unless their income, after consideration
of medical expenses, is below state standards
of eligibility.
Id., 457 U.S. at 590, 102 S. Ct. at 2609.

and (D) . . . provide for flexibility in the
application of such standards with respect to
income bv taking into account . . . the costs
. . . incurred for medical care or for anv
other type of remedial care recognized under
State lav.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1992)(emphasis added).
recognize section 17(D) as the "income spend down
that state plans must permit a Medicaid applicant
or deplete excess income to comply with a state's
standards.9

Courts
rule," finding
to "spend down"
eligibility

The question in the present caser however, is whether the
federal Medicaid regulations also require states to allow an
applicant to "spend down" excess resources in the same manner.
Allen contends that the federal Medicaid program requires states
to implement "resource spend down" because it is necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the Medicaid program and is reasonable.
The DHCF responds that federal Medicaid regulations mandate
"income spend down" but merely permit states to incorporate
"resource spend down" within their plans at their discretion.

9. See, e.g., Atkins. All U.S. at 158, 106 S. Ct. at 2459 ("the
spenddown mechanism of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)" allows the
medically needy to spend down "the amount by which their income
exceeds" the eligibility level); Foley v. Coler, No. 83-C-4736,
1986 WL 20891 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1986) ("42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down");
Harriman v. Commissioner, No. 90-0046-B, 1990 WL 284515 (D. Me.
Nov. 9, 1990)(42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) "specifically requires
the state to have an income spend-down rule"); Walter O. Boswell
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Yavapai County, 148 Ariz. 385, 714 P.2d
878, 881 (Ct. App. 1986)("Federal regulations implementing [42
U.S.C. § 1396a(17)] expressly require deduction of incurred
medical bills from income for purposes of determining
eligibility."); Ramsey v. Department of Human Servs.. 301 Ark.
285f 783 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1990)("Under the ^medically needy'
procedure, applicants are permitted to xspend down' their excess
income for medical expenses."); Haley v. Commissioner of Pub.
Welfare, 394 Mass. 466, 476 N.E.2d 572, 574 (1985)(42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(17) "provide[s] for application of the spend down
principle to income eligibility determinations"); Kempson v.
North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 482, 397
S.E.2d 314, 316 (1990)(The "explicit reference to income [in 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D)] has been interpreted by the courts to
mean that * income spend-down' is allowed by the statute."),
aff'd, 328 N.C. 722, 403 S.E.2d 279 (1991).

Courts considering the issue agree with the DHCF, finding
the express statutory mandate is limited to "income spend
down."10 Courts conclude that federal Medicaid regulations
permit, but do not require, states to employ "resource spend
down."11 We agree and conclude "resource spend down" is not
mandated by federal law.

10. Legislative history accompanying section 1396a(a)(17) points
to only "income spend down" as a mandatory federal requirement.
See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1943.
11. See, e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 ("42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) requires states to use income spend-down but is
silent regarding resource spend-down . . . .
Resource spend-down
is thus permitted, but not required, by the Medicaid statute and
regulations"); Harriman, 1990 WL 284515 ("The federal statute
specifically requires the state to have an income spend-down
rule. . . . But there is no similar requirement in the federal
statute for a resource spend-down rule."); Hession v. Illinois
Dept. of Pub. Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751, 757
(1989)("Simply stated, we perceive nothing in section
1396a(a)(17) which precludes a State that participates in the
Medicaid program from using the resource spend down methodology
if it chooses to do so."); Hession v. Illinois Dept. of Pub. Aid,
163 111. App. 3d 553, 516 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1987)("section
1396a(a)(17) of the Act permits a state plan to utilize resource
spend down in determining an applicant's eligibility for medical
assistance benefits"), aff'd, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751
(1989); Harriman v. Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053, 1055 n.2 (Me.
1991)(court adopts prior holding of district court in this case
that federal Medicaid statute "only permits, and does not
require, a state to use an asset spend-down"); Bemowski v.
Department of Pub. Welfare. 136 Pa. Commw. 103, 582 A.2d 103, 106
(1990)(the provision of medical benefits "to the medically needy
by participating States is optional and may be excluded entirely
from a State's Medicaid program").
But see Ramsey. 783 S.W.2d at 364 (court finds "no authority
in any category for a xspend-down' of excess resources that is
similar or identical to the expressly authorized *spend-down7 of
excess income"); Kempson. 397 S.E.2d at 317 (court stops short of
holding "resource spend down" discretionary, stating that,
although "§ 1396a(a)(17)(D) only mentions income in instructing
states to provide flexibility in their program application
standards, we note that § 1396(a)(17)(C) instructs that a state's
plan must *provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income
or resources'").

C.

Utah's Medicaid Program

Since Utah may implement "resource spend down" at its
discretion, we must determine whether the Utah Medicaid plan has,
in fact, adopted "resource spend down" in determining Medicaid
eligibility. Utah courts have never addressed Medicaid "spend
down" issues.
Utah chose to participate in the Medicaid program with the
adoption of the Medical Assistance Act in 1981.
Utah has
complied with federal requirements by creating a state plan13,
which has been approved by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and designating the DHCF as the agency responsible for
Medicaid administration.14 Utah's statutes describe the DHCF's
responsibilities, in pertinent part, as follows:
[T]he division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of
this chapter in an efficient, economical
manner. The division shall establish, on a
statewide basis, a program to safeguard
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of
Medicaid services, excessive payments, and
unnecessary or inappropriate hospital
admissions or lengths of stay.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989).

12.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to -11 (1989 and Supp. 1991).

13. See Utah Code Admin. P. RR455-1 to -48 (1991). Utah has
elected to provide assistance to the "medically needy." See Utah
Code Admin. P. R455-1-17 and R455-1-20 (1991). Assets Utah has
designated as exempt from Medicaid eligibility determination,
including the burial fund discussed earlier, are listed at Utah
Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991).
14. "[T]he Division of Health Care Financing . . . shall be
responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the
Medicaid program . . . in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and applicable federal law." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1
(1989)(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-3(1)
(Supp. 1991)("The department shall be the single state agency
responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in
connection with the United States Department of Health and Human
Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security
Act.")(emphasis added).

(2) The department shall develop implementing
policy in conformity with this chapterf the
requirements of Title XIX, and applicable
federal regulations.
Utah Code Ann, § 26-18-3 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added).
The department may develop standards and
administer policies relating to eligibility
under the Medicaid program.
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1) (1989).
Allen points to no Medicaid statute, regulation, or rule
indicating that the Utah legislature has adopted "resource spend
down" in determining Medicaid eligibility. Rather, Allen posits
a more delicate argument which goes beyond literal statutory
language. Specifically, Allen contends that Utah will not be
following the federal requirement to use "reasonable standards"
in determining Medicaid eligibility unless it applies "resource
spend down."
Furthermore, Allen observes that Utah's Medicaid plan
designates certain assets as exempt in determining eligibility
for the "medically needy."15 Allen, thus, argues that Utah has
tacitly adopted a policy of allowing "medically needy" Medicaid
applicants to maintain a level of income and resources for the
necessities of life while still qualifying for Medicaid.
In support of these claims, Allen cites cases from other
jurisdictions which, he argues, require "resource spend down"
because, like Utah, they exempt certain assets from Medicaid
eligibility determination. We read these cases differently.
Courts in these jurisdictions have found a state mandate for
"resource spend down" based on a specific legislative directive
within their Medicaid plans, not just on the practice of allowing
exemptions.
In Haley v. Commissioner of Public Welfare. 394 Mass. 466,
476 N.E.2d 572 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts closely examined both federal and its own state
Medicaid laws to determine if "resource spend down" was mandated
or simply permitted. The court, first, determined that, although
the federal statutes did not require "resource spend down," it
was a reasonable method of calculating resources and "consistent
with the goals of Title XIX." Id., 476 N.E.2d at 578.
Therefore, the court concluded that it "must determine
15.

See Utah Code Admin. P. R810-304-411 (1991).

independently whether the Legislature intended to require the use
of a resource spend down." Id. at 579. The court found a
statute "explicitly applfying] a resource spend down," Id. n.9,
as evidence of "the legislature7s determination to ensure an
individual's retention of a certain level of resources." Id. at
579. The court, thus, held that the Massachusetts Medicaid plan
required "resource spend down."
The Supreme Court of Illinois performed an analysis similar
to that of the Haley court in Hession v. Illinois Department of
Public Aid, 129 111. 2d 535, 544 N.E.2d 751 (1989). After
concluding that the federal Medicaid statutes permit, but do not
require, "resource spend down," the court turned its attention to
the Illinois Medicaid plan. The court recognized that the plan
included a provision whereby $1,500 in assets is exempt from
Medicaid eligibility determination. However, the court, relying
upon a specific Illinois statute, also stated: "In establishing
an assistance program for these individuals, the legislature has
noted that it is of special importance that their incentives for
continued independence be maintained and that their limited
resources be preserved." Id., 544 N.E.2d at 757 (citing 111.
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 23, par. 5-1). Based on this clear
manifestation of legislative intent, the court held that the
Illinois Medicaid plan required "resource spend down."
Utah does not have such a saving, "resource spend down"
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of policy
expressing a desire to preserve the resources of potential
beneficiaries.16 Utah's statutes, particularly those outlining
16.

In fact, one commentator states:
It is not only conceivable, but a fact that
some unprepared applicants/ assets are
reduced beyond the poverty level to
bankruptcy because medical bills in that
month exceed those resources which the
applicant cannot preserve under the Utah
Exemptions Act. It [is] to the applicant's
advantage to put forth any plausible argument
that a particular value should be counted as
income rather than asset, if the reverse
would result in excess assets. Excess assets
mean a denial of Medicaid eligibility: excess
income means that the applicant will be
required to shoulder more of [his or] her
health care costs for that month.
Ken Bresin, Utah's Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility
Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp. L. 1, 9 (1988)
(emphasis added)(footnote omitted).

the DHCF's authority17, seem to evince a legislative concern for
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid program, not the
preservation of applicants' assets. Jurisdictions requiring
"resource spend down," on the contrary, appear concerned about
preserving the limited assets of Medicaid applicants.
We, unlike our colleague in dissent, cannot say it was
unreasonable for the DHCF to choose not to adopt "resource spend
down" in an otherwise completely optional state benefit plan.
The expressed legislative concern is for economy and efficiency
in implementing a Medicaid program, and we cannot see how this
line-drawing offends the legislative delegation of power.
Utah's statutory scheme is more similar to that of Maine,
recently reviewed in Harriman v, Commissioner, 595 A.2d 1053 (Me.
1991). In Harriman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
recognized that its state plan does not include "resource spend
down." "If the assets of applicants exceed the specified dollar
limit, they are ineligible for assistance under the medically
needy program, regardless of the amount of their medical
expenses." Id. at 1056. Noting that "[t]he overall effect was
to restrict as much as possible the number of eligible Medicaid
recipients," the court stated: "For whatever reason—whether to
achieve cost containment or to comply only with the federal
mandate or through simple oversight—the legislature stopped
short of enacting an asset spend-down." Id. at 1057 (footnote
omitted).
We, therefore, conclude there is nothing in the Utah
Medicaid plan or its regulations that requires the utilization of
"resource spend down."18 Allen had $3,029.86 in his savings
17.

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) quoted above.

18. We agree with most courts which have considered the issue
and believe the adoption of "resource spend down" is good public
policy. See e.g., Foley, 1986 WL 20891 (a state resource spenddown provision furthers the general purpose of the Medicaid
program); Harriman. 1990 WL 284515 ("Clearly, if the goal of
Medicaid is to assist individuals who are medically needy—
defined as having insufficient income or resources to meet the
cost of necessary medical services—the sensible solution is the
spend-down rule."); Hession, 516 N.E.2d at 823 (a stated
adoption of resource spend down "would be in conformity with the
purpose and spirit of the Act"); Kemoson. 397 S.E.2d at 318 ("Our
review of the case law reveals a pattern where Medicaid
applicants are blindsided by this eligibility requirement simply
because it is so illogical. Applicants who otherwise qualify are
(continued...)

account at the time he applied for Medicaid. The DHCF, thusf
correctly determined he was ineligible for Medicaid benefits as
Utah has not adopted a "resource spend down" system.

Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge

I CONCUR:

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in
par*-) :
I concur with part I of the main opinion and dissent from
part II.
Whether a "medically needy" applicant may have been eligible
for Medicaid by spending down his or her assets is a policy
decision delegated in Utah to DHCF by Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(1)
(1989). We review for reasonableness an agency's policy based on
a legislative grant of discretion to interpret a statute. See
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d
581 (Utah 1991).*

18.(...continued)
denied coverage because they have several hundred dollars above
the reserve asset limit while at the same time they are liable
for tens of thousands of dollars worth of medical bills.").
Nevertheless, a determination of the eligibility criteria
for Medicaid benefits is not one for the courts to make.
1. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. § 26-18-2.3(1) (1989) as an expression of intent to limit
coverage. The Legislature's concern for economy and efficiency
in the administration of the program simply does not have any
logical relationship to the intended coverage of the program.

I do not believe the policy adopted by DHCF is reasonable
since eligibility is determined by when the medically needy
applicant applies for benefits. Under DHCF's policy, the
applicant who is savvy enough to spend down his or her assets
before applying for medicaid would be eligible, while the
applicant who applies for benefits before spending down is not
eligible. Because that agency policy is not reasonable, I would
allow Allen to spend down his assets before his eligibility is
determined.
I would therefore reverse and remand the case for further
proceedings.

&HUL MX He^L
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

Rule 26

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 29. Oral argument
(a) In general. Oral argument will
all cases unless the court concludes:
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or
(2) The dispositive issue or set <
been recently authoritatively decide*
(3) The facts and legal argument
quately presented in the briefs andS
the decisional process would not ben "
aided by oral argument.
(b) Priority of a r g u m e n t Cases2
uled for oral argument in accordance %iv
ing list of priorities:
(1) Appeals from convictions'
death penalty has been imposed;
(2) Appeals from convictions in all<&39
nal matters;
(3) Appeals from habeas corpus peti^H
other post-conviction proceedings; j
(4) Appeals from orders concerning^
tody or termination of parental

m

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

(5) Matters relating to the discipline of attorneys;
- (6) Matters relating to applicants who have
failed to pass the bar examination,
^ (7) Petitions for review of Industrial Commission orders;
j» (8) Appeals from the orders of the Juvenile
Court;
fi (9) Appeals from actions involving public elections;
r
(10) Petitions for review of Public Service
Commission orders,
(11) Appeals from interlocutory orders,
(12) Questions certified to the Supreme Court
by a court of the United States,
(13) Original writ proceedings,
(14) Petitions for certiorari that have been
granted,
(15) Petitions to review administrative agency
orders not included within other categories, and
(16) Any matter not included within the above
categories
(c) Notice by clerk and request by a party for
argument; postponement Not later than 30 days
jifior to the term of court in which a case is to be
'submitted, the clerk shall give notice to all parties
fhat oral argument is to be permitted, the time and
place of oral argument, and the time to be allowed
[each side Oral argument shall proceed as scheduled
unless all parties waive the same in writing filed
%ith the clerk not later than 15 davs from the date of
the clerk's notice A request for postponement of the
'argument or for allowance of additional time must be
made by motion filed reasonably in advance of the
f
<Jate fixed for hearing
«L(dXOrder and content of argument. The appellant is entitled to open and conclude the argument
The opening argument shall include a fair statement
p£the case Counsel will not be permitted to read at
length from briefs, records or authorities
j|[(e) Cross and separate appeals. A cross or sepa
rate appeal shall be argued with the initial appeal at
"a single argument, unless the court otherwise directs
If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff in the
action below shall be deemed the appellant for the
purpose of this rule unless the parties otherwise
agree or the c ourt otherwise directs If separate appellants support the same argument, care shall be
taken to avoid duplication of argument
(0 Non-appearance of parties. If the appellee
fails to appear to present argument, the court will
hear argumer t on behalf of the appellant, if present
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear
argument on behalf of the appellee, if present If neither party appears, the case may be decided on the
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be rescheduled for argument
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the
parties, a case may be submitted for decision on the
briefs, but the court may direct that the case be argued.
(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; removal. If physical exhibits other than documents are
to be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to
have them placed in the courtroom before the court
convenes on the date of the argument After the arguBtent, counsel shall remove trie exhibits from the
courtroom unless the court otherwise directs If exhibits are not reclaimed by counsel within a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk
•ball think best

§416.1212

20 CFR Ch. Ill (4-1-91 Edii

Mar. 15, 1979; 48 PR 57127, Dec. 28, 1983; 51
FR 34464, Sept. 29, 1986; 55 FR 28378, July
11, 19903
§ 416.1212 Exclusion of the home.

(a) Defined. A home is any property
in which an individual (and spouse, if
any) has an ownership interest and
which serves as the individual's principal place of residence. This property
includes the shelter in which an individual resides, the land on which the
shelter is located and related outbuildings.
(b) Home not counted. We do not
count a home regardless of its value.
However, see §§416.1220 through
416.1224 when.there is an income-producing property located on the home
property that does not qualify under
the home exclusion.
(c) If an individual changes principal place of residence. If an individual
(and spouse, if any) moves out of his
or her home without the intent to
return, the home becomes a countable
resource because it is no longer the individual's principal place of residence.
If an individual leaves his or her home
to live in an institution, we still consider the home to be the individual's
principal place of residence, irrespective of the individual's intent to
return, as long as a spouse or dependent relative of the eligible individual
continues to live there. The individual's equity in the former home becomes a countable resource effective
with the first day of the month following the month it is no longer his or
her principal place of residence.
(d) Proceeds from the sale of an excluded home. The proceeds from the
sale of a home which is excluded from
the individual's resources will also be
excluded from resources to the extent
they are intended to be used and are,
in fact, used to purchase another
home, which is similarly excluded,
within 3 months of the date of receipt
of the proceeds.
(50 FR 42686, Oct. 22, 1985, as amended at
51 FR 7437, Mar. 4,1986]
§416.1216 Exclusion of household goods
and personal effects.

(a) Household goods and personal effects; defined. Household goods are defined as including household furni-

ture, furnishings and equip
which are commonly found in or.i
a house and are used in conne
with the operation, maintenance^,
occupancy of the home. HousehoL
goods would also include the furfi
ture, furnishings and equipme
which are used in the functions ^u^.
activities of home and family lifeiiSl
well as those items which are fori __
fort and accommodation. Personal/e
fects are defined as including clot
jewelry, items of personal care,:
vidual education and
u;^
(b) Limitation on household \
and personal effects. In deter
the resources of an individual:(a
spouse, if any), household goods la
personal effects are excluded if -the
total equity value is $2,000 or le
the total equity value of househo
goods and personal effects is inNexc~
of $2,000, the excess is counted ag"^
the resource limitation.
(c) Additional exclusions'
hold goods and personal effect^
termining the resources of an-lnS
ual (and spouse, if any) and inT
mining the value of the ? hqu
goods and personal effects of s
dividual (and spouse), there si
excluded a wedding ring and-'
gagement ring and householdp
and personal effects such as pr ^
devices, dialysis machines; hB
beds, wheel chairs and similar *§
ment required because of a jT
physical condition. The exclusic
items required because of av]
physical condition is not applic
items which are used extensive
primarily by members of the*
hold in addition to the persdnfl
physical condition requires the%
[40 FR 48915, Oct. 20,1975. as am£
44 FR 43266, July 24, 1979]
§ 416.1218 Exclusion of the automob|

(a) Automobile; defined. As u
this section, the term automob
eludes, in addition to pa
other vehicles used to provide!
sary transportation.
(b) Limitation on automol
determining the resources of
vidual (and spouse, if any),
biles are excluded or count
lows:
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§416.1222

1% Total exclusion. One automobile
Dtally excluded regardless of its
ie if, for the individual or a
er of the individual's house\ It is necessary for employment;
I)"It is necessary for the medical
atment of a specific or regular medfproblem;
ii) It is modified for operation by
"* sportation of a handicapped
;or
|J> It (or other type of vehicle) is
because of climate, terrain,
ace, or similar factors to provide
ssary transportation to perform
itial daily activities.
ZlExclusion to $4,500 of the market
Sue. If no automobile is excluded
tier paragraph (b)(1) of this section,
">i automobile is excluded from
iting as a resource to the extent
^current market value does not
$4,500. If the market value of
^automobile exceeds $4,500, the
ss is counted against the resource

income-producing property (houses or
apartments for rent, land other than
home property, etc.) and property
used to produce goods or services essential to an individual's daily activities. Liquid resources other than those
used as part of a trade or business are
not property essential to self-support.
If the individual's principal place of
residence qualifies under the home exclusion, it is not considered in evaluating property essential to self-support.
[50 PR 42687. Oct. 22. 19851
§416.1222 How income-producing property essential to self-support is counted.

(a) General When deciding the
value of property used in a trade or
business or nonbusiness income-producing activity, only the individual's
equity in the property is counted. We
will exclude as essential to self-support
up to $6,000 of an individual's equity
in income-producing property if it produces a net annual income to the individual of at least 6 percent of the ex^ Other automobiles. Any other cluded equity. If the individual's
^mobiles are treated as nonliquid equity is greater than $6,000, we count
gurces and counted against the re- only the amount that exceeds $6,000
limit to the extent of the indi- toward the allowable resource limit
l's equity (see § 416.1201(c)).
specified in $416.1205 if the net
J§j£ Current market value. The eur- annual income requirement of 6 peromarket value of an automobile is cent is met on the excluded equity. If
average price an automobile of the activity produces less than a 6-per^particular year, make, model, and cent return due to circumstances
Ition will sell for on the open beyond the inividual's control (for extet (to a private individual) in the ample, crop failure, illness, etc.), and
icular geographic area involved.
there is a reasonable expectation that
j'PR 48915, Oct. 20. 1975, as amended at the individual's activity will again
?FR 43266. July 24. 1979; 50 PR 42687, produce a 6-percent return, the property is also excluded. If the individual
"I 22,1985]
owns more than one piece of property
[416.1220 Property essential to self-sup- and each produces income, each is
fe port; general.
looked at to see if the 6-percent rule is
BVhen counting the value of re- met and then the amounts of the inditirees an individual (and spouse, if vidual's equity in all of those properny) has;, the value of property essen- ties producing 6 percent are totaled to
[•lito self-support is not counted, see if the total equity is $6,000 or less.
gthin certain limits. There are differ- The equity in those properties that do
gtfruleis for considering this property not meet the 6-percent rule is counted
pending on whether it is income- towards the allowable resource limit
Spduciiig or not. Property essential to specified in § 416.1205. If the individg&upport can include real and per- ual's total equity in the properties proKal property (for example, land, ducing 6-percent income is over the
Sidings, equipment and supplies, $6,000 equity limit, the amount of
Btor vehicles, and tools, etc.) used in equity exceeding $6,000 is counted as a
Etrade or business (as defined in resource towards the allowable re804.1066 of Dart 404), nonbusiness source limit.
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for individuals receiving optional State
supplements); and
(3) Available to all individuals in the
^(2) Would be eligible for AFDC if
$e State's AFDC plan did not contain State; however, the plan may provide
eligibility requirements more restric- for variations in the income standard
ti?e than, or in addition to, those re- by political subdivision according to
cost-of-living differences.
aped under Title IV-A.
(b) The agency may cover any AFDC
optional group without covering all §435.231 IndiTiduals in institutions who
are eligible under a special income
such groups.
level.
(46 PR 47985, Sept. 30,19811
(a) If the agency provides Medicaid
under 1435.211 to individuals in instiOPTIONS FOR COVERAGE or THE AGED,
tutions who would be eligible for
BLIND, AND DISABLED
AFDC, SSI, or State supplements
I4&230 Individuals receiving only op- except for their institutional status, it
tional State supplements.
may also cover aged, blind, and dis(a) The agency may provide Medic- abled individuals in institutions who—
(1) Because of their income, would
aid, in one or more of the following
classifications, to individuals who re- not be eligible for SSI or State suppleceive only an optional State supple- ments if they were not institutionalment that meets the conditions speci- ized; but
fied in paragraph (b) of this section (2) Have income below a level speciand who would be eligible for SSI fied in the plan under § 435:722. (See
1435.1005 for limitations on FFP in
except for the level of their income:
Medicaid expenditures for individuals
(1) All aged individuals.
specified in this section.)
(2) All blind individuals.
(b) The agency may cover individ(3) All disabled individuals.
(4) Only aged individuals in domicili- uals under this section whether or not
ary facilities or other group living ar- the State pays optional supplements.
rangements as defined under SSI.
[43 FR 45204, 8ept. 29. 1978, as amended at
(5) Only blind individuals in domicil- 45
FR 248S4, Apr. 11,1980]
iary facilities or other group living arrangements as defined under SSI.
(6) Only disabled individuals in Subpart D—Optional Covorago of tho
Modicalty Noody
domiciliary facilities or other group
living arrangements as defined under §435.300 Scope,
881.
This subpart specifies the option for
(7) Individuals receiving a federally
administered optional State supple- coverage of medically needy individment that meets the conditions speci- uals.
fied in this section.
(8) Individuals in additional classifi- §435.301 General rules.
(a) A medicaid agency may provide
cations specified by the Secretary for
federally administered supplementary Medicaid to individuals specified in
this subpart who—
Payments under 20 CFR 416.2020(d).
(1) Either—
<b) Payments under the optional
(i) Have income that meets the apsupplement program must be—
(1) Based on need and paid in cash plicable standards in §{435.812
through 435.814; or
on a regular basis;
(ii) If their income is more than al(2) Equal to the difference between
the individual's countable income and lowed under those standards, have inthe income standard used to deter- curred medical expenses at least equal
mine eligibility for supplement. Count- 4*> the difference between their income
able income is income remaining after and the applicable income standard;
deductions required under SSI or, at and
8tate option, more liberal deductions
(2) Have resources that meet the apare made (see {435.1006 for limita- plicable standards in IS 435.840
tions on FFP in Medicaid expenditures through 435.843.
them under the State's AFDC plan);
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42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-90 Edition}

(d) Optional deductions. In determining the amount of the individual's
income to be used to reduce the agency's payment to the institution, the
-agency may deduct the following
amounts from the individual's total
income as determined under paragraph (e) of this section:
(1) Necessary medical or remedial
services included in the State's Medicaid plan for the medically needy,
which exceed limitations on amount,
duration or scope imposed by the
agency, subject to reasonable limits
the agency may establish on amounts
of these expenses;
(2) Necessary medical or remedial
care recognized under State law but
not covered under the State's Medicaid plan, subject to reasonable limits
the agency may establish on amounts
of these expenses; and
(3) For single individuals and couples, an amount (in addition to the
personal needs allowance) for maintenance of the individual's or couple's
home if—
(i) The amount is deducted for not
more than a 6-month period; and
(ii) A physician has certified that
either of the individuals is likely to
return to the home within that period.
(e) Determination of income—{I)
Option. In determining the amount of
an individual's income to be used to
reduce the agency's payment to the institution, the agency may use total
income received or it may project total
monthly income for a prospective
period not to exceed 6 months. f
(2) Basis for projection. The agency
must base the projection on income received in the preceding period, not to
exceed 6 months, and on income expected to be received.
(3) Adjustments. At the end of the
prospective period specified in paragraph (eXl) of this section, or when
any significant change occurs, the
agency must reconcile estimates with
income received.
(f) Determination of medical expenses—<l) Option. In determining the
amount of medical expenses to be deducted from an individual's income,
the agency may deduct incurred medical expenses, or it may project medical
expenses for a prospective period not
to exceed 6 months.

(2) Basis for projection. The agency
must base the estimate on medical ex*
penses incurred in the preceding
period, not to exceed 6 months, and
medical expenses expected to be incurred.
(3) Adjustments. At the end of the
prospective period specified in paragraph (fXl) of this section, or when
any significant change occurs, the
agency must reconcile estimates with
incurred medical expenses.
[45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980, as amended at
46 FR 47988, Sept 30, 1981; 48 FR 5735,
Feb. 8, 1983; 53 FR 3596, Feb. 8,1988; 53 FR
5344, Feb. 23,1988]
MEDICALLY NEEDY RESOURCE STANDARDS

§435.840 Medically needy resource standards: General requirements.

To determine eligibility of medically
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency
must use a resource standard under
this subpart that is—
(a) Based on family size;
(b) Uniform for all individuals in a
gr~' r ' zrA
(c) Reasonable. (Sec 5 435.841)
£46 FR 47988, Sept. 30, 1981; 46 FR 54734,
Nov. 11.19813
§435.841 Medically needy resource standards: Reasonableness.

(a) The agency must use a medically
needy resource standard that is reasonable, according to the provisions *>f
this section.
(b) The following medically needy
resource standards are presumed to be
reasonable:
(1) The agency provides one medically needy resource standard for all covered medically needy groups. Except
as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section, the standard must at least
equal the highest resource standard
used to determine eligibility in the
cash assistance programs related to
the covered medically needy groups.
(2) The agency provides a different
medicaUy needy resource standard for
each covered medically needy group.
Except as provided in paragraph (c) of
this section, the standard for each covered group must at least equal the
highest resoiuxe standard used to determine eligibility in the cash assist-
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ance program related to that covered
medically needy group.
(c) In the case of an agency that prowVides Medicaid for the aged, blind, or
disabled individuals only if they meet
more restrictive requirements than
tpsed under SSI, the following provisions apply:
(1) The agency may use a resource
standard for those individuals that is
lower than the standard specified in
paragraph (b) of this section.
J: <2) The lower standard must at least
equal the medically needy resource
Standard for those aged, blind, or disabled individuals under the State's
plan on January 1,1972.
^td) If the agency uses a medically
needy resource standard not specified
In: paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section—
1£{1) That standard is not presumed to
{^reasonable; and
*<2) HCPA must approve the standird.

determining eligibility under the
State's AFDC planned) For aged, blind, or disabled individuals in States covering all SSI recipients, deduct the value of resources
that would be deducted in determining
eligibility under SSI;
(e)(1) For aged, blind, or disabled individuals in States using requirements
more restrictive than SSI, deduct the
value of resources in an amount no
more restrictive than those deducted
under the Medicaid plan on January 1,
1972 and no more liberal than those
deducted in determining eligibility
under SSI.
(2) However, the amounts specified
in paragraph (eXl) of this section
must be the same as those that would
be deducted in determining, under
{ 435.121, the eligibility of the categorically needy; and
(f) Apply the resource standards established under § 435.843.

146 FR 47988. Sept 30, 1981; 46 FR 54743,
ttov. 11,1981]

£43 FR 45204, Sept 29, 1978, as amended at
45 FR 24886, Apr. 11, 1980; 46 FR 47989.
Sept. 30,19813

I 435£43 Medically needy resource standards: State plan requirements.

TREATMENT OF INCOME AND RESOURCES

(a) The State plan must specify the
"resource standard for each covered
medically needy group.
- (b) If the agency uses a resource
standard that is not presumed to be
reasonable under § 435.841, the State
plan must describe that standard.
t46 PR 47989, Sept 30,1981]
-¥

pETKRMIKING ELIGIBILITY ON THE BASIS
or RESOURCES

£435.845 Medically needy resource eligibility.
To determine eligibility on the basis
oi resources for medically needy individuals, the agency must—
(a) Consider only the individual's resources and those that are considered
available to him under the financial
responsibility requirements for relatives in (435.821, {435.822, or
i 435.823;
(b) Consider only resources available
during the peried-fcr which income is
computed under S 435.831(a);
~ (c) For individuals under age 21 and
caretaker relatives, deduct the value of
resources that would be deducted in

§435.850 Treatment of income and resources: General requirements.

To determine eligibility of medically
needy individuals, a Medicaid agency
must use a methodology for the treatment of income and resources that is—
(a) Uniform for all individuals in a
covered group; and
(b) Reasonable (see § 435.851).
[46 FR 47989, Sept 30,1981)
8435.851 Treatment of income and resources: Reasonableness.
(a) The agency must use a methodology for the treatment of income and
resources, to determine eligibility of
the medically needy, that is reasonable.
(b) The methodology used to determine eligibility of individuals in the
cash assistance program related to the
covered medically needy group is presumed to be reasonable.
(c) If the agency provides Medicaid
for the aged, blind, or disabled individuals who meet more restrictive requirements than used under SSI, the
methodology for the treatment of

yMt Car* financing Administration, HHS
QiUfforically needy means aged,
* £ or disable individuals or families
y children
E) Who are otherwise eligible for
b a k i and who meet the financial
pbOlty requirements for OAA,
fcCAB, APTD, or AABD; or,
k) Whose categorical eligibility is
Egted by statute (e.g., persons who
K i d increased OASDI payments.
C| 486.112).
•fcnOief and children refers to eligiLnanbers of families with children
b are financially eligible under
DC or medically needy rules and
bare deprived of parental support
Kant as defined under the AFDC
knm (see 45 CFR 233.90; 233.100).
[addition, this group includes indiptfc under age 21 who are not debed of parental support or care but
fco are financially eligible under
|DC or medically needy rules -Xsee
pooal coverage group, f 436.222);
**Uc": rztedv rr^ — ««•* *•*-!
tfabled individuals or families and
fcren who are otherwise eligible for
Paid, who are not categorically
ply and whose income and resources
§ within limits set under the MedicMtateplan.
MA means old age assistance under
p i of the Act;
mSDI means old age, survivors, and
Nfa&ity insurance under Title n of
fcAct

§436.112

6436.110 Individual recehring cash assistance.
(a) A Medicaid agency must provide
Medicaid to individuals receiving cash
assistance under OAA, AFDC, AB,
APTD, or AABD.
(b) For purposes of this section, an
individual is receiving cash assistance.
If his needs are considered in determining the amount of the payment.
This includes an individual whose
presence in the home is considered essential to the well-being of a recipient
under the State's plan for OAA,
AFDC. AB, APTD, or AABD if that
plan were as broad as allowed under
the Act for FFP.
6 438.111 Individual! who are not eligible
for cash assistance because of a requirement not applicable under Medicaid.
The agency must provide Medicaid
to individuals who would be eligible
for OAA, AFDC. AB, ATTD, cr AABD
except for an eligibility requirement
used in those programs that is specif ically prohibited under title XIX.
[47 FR 4364ft, Oct 1,1*82]
EDITORIAL NOTC Section 486.111 wss re-

vised at 47 FR 43646, Oct 1, 1*82. The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements
contained in this section are not effective
until OMB approval has been obtained.

9436.112 Individuals who would be eligible for cash assistance except for in|£R 45218, Sept 29,1978, u amended at
creased OASDI under Pub. L. 92-336
TO 24687. Apr. 11. 1980; 46 FR 47989,
(July 1,1972).
fL*Q. 1981]
The agency must provide Medicaid
|W0 State plan requirement*.
to individuals who meet the following
conditions:
I Bute plan must—
(a) In August 1972, the individual
jj> Provide that the requirements of
was entitled to OASDI and—
•Part are met; and
(1) He was receiving cash assistance;
jMSpedfy the groups to whom or
jfctid is provided, as specified in
(2) He would have been eligible for
touts B, C, and D of this part, and cash assistance if he had applied, and
^conditions of eligibility for Individ- the Medicaid plan covered this option•to those groups.
al group; or
(3) He would have been eligible for
j*MI ft—Mandatory Coverage of
cash assistance if he were not in a
the Categorically Noody
medical institution or intermediate
care facility, and the Medicaid plan
jj^lO Scope.
covered this optional group.
™» subpart prescribes require(b) The individual would currently
J5* for coverage of categorically be eligible for cash assistance except
FJ individuals.
that the increase in OASDI under
i
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HEALTH CARE FINANCING, POLICY AND PLANNING
i-9. Nursing Facility Preadmission/Continued
ay Review and Level of Care Criteria.
>-10. Pharmacy Policy.
K11. Podiatry Services.
WLlx. Dental Services.
-12. Medical Supplies Durable Medical Equipat — Prosthetics.
>-13. Psychology Services.
>-13x. Section V of all Medicaid Provider Man"Provider Compliance".
>-14. Home Health Services.
^14A. Hospice Care.
>-15. Patients Personal Needs Fund.
-16. Preadmission and Continued Stay Review
^Policy and Procedures Manual.
-17. Policy on Use of Oxygen Concentrators.
-18. Medicaid Payment Reductions.
-19. Percent of Mean Upper Limit for Medicaid
bursement
-19A. Coverage for Dialysis Services by a Freetiding State Licensed Dialysis Facility.
>-20. Dental Service.
K20B. Dental, Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons.
K20X. Rule Exempting from 10% Rule.
K21. Physical Therapy.
K22. Administrative Sanction Procedures and
ations.
K23. Provider Compliance with Medicaid Policy
Procedures.
^24. Policy concerning the timeframe in which
ledicaid claims must be submitted for payment.
-25. Mental Health Clinic Services.
K25X. Policy concerning the timeframe in which
iicaid claims must be submitted for payment.
i-26. Implenif
a w Maintenance °f the
lealth Care Financing Administration Common
dure Coding System (HCPCS).
^27. Medicare Nursing Home Certification.
K28. Record Keeping and Disclosure for Medicaid Providers.
K29. Recipient Review/Education and Restricffibn Policy.
"~~ 30. Bureau of Facility Management Policy and
dures Manual Part B, Hospital Preadmission
Continued Stay Review.
31. Inpatient Psychiatric Services for Individi Under Age 21 in Psychiatric Facilities or ProSix. Hospital Utilization Review.
32. Hospital Record-keeping Policy.
Targeted Case Management Services.
3A. Targeted Case Management For The
^Chronically Mentally 111.
34. Record-Keeping and Physician Order Requirements for Ancillary Services.
35. Naturopathic Services Not a Medicaid Benefit
36. Bureau of Facility Management Policy and
dures Manual.
Personal Care Service.
39. Home and Community-Based Services
tWaiver.
39x. Day Treatment Rate.
Nursing Service.
41. Increase in Fees for dental, kidney dialysis,
iical transportation, nurse midwife, physical
|therapy, rural health clinics, speech and hearing,
don, home health agency, ambulatory surgical
" outpatient hospital.
42. Limitations on Scope of Service for Inpaat Hospitals and Outpatient Hospitals and Limit-on Scope, of Service for Psyaician Services.

R455-1-5

R455-45. Personal Supervision.
R455-48. Out-of-State Services.

R455-1. State Plan Under Title XIX of
the Social Security Act Medical Assistance Program of Utah.
R455-1R455-1- 2. Section 1: Single State Agency Organization.
R455-1- 3 to R455-1-9.
R455-1- 10. Section 2: Coverage and Eligibility.
R455-1- 11 to R455-1-31.
R455-1- 32. Section 4: General Program Administration.
R455-1- 33 to R455-1-79.
R455-1- 80. Section 5: Personnel Administration.
R455-1- 82
R455-1- 83. Section 6: Financial Administration.
R455-1- 84
R455-1- 85
R455-1- 86. Section 7: General Provisions.
R455-1- 87
R455-1- 88
R455-1-1
As a condition for receipt of Federal funds under
title XIX of the Social Security Act, the UTAH
STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (single State
agency) submits the following State plan for the medical assistance program, and hereby agrees to administer the program in accordance with the provisions of
this State plan, the requirements of titles XI and XIX
of the Act, and all applicable Fe^OT*~! ~»£"i«fi«nq and
other official issuances of the Department.
R455-1-2. Section 1: Single State Agency Organization.
1.1 Designation and Authority
(a) The UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH is the single State Agency designated to
administer or supervise the administration of the
Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social Security Act. (All references in this plan to "the Medicaid
agency" mean the agency named in this paragraph).
Attachment 1.1A is a certification signed by the
State Attorney General identifying the single State
agency and citing the legal authority under which it
administers or supervises administration of the program.
R455-1-3
1.1(b) The State agency that administered or supervised the administration of the plan approved under
title X of the Act as of January 1, 1965, has been
separately designated to administer or supervise the
administration of that part of this plan which relates
to blind individuals.
X Not applicable. The entire plan under title XIX is
administered or supervised by the State agency
named in paragraph 1.1(a).
R455-1-4
1.1(c) Waivers of the single State agency requirement which are currently operative have been
granted under authority of the Intergovernmental
Cooperation Act of 1968.
X Not applicable. No waivers have ever been
granted.
R455-1-5
l.Kd)

K455-1-6

HEALTH

X Determinations of eligibility for Medicaid under
this plan are made by the agencydes) specified in
Attachment 2.2A. There is a written agreement between the agency named in paragraph 1.1(a) and
other agencyftes) making such determinations for
specific groups covered under this plan. The agreement defines the relationships and respective responsibilities of the agencies.
R455-1-6
1.1(e) All other provisions of this plan are administered by the Medicaid agency except for those functions for which final authority has been granted to a
Professional Standards Review Organization under
title XI of the Act.
(f) All other requirements of 42 CFR 431.10 are
met.
R455-1-7
1.2 Organization for Administration
(a) Attachment 1.2A contains a description of the
organization and functions of the Medicaid agency
and organization chart of the agency.
(b) Within the State agency, the DIVISION OF
HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND STANDARDS
has been designated as the medical assistance unit.
Attachment 1.2B contains a description of the organization and functions of the medical assistance unit
and an organization chart of the unit
(c) Attachment 1.2C contains a description of the
kinds and numbers of professional medical personnel
and supporting staff used in the administration of the
plan and their responsibilities
(d) Eligibility determinations are made by State or
local staff of an agency other than the agency named
m paragraph 1.1(a). Attachment 1.2D contains a description of the staff designated to make such determination and the functions they will perform.
R455-1-8
1.3 Statewide Operation
The plan m in operation on a Statewide basis in
accordance with all requirements of 42 CFR 431.50.
X The plan is state administered.
R455-1-9
1.4 State Medical Care Advisory Committee
There is an advisory committee to the Medicaid
agency director on health and medical care services
established m accordance with and meeting all the
requirements of 42 CFR 431.12.
R455-1-10. Section 2: Coverage and Eligibility.
2.1 Application, Determination of Eligibility and
Furnishing Medicaid
(a) The^Medicaid agency meets all requirements of
42 CFR Part 435, Subpart J for processing applications, determining eligibility and furnishing Medicaid.
R455-M1
2.1(b) Individuals are entitled to Medicaid services
under the plan during the three months preceding
the month of application, if they were, or on application would have been, eligible. The effective date of
prospective and retroactive eligibility is specified in
Attachment 2.6A.
2.1(c) The Medicaid agency elects to enter into a
risk contract with an HMO that is
X Not Federally qualified, but meets the requirements of 42 CFR 434.20(c) and is defined in Attach—nt 2.1A.

R455-M2
2.2 Coverage and Conditions of Eligibility
Medicaid is available to groups specified in'AtEaSS
ment 2.2A.
X Both categorically needy and medically Jae&Hl
The conditions of eligibility that must be nietira
specified in Attachment 2.6A.
All applicable requirements of 42 CFR Part 4 3 5 ^
met.
R455-M3
2.3 Residence
Medicaid is furnished to eligible individuals ^Sm
are residents of the State under 42 CFR 435.4(ifS
R455-M4
2.4 Blindness
(a) The definition of blindness in terms of ophtKaE
mic measurement used in this plan is specifie^m!
Attachment 2.6A.
(b) All other requirements of 42 CFR 435.WG33T
42 CFR 435.531 are met.
R455-M5
2.5 Disability
(a) The definition of disability that is used InwtKiF
plan is specified in Attachment 2.6A.
(b) All other requirements of 42 CFR 435.540USd"
435.541 are met.
R455-M6
2.6 Financial Eligibility
(a) Categorically needy
n\ w,n. aspect to AFDC-related families and^in?
dividuals under age 21 (not otherwise eligible ^nde£
this plan), the financial ehgibility conditions "of tfie*
State's approved AFDC plan apply.
^"
(2) With respect to aged, blind and disabled i n ^
viduals, the financial ehgibility conditions describe^
in Attachment 2.6A apply.
(3) All requirements of 42 CFR Part 435; Subparts:
G and H are met with respect to the famihes~imaj
individuals to whom the requirements apply.
R455-M7
2.6(b) Medically needy
All requirements of 42 CFR Part 435, SubpartsjGjl
and I are met with respect to the families and inc^vm^
uals to whom the requirements apply. The level-gj
income and resources, expressed in total doUajSj
amounts, that are used as a basis for establishing^
eligibility under the plan are as described in Attocn^^
ment 2.6A.
R455-M8
2.7 Medicaid Furnished out of State
^
Medicaid is furnished under the conditions 'spSS^
fied in 42 CFR 431.52 to an eligible individual wh%1||
a resident of the State while the individual is iri**JJgj
other state, to the same extent that Medicaid iflTuJal
nished to residents in the State.
R455-M9
3.1 Amount, Duration and Scope of Services'5SB]
(a) Medicaid is provided in accordance with thejrejj
quirements of 42 CFR Part 440, Subpart B . > * Q H
(1XD Each item of service listed in section &ffl§3
(a)(1) through (5) of the Act, as defined in 42 CEBl
Part 440, Subpart A is provided for the categoricaUy|
needy.
(ii) Nurse-midwife services listed in secaana
1905(aX17) of the Act, as defined in 42 CFR 4 4 0 i f 2 |
are provided for the categorically needy to the e x t » | g

R810-303-375

5. Subtract medical insurance premiums and payments for medical services, see section 309.32.
6. If the client is a resident of a nursing home, the
client must pay the rest of the income to the nursing
home. If the client is a resident of another kind of
medical institution, the client must spend down to
the district office.
R810-303-375. Changes In Circumstances — Residents of Medical Institutions.
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institution. See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a
medical institution.
375.1 Client Responsibility
The client is responsible to report within 10 days
any change in income or circumstances which may
affect eligibility.
375.2 Date of Income Change
Consider the date of receipt of income as the date of
change.
R810-303-377. Residents of Medical Institutions
and Veteran's Administration (VA) Benefits.
A VA benefit recipient may be eligible for increased benefits when they enter a medical institution. These increased benefits are called Aid and Attendance. Also, potential VA recipients may become
eligible for VA benefits when they enter a medical
institution. Potential recipients include a veteran, or
the spouse, parent, or child of a veteran.
When you identify a recipient or potential recipient
who has enteicJ a medical institution, take one of
these actions:
1. Notify ORS.
2. If the client or his family wishes to apply directly to the VA, they may do so. Notify ORS.
3. If the OCO worker wishes to apply directly with
the VA, you may do so. Notify ORS.
To notify ORS, use VA Form 21-8416a (Request for
Information Concerning Unreimbursed Family Medical Expenses). This form is the minimum that you
must send to ORS. If you have more information or a
copy of the complete application, send it too. Send the
form as soon as possible after application. The VA
will pay only from the date this form is received by
them.
If the client is in a nursing home, tell the nursing
home operator to immediately report any increased
benefits. Control for the increased benefits on Form
62 or Form 69.
If you have any questions about application for increased veteran's benefits, you may call the ORS Veteran's Benefits Coordinator at 538-4534.
377.1 Treatment of Lump Sum VA Benefits
Break any lump sum payment into Aid and Attendance and regular pension.
1. Tell ORS of the Aid and Attendance amount.
ORS will collect any Aid and Attendance for the time
period that the client recieved Medicaid.
2. Consider the remainder of a VA lump sum payment as income in the month received. If the client is
a resident of a nursing home and it is too late to be
correctly reflected on the APA file, use the Form
417A to notify the nursing home and HCF.
1989
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R810-304. Medicaid: Asset Standards.
R810-304-400.
R810-304-403.
R810-304-405.
R810-304-407.
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Asset Standards.
Asset Limits.
Real Property.
Personal Property.

R810-304-409. Availability of Assets.
R810-304-411. Exempt Assets.
R810-304-419. When to Deem Assets.
R810-304-421. Lump Sum Payments — All Cases.
R810-304-425. Income Producing Property.
R810-304-431. Transfer of Excess Assets.
R810-304-441. Third Party Liability (TPL) —. All
Cases.
R810-304-443. Eligible Aliens and Counting The Assets of Sponsors — All Cases.
R810-304-461. Whose Assets to Count — Clients
Who Are Not Residents of Medical Institutions.
R810-304-465. Whose Assets to Count — Clients,
Who Are Residents of Medical Institutions.
R810-304-400. Asset Standards.
1. This section describes asset41 standards for all)
Medicaid clients.
2. An Asset is available when the client owns it, or1
has the legal right to sell it or dispose of it for his own
benefit. (See Sec. 409.)
3. The assets of a ward controlled by a legal guardian are available to the ward. This is true even if the
ward is not living with the guardian. If the asset is a
trust, follow the rules on trusts. (See Sec. 409.6.)
4. Do not count money as an asset in the same
month it is counted as income.
R810-304-403. Asset Limits.
Base asset levels on the same number of persons
included in the Basic Maintenance Standard (BMS):
Number In BMS
1 person BMS
2 person BMS
Each additional person in
the BMS

Asset Level
$2,000
$3,000
add $25

Use section 329 to set the number of persons in the
BMS.
Close the case or deny the application when the
countable value of all assets is more than the asset"
limits.
403.1 The Value of Assets
Judge assets by their equity value. An exception is
made for vehicles in A, B and D cases. (See Sec
411-5.)
1. Equity value is the current market value less
any debts owing on the asset.
2. Current market value is the item's selling price
on the open market as 6et by current standards of
appraisal.
Assets: Any real or personal property that has
money value. (See Sec. 405 and 407)
403.11 F and C Cases
For both applications and open cases, if asset levels
are met at any time in a month, they are met for the
entire month.
403.12 A,B, and D Cases
For both applicants and open cases, use assets held
on the first moment of a calendar month to computeeligibility for that month. The case is ineligible for
the entire month if countable assets exceed limits on
the first moment of the month.
1. However, when the asset level is exceeded and a
checking account is part of it, look at checks written
prior to the first moment of the month which had not
cleared as of the first moment.
2. Do not count such checks in the asset computation.
Subtract these checks from the checking balance.
403.2 SSI Recipient
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An SSI recipient must meet Medicaid asset limits.
When these limits are exceeded, close the case or
deny the application.
£1403.3 Deeming of Parental Assets to D and B Children
tjWhen a D or B unemancipated child is a Medicaid
recipient and lives with his parents, count his parents' assets. It does not matter whether either parent
ineligible. In this situation, follow the rules below.
I 1. Apply all asset exclusions of the D or B program
to the parent's assets.
r 2. From the value of the parent's countable assets,
deduct the one person $1,900 or two person $2,850
asset limit depending on whether there are 1 or 2
parents in the home. Do not allow the $25.00 exemption for each additional household member.
* 3. When more than one child is D or B, divide the
parents' countable assets equally between each eligibly child.
^ 4 . Allow each eligible B or D child the $1,900 limit
-~- .total countahle assets.
.le:
Blakes have five children living at home. Tom
17) and Tim (age 16) are SSI recipients. Neither
nor Tim have any assets of his own. Mr. and
Blake have a $5,000.00 savings account. Of this
$£g50.00 is exempt as a parental asset exclusion.
TKs leaves a countable asset of $2,150.00 ($5,000.00
B? $2,850.00 = $2,150.00). Of this $1,075.00 is
deemed to each eligible D or B child ($2,150.00 divided by 2 equals $1,075.00). In this example neither
cfiBcfa assets exceed $1,900.00. Both are eligibile
blsed'on their assets.
(gtt£ •
R810-304-405. Real Property.
j^Real property includes itemsjvhich may be fixed or
permanent, such as land^ houses, buildings, and
trailer homes.
R810-304-407. Personal Property.
Kgeraonal property is an item other than real property.^ Some examples are:
Kl^Liquid assets such as savings and checking accounts, stocks, water stock, bonds, mutual fund
Sfi&es. promissory notes, mortgages, insurance poli|rust funds, and agreements in escrow.
Idtor vehicles, including automobiles, trucks,
:es, snowmobiles, etc.
its,' campers and trailers.
Implements, instruments, and tools.
Ivestock.
^Merchandise and inventory.
TTTime shares and time share agreements.
liquid Assets: Assets in cash or payable in cash on
oemaiuL
HfllO-304-409. Availability of Assets.
R*09.1 Joint Accounts
jjjtf*When an account is jointly held by a client and
ggniebne who is not eligible, count all the funds as an
wsf.fbr the client if he can legally withdraw funds
famtthe account If more than one of the account
KE^ers.is eligible, divide the funds equally among
\ client cJaims that the asset does not belong to
~ow him to refute it. He can refute it by providithinga:
atement about the ownership of the funds,
atement should include the reason the joint
•was set up and who made the deposits to and
awals from the account, and
statements from the other account

R810-304-409

If the asset belongs to someone else, the money
must be removed or access must be restricted. If this
is not done, count all the funds as an asset for the
entire time access was not restricted. If access is restricted, do not count the asset back through the entire period the client is able to refute his ownership.
Example: In October you discover Mr. Jones had a
savings account in his name and that of his father.
Mr. Jones has been a joint owner of this account since
January when first started receiving assistance. He
proves that all deposits and withdrawals have been
made by his father and are his father's money. Mr.
Jones has his name removed from the account in October. Exempt the asset back to January.
2. When the assets of an A, B, or D SSI recipient
are combined with those of an F or C family unit,
such as in a savings account, decide the portion of the
asset available to the F or C household as follows:
a. If the asset is jointly owned, divide the value
equally among the owners.
Account: A contract of deposit of funds between depositors and a financial institution. This includes
checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit,
share accounts, etc.
b. If you can identify exempt funds, such as a lump
sum SSI payment which is exempt for 6 months after
receipt, do not count them until after the exempt period has expired.
409.2 Joint Ownership of Assets
If property is owned by more than one person, determine the client's share. Plural ownership can exist
in different forms.
In Utah these are:
1. Joint-tenancy.
2. Tenancy-in-common.
3. Not speci**** ^ ^ property is sirrtDly recorded in
the names of 2 or more persons. Ownership is tenancy-in-common unless stated to be otherwise.
In all 3 cases, each owner has the legal right to sell
only his share of the property. Unless there is a condition of ownership specifically prohibiting sale of any
part of the asset without permission of the other
owners, the client's share is an available asset. If
there is such a condition, see Sec. 409.3.
However, when other owners refuse to sell the
property, the fair market value of the client's share
may be reduced. In such a case, allow the client to
refute the determination of his equity by providing a
statement from a knowledgeable source documenting
the fair market value of the client's share based on
the particular circumstances of the case.
The laws on plural ownership may differ for property located in other states. If you have a case with
property in another state under plural ownership,
contact the State APA Office.
409.3 When Legal Factors Hinder Making an Asset Available
1. If legal factors hinder making the asset available, it is exempt until it can be made available. (See
2 below). For example, a condition of ownership may
prohibit selling the asset without the consent of both
parties. In this case, the asset is exempt until the
condition of ownership is changed or both parties consent to the sale.
2. If an asset is not legally available but can be
made available by client action, the client must take
steps to make it available. There are 2 exceptions.
These are:
a. It is doubtful that reasonable actions will succeed. This should be confirmed by a knowledgeable
source, such as a lawyer or financial institution.
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b. The likely cost of making the asset available
exceeds its value.
If2a or 2d applies, explain this ia the case 2<tgead
do not count the asset. Otherwise, require the client
to take all reasonable steps to make the asset available. The asset is exempt while these steps are being
taken.
For applicants, such steps must begin before the
application is approved. For ongoing cases, such steps
must begin before any more assistance is issued, provided 10 day notice can be given. If such steps are not
taken, or if the client does not follow through with
the process, close or deny the case.
409.4 Transfer of Title
1. Vehicles — including motor vehicles, trailers,
etc.
Unless you have reason to question ownership of a
vehicle, accept the bill of sale or other legal document
as proof of ownership. When questioning ownership,
remember that until the Department of Motor Vehicles issues a new certificate of registration and certificate of ownership, the transfer of title is incomplete.
If transfer is incomplete, legal ownership is retained by the original owner and the vehicle is available to him alone, and not to the new owner.
If transfer is complete, legal ownership is with the
new owner.
2. All Other Property with a Title Document.
When the client states property has been sold, but
the title document has not been transferred, contact
the State APA Office to determine the availability of
the property. Send all document: re!*»<~3 {? the property and the transfer. Be sure to include any conditions attached to the transfer.
If the State APA Office determines that the asset is
not available because title has not been transferred,
follow the rules in Sec. 409.3.
409.5 Divorce Decrees
Review divorce decrees on a case-by-case basis.
1. Before a divorce is final:
The filing of a divorce petition does not change the
ownership or availability of assets unless there is a
court order specifically dealing with the assets. Unless there is such a court order, base availability on
the ownership prior to the filing of the divorce petition.
If there is a question of an asset's availability after
viewing the court order, contact the State APA Office.
2. After a divorce is final:
a. When there is no title document, a divorce decree can transfer legal title of personal property. But
be sure to check for conditions attached to the transfer: liens, conditions conc^rninjr remarriage, etc.
These conditions may restrict the sale of the asset. If
so, see Sec. 409.2-2.
b. In cases of property where there is a title document, be sure the title has been transferred. Again,
be sure to check for conditions attached to the transfer. If title has not been transferred, see Sec. 409.4.
409.6 Trusts
The rules which follow are guidelines to help you
determine the availability of trust funds. Sometimes
you will have to get more information or a legal opinion about trust funds. This can occur even when you
have complete documentation. In these cases, be sure
to send a copy of the trust agreement to the State
APA Office for a decision about the availability of the
trust.
409.61 Definitions
1. Trust: A right of property held by one party for
another.
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2. T ^ t e e : The person who holds the legal title to
property for the benefit or use of another.
*?• beneficiary: The person for whose benefit theIf
trust i$ created. Although this person does not hold
legal title, he does have an ownership interest, srfe
The beneficiary can receive money from the trust
directly 0 r through the trustee.
409.^2 Availability to the Trustee
1. The entire trust is available as an asset if thei
client i 8 the trustee and has the legal ability to:
a. Revoke the trust, and
b. Use the money for his own benefit.
2- The entire trust is available if:
a. The trust was created by the client or his spouse,-2
and
-*q
D
- The client or his spouse has the right to dissolve'3
the tr\ist, and
" •
can use the money for his own benefit. vl ^j
3. In all other cases, the trust is not available tbl
the trustee.
* )
409.^3 Availability to the Beneficiary — All Cases*!
If th e client is the beneficiary and access to tkie^
trust i% n o t restricted, the full value of the trust is an1
available asset. If access is restricted, see 409.64 and*i
409.65 below.
"£
409.^4 Trusts Set Up for Purposes Other Than to*
Qualify for Medicaid — Created by the Client or Hist
Sjpwa* — All Cases
_
1- Wjth the exception of burial trusts, these rules^
a
PPly to all trusts, including irrevocable trusts. _
2
- Potential payments in the budget month from,
tne u'Hst are an available asset if the client or his *
spouse set up the trust. The value of the asset is the ;
mazim\2iQ amount that the trustee ^»*i disburse toi.
the cli^nt when exercising his full discretion under \
the terxns of the trust. It does not matter whether^
disbursement is actually made. The potential dis-"3
bursen>ent can include both income and principle of
the tri^st.
409.^5 Trusts Set Up for Purposes Other Than to
Qualify for Medicaid — Created by Someone Other
Than the Client or His Spouse
For A , B, and D Cases
T
If the client's access to the trust principle is re?
stricter*, the principle is not an available asset. Thik*
is true even when the trust:
^j
1- C^n be revoked by someone other than the bene?
ficiary, ^ d
^'*2. Provides a regular payment from the principle
to the beneficiary.
Payments made to the client from the trust are
income.
For £ and C Cases
The Principle is an available asset if there is access
to the principle to meet the needs of a household*
member> it does not matter if access is restricted. If
the onfy w a y to access the trust is by approval of the'
court, i-equire the client to petition the court to re-u
lease th.e funds in the trust. Follow the procedures inj
Sec. 4O9.3.
^
Wheii disbursement is limited to specific and lim-j
ited needs or the principle cannot be invaded, the!
trust n\ay ^ t be available. (See 409.68.)
^Z
For example, when disbursement of funds of a trust)
setupfVom an insurance settlement is legally limitedi
to payn ien t 0 f medical bills arising from an accident,
the tru^t is not available. However, forward informal
tion ab<)ut the trust to ORS. In this case, there is TPLl
coverage ORS must pursue.
409.66 Trusts Set Up for the Purpose of Qualifying
for Meqicaid
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When it appears that a trust has been established
to allow the beneficiary to qualify for Medicaid, submit the trust document and all other pertinent information to the State APA Office for a decision on the
availability of the trust
e Restricted Access: Only the court or the trustee,
*bo is not the beneficiary, or the beneficiary's spouse
or* parent, can invade the principle of the trust.
b 409.67 Trusts Set Up to Pay For Medical Expenses
Related to Organ Transplants
Send a copy of all trust set up to pay expenses refated to organ transplants to the State APA Office for
r decision regarding the availability of the trust.
: 409.68 When Availability is Not Clear
' When you cannot determine whether all or part of
a trust is available, submit it and all other pertinent
locuments to the State APA Office for a decision.
R810-304-411. Exempt Assets.
&*-Allow the following exemptions for medical assistance cases other than Indigent Medical cases. See
Section 807 for exemptions specific to Indigent MediSafcases. If an asset is not treated in that section, use
& # F or C policy.
ill One Home and Lot — All Cases
Exclude one home, including a mobile home, and
lot owned or being purchased and occupied by the
:Bent
a. F and C Cases — The lot on which the home
stands shall not exceed the average size of residential
lots in the community where it is. Count the equity
rafiie of property exceeding an average size lot.
^bv A, B and D Cases — Exempt the home and all
Contiguous property.
/Exempt a life estate in a home if the owner of the
life estate continues^to live in the home.
*2. One Home and Lot of a Person Who is A Resilent of a Medical Institution — All Cases
| When a person who owns a home, or life estate in a
Some, becomes a resident of a medical institution, the
tame or life estate becomes countable unless:
^a. The person's stay in the medical institution will
ie short term. A stay is short term if a doctor says
|5t*the client is likely to return home within 6
nonths of admission. Anyone in a medical institution
nore than 6 months after admission is long term, or
Ok The person states that he intends to return
aometlt does not matter whether the person actually
returns home within 6 months. There is no time limit
Sfthis exemption. The' statement of intent must be in
Jpting from the client or his representative, or
r d T h e person has a spouse, dependent child, or relieve* who lives in the home.
x"3. Water Rights — All Cases
^Exclude water rights attached to a house and lot.
».Relative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter,
stepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, stepBother, stepfather, half-sister, half-brother, niece,
aephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sister^ brother, stepbrother, or stepsister
iM^Household Goods and Personal Effects
fe&and C Cases
|TExclude the contents of the home that are essential
fc^daily living. However, individual items with an
lajue over $1,000 must be counted against the asset
&uB, and D Cases
Exclude household gooas ana personal eifects only
M h e extent they do not exceed $2,000.
|&$In developing this $2,000 limit, if there are no
nnffk items with a value (as can be currently sold) of
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$500 or more, then do not consider the $2,000 exempt
amount to be exceeded.
b. If there are single items with a value of $500 or
more, then consider all other household goods and
personal effects to have a value of $1,000. Add the
single item(s) of $500 or greater value to $1,000, and
then count the amount in excess of $2,000 towards
the household's asset level.
5. Vehicles
F and C Cases — Exclude the equity value up to
$1,500 of one car or other motor vehicle used to provide transportation for the assistance unit. Count any
equity value in excess of this amount towards the
household's asset limitation.
A, B, and D Cases — Exclude one vehicle, regardless of value if:
a. It is necessary for employment; or
b. It is used at least four times per calendar year
for obtaining medical treatment; or
c. It is modified for use by a handicapped person.
d. It is needed due to climate, terrain, distance or
other such factors to provide transportation for essential daily activities.
If no vehicle is excludable for one of the above reasons, one vehicle may be exempt if its fair market
value does not exceed $4,500. If its fair market value
exceeds $4,500, then count the amount in excess towards the asset limit.
Count the equity value of all other vehicles towards
asset limits.
6. Irrevocable Burial Trust — All Cases
a. Exempt the value of an irrevocable burial trust
fund such as a pre-arranged funeral plan.
b. Additionally, only the value of an irrevocable
burial trust is used to reduce the burial/funeral fund
exemption (see Sec. 411, (9)).
7. Life Insurance
A, B, and D Cases
a. Whole life insurance policies are exempt if the
total face value of all such policies does not exceed
$1,500 per individual. If their total face value exceeds
$1500 for any individual, count the cash value of all
that individual's policies against the asset limit. Up
to $1,500 of the cash value can be exempt if it is used
as a burial/funeral fund (See 411-9 below). Term insurance policies have no cash value, are not resources, and are not used in any way in determining
countable assets.
b. Whole life insurance which is exempt must be
deducted from the exemption level of burial/funeral
funds (see Sec. 411, (9)).
Note: The cash value shown on the insurance policy
table includes some interest. Often the interest paid
on the cash value is greater than that used to compute the table. Therefore, the table may not show the
true cash value. This is especially likely in cases of
policies that have been held for a long time. When
there is countable cash value that, combined with
other assets, puts the assets close to the limit, you
should obtain a current statement of the cash value.
F and C Cases
Count the cash value of life insurance policies.
8. Burial Spaces — All Cases
a. Exempt burial spaces and any items related to
repositories used for the remains of the deceased, for
any member of the client's immediate family. This
includes caskets, concrete vaults, crypts, urns, grave
markers, etc Also, if a client owns a grave site, the
value of which includes opening and closing, the
value of these services is also excluded.
b. A burial contract or funeral plan may include
many of the items exempted in this section. However,
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these types of contracts are merely promising these
items when needed (a plot, a casket, a marker, etc.)
and are considered to be a part of the contract or plan.
Tliey are not evaluated separately. They are considered for exemption under Section 411, (9).
9. Burial/Funeral Fund — All Cases
Allow a $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption for
each eligible household member. Compute this burial
or funeral fund exemption as follows:
a. First, subtract the value of any irrevocable burial trust from the $1,500 burial or funeral fund exemption. If the irrevocable burial trust is valued at
$1,500 or more, it will reduce the burial or funeral
fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go
on to steps b. and c. The amount of the irrevocable
burial trust which exceeds $1,500 is not counted as an
asset.
b. Second, for A, B and D categories only, reduce
the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption by
the total face value of any exempt whole life insurance policies. If the face value of these policies exceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption, it will reduce the burial or funeral fund exemption to zero. If that is the case, do not go on to step c.
The amount of face value which exceeds the remaining burial or funeral fund exemption level is not
counted as an asset. This step does not apply to F and
C categories as life insurance is already counted.
c. If after subtracting the value of the irrevocable
burial trusts and face value of exempt whole life insurance policies there is still a balance in the burial
or funeral fund exemption, reduce tne remaining exemption level by the cash value of any burial contract, funeral plan, and/or funds set aside for burial.
d. In A, B, and D cases only, subtract the cash
value of non-exempt life insurance policies.
e. If these reductions result in an exemption
greater than $1,500 then the difference is to be added
to the other countable assets.
(1) Any interest which is accrued on an exempt
burial contract, funeral plan, or on funds set aside for
burial are exempt from consideration as an asset or
as income.
Funds set aside for burial: funds which are separately identified and not commingled with other
funds. They must be clearly designated so that an
outside observer can see that these funds are specifically for the client's burial expense.
(2) If a person ever removes the principle or interest from an exempt burial contract, funeral plan,
funds set aside for burial, or a life insurance policy
and uses the money for a purpose other than for their
burial expenses, the amount withdrawn from the account must be counted as income. The amount remaining in the fund is still exempt.
If a client has a previously unreported resource
which he claims is to be used for burial:
(a) and the resource is clearly designated as being
for burial, evaluate it for exemption back to when it
was either designated or intended for burial. However, the date cannot be before November 1,1982 and
cannot be any earlier than 2 years prior to the date of
application.
(b) and if the case is A, B, or D case and the resource is not clearly designated as being for burial, it
can be designated for burial retroactively back to the
first day of the month the client intended to set it
aside for burial. However, the date cannot be before
November 1, 1982 and cannot be any earlier than 2
years prior to the date of application.
10. Land or Accounts Held in Trust — All Cases
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Exclude ownership of beneficial interest in any
land or account which is held in trust by the United
States, a state/or in a tribal account
11. Per Capita Tribal Payments
Exlude all per capita payments or any asset purchased with per capita payments made to a tribal
member by the Secretary of the Interior or the tribe.
12. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act — All
Cases
Exclude shares received as payment under the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (Public Law
92-203).
13. Income Producing Property — A 3 , and D
Cases
Exclude income producing property from assets
when the individual's equity in the property does not
exceed $6,000 and the property produces a net annual
return of at least 6 percent of the equity. Count any
equity value in excess of $6,000 only if the 6 percent
net «nn»«l return* is met. If it is not then count the
entire equity amount.
Net annual return: The income produced after
subtracting mortgage payments or other payments
necessary to generate income.
14. Retroactive Social Security Benefits — All
Cases
Exempt lump sum retroactive benefits received
from the Social Security Administration (SSA and
SSI) for 6 months after the month of receipt.
15. Student Benefits
All Cases
Do not count monies from certain sources to undergraduate students as assets. These sources include:
a. Educational loans, grants or scholarships that
have funds guaranteed by the U.S Commissioner of
Education, including:
— Pell Grants (Formerly BEOG)
— Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant
(SEOG)
— National Direct Student Loans (NDSL)
— Guaranteed Student Loans
— State Student Incentive Grants (SSIG)
b. Payments to participants of a service learning
program, such as College Work Study or University
Year for Action (UYA).
A, B, and D Cases
Count any monies which remain after the school
period covered from an educational grant, loan, or
scholarship as an asset.
16. Pension Funds — A, B and D Cases
Do not count money held in a retirement fund under a plan administered by an employer or union, an
individual retirement account (IRA), or Keogh account owned by a spouse or parent ineligible for A, B,
or D medical.
a. Count as an asset any available money withdrawn from the pension starting the month after it is
withdrawn.
17. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) — All
Cases
Do not count any asset, or the interest from the
asset, which is held within the rules of the Uniform
Gift to Minor's Act (UGMA). Count any money from
the asset given to the child as unearned income.
Uniform Gift to Minors Act: An irrevocable gift of
money or property to a child under the age of 21. The
gift can be made to only one child, with only one
custodian. The gift is verified on a specific form which
includes a statement that the custodian holds the asset for the child under the Utah UGMA rules.
18. Cash Payments Given to Help Pay for Medical
or Social Services.
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7 For A, B, and D Medicaid, exclude cash payments
from federal, state, or local government programs if
the purpose of the payment is so the client can pay for
medical or social services. This includes payments for
^vocational rehabilitation. Exclude these payments
only for one calendar month following receipt. Do not
confuse this exemption with reimbursements for
medical or social services; money received as reimbursement must be counted as a resource the first
month following receipt.
R810-304-419. When to Deem Assets.
^Spouses have a legal responsibility to financially
support one another. Parents have a legal responsibility to financially support their children until they
are emancipated*. Because of this legal responsibility, assets from a spouse or parent are counted as
available to the eligible spouse or child. This process
is called deeming. Because the asset is available, include it in the countable assets.
419.1 Non-Nursing Home Cases
t£_Deem only from spouse to spouse or parent to unemancipated child. Deem only among people who live
together.
^419.12 F and C Cases
^, Do not deem from a parent or spouse who gets SSI.
^419.2 Clients Who Are Residents of Medical Institutions
%. Do not deem to a resident of a medical institution.
However, there may be persons in medical institutions who are not treated as medical institution cases.
Jhese cases will be set up using policy for clients who
aire* not residents of medical institutions: deeming
may apply. Examples are:
£\1. F or C Cases — Persons who are temporarily
living apart from their parents or children are not
"considered residents of medical institutions.
^.2.- All Cases — Persons are not considered residents for the month they enter the medical institution.
3*419.3 All Cases
^Exemptions for deemed assets are applied based on
the.-type of asset (home, burial funds, tribal funds,
certain lump sum payments etc.), and the category of
^assistance to which it is being applied. Emancipated:
ffi*child is emancipated by:
^turning L8 years old, or
^ g e t t i n g married, or
Begetting a court order which says that the child is
[emancipated.
&810-304-421. Lump Sum Payments — All Cases.
|f Remember that most lump sums count as income in
;the> month they are received. Count as an asset any
(balance which remains the month after receipt All
SSA and SSI lump sums are exempt for 6 months
Rafter receipt.
$r;421.1 Lump Sum Received on Sales Contract
MiL Exempt lump sum payments received on a sales
contract for the sale of an exempt home if the money
isucprnmitted to replacement of the property sold
^within thirty days and the purchase is completed
^itjun ninety days.
jftaa If a period longer than ninety days is required to
^complete the actual purchase, the District Director
ma&jgrant an extension in writing, using Form 689,
£pjiicy> Decision.
.the property is not replaced within 90 days
no extension has been granted, consider the total
payment received as an asset
Proceeds Other Than or In Addition to a
Sum.

R810-304-431

1. Proceeds of a sales contract other than or in addition to a lump sum shall be exempt if applied to the
purchase of replacement property. The same conditions of time and commitment as for a lump sum apply (see Sec, 421.1).
2. If proceeds from the contract are not to be used
to replace property, consider the balance remaining
on the sales contract as an asset
3. Availability (at any amount which would result
in excess assets) is a factor. This means that if the
balance remaining on a sales contract can be discounted to an amount which (in conjunction with any
other countable assets) exceeds the asset level, the
client is ineligible.
Example:
Assume a single individual has no other countable
assets, but has a balance remaining on a sales contract of $5,000. We would ask a financial institution
or other knowledgeable source if a market exists to
assign the balance remaining to a buyer for the oneperson asset limit. If the market exists, then the balance remaining on the sales contract would make the
client ineligible.
421.3 Insurance Settlements for Destroyed Property
Exempt lump sum insurance payments for destroyed property if the available money is used
within ninety days to replace the destroyed property,
and the destroyed property was exempt at the time of
loss.
1. The District Director may grant an extension
beyond ninety days, using Form 689, Policy Decision.
R810-304-425. Income Producing Property.
425.1 F And C Cases
When a client owns property and has the legal
right tc 5ell it without interference, the ^ro^ * „. ".<,
available and we will count it in determining eligibility.
425.2 A. B and D Cases
1. Exempt income producing property when:
a. The equity in the property is less than $6,000
and
b. The property produces a net annual return of at
least 6 percent of the equity.
Equity value more than $6,000 counts as an asset
only if the 6 percent net annual return is met. If it is
not, then the entire equity amount shall count.
2. If the client has the legal right to sell his share
of the property, and if such equity is includable as an
asset, and this results in the asset level being exceeded, close the case or deny the application.
3. The actual availability (whether a market exists
to sell the property) is not a factor in counting the
property as an asset.
R810-304-431. Transfer of Excess Assets.
431.1 F and C Medicaid
Take no sanction on the transfer of any asset.
431.2 A, B, and D Medicaid — Clients Who Are
Not Residents of Medical Institutions
Take no sanction on the transfer of any asset if the
client is not a resident of a medical institution.
431.3 A, B, and D Medicaid — Clients Who Are
Residents of Medical Institutions
431.31 Apply no sanction for the transfer of the
following assets^
1. If the property was transferred prior to July 1,
1988 and the property was transferred more than 24
months prior to the date of application. Also, apply no
sanction for the transfer of an asset which would have
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been exempt by Medicaid rules in effect at the time of
the transfer.
2. If the property was transferred on or after July
1, 1988 and the property was transferred more than
30 months prior to the date of application. Also apply
no sanction in the following situations:
a. Transfer of a home to a spouse
b. Transfer of any resource to a spouse or for the
sole benefit of a spouse
c. Transfer of a home or other resource to a child
under age 18 who is blind or permanently and totally
disabled
d. Transfer of a home to a sibling who has an equity interest in the home and who has lived in the
home for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
client's entry into a medical institution
e. Transfer of a home to a son or daughter who has
lived in the home and cared for the client for at least
two years prior to the individual's entry into the medical institution.
431.21 Undue Hardship
Apply no sanction for transfer of assets if the sanction would be an undue hardship on the client. An
undue hardship exists when:
1. The client has exhausted all reasonable legal
means to regain possession of the asset transfarred. It
is not reasonable to require the client to take action if
a knowledgeable source (such as the client's lawyer or
financial institution) confirms that it is doubtful
those efforts will succeed. That knowledgeable source
must specify the reasons for that decision. The
worker or supervisor must agree that it is doubtful
those efforts will succeed, v vv oncers may contact the
State Office of Assistance Payments for advise or assistance if needed.) It is not reasonable to require the
client to take action more costly than the value of the
asset, and
2. Either V or "b" below
a. Without Medicaid, the client will not be able to
enter a nursing home and the client is at risk of death
or permanent disability if not admitted to a nursing
home. This must be verified by a physician's statement.
b. This household cannot afford to meet the client's
medical needs at home. The client must verify that
the cost of medical care (including diapers and special
foods) added to normal living costs, exceeds household
income. Do not count medical costs that are covered
by insurance. If the client is eligible for Medicaid, do
not count medical costs covered by Medicaid but
count any spenddown required.
431.33 Rebuttal of Presumption the Resource Was
Transferred to Become Eligible for Medicaid
Presume that any transfer of assets at less than
current market value is for the purpose of meeting
asset limitations. It is the client's responsibility to
provide evidence that a transfer was made for exclusively another purpose. Apply no sanction if the client verifies this.
431.34 How to Apply the Sanction
1. Determine if the current market value* (at the
time of the transfer) was received. Form 421 may be
used to contact a knowledgeable source to aid in this
decision. Do not consider the services of or assistance
of a family member in exchange for property unless a
contract existed prior to the receipt of the service.
2. If the asset transfer occurred after July 1,1988,
the period of ineligibility begins with the month in
which the resources were transferred. The client is
ineligible for the less of:
a. 30 months, or
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b. The number of months resulting from dividing
the total uncompensated value* by the average private-pay rate for nursing homes. This is $1,365. -Current Market Value: A fair and reasonable compensation (in money or other worth) for property as
established by current standards of appraisal. Uncompensated Value: The difference between the current market value of property and the lesser compensation received as a result of the transfer. When an
asset was jointly owned the uncompensated value is
the difference between the individuals shares of the
current market value and the compensation received.
3. If the asset transfer occurred before July 1,
1988, add the uncompensated value to all other
countable assets for a maximum of 24 months from
the date of transfer. The household is ineligible as
long as the asset level is exceeded. Uncompensated
value may be reduced as follows:
a. During months not eligible for Medicaid — reduce uncompensated value by incurred expenses as
listed in Section 309.31.
b. During months eligible for Medicaid — reduce
uncompensated value by any spenddown paid and
any incurred expenses as listed in Section 309.32.
431.5 Determination of Current Market Value in
Transfer of Property
To determine whether property was transferred for
Current Market Value, add to the amount received
by the seller any debts against the property.
To determine the proceeds from the transfer of
property, subtract from the sale price any unsatisfied
mortgage, any burial expense paid within the prior 3
months, and anv medical expense paid within the
prior 6 months. ^
431.6 Life Estates as Assets
A, B and D Medicaid
When an applicant/recipient transfers property to
another party and retains a life estate* interest, consider the transfer according to the policy requirements for transfer of assets.
If the transfer of assets provisions are met, proceed
as follows:
1. Determine the current market value of the property by contacting a knowledgeable source which include:
a. Real Estate brokers.
b. The local office of the Farmer's Home Administration (for rural land).
c The local office for the Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Service (for rural land).
d. Banks, savings and loan associations, mortgage
companies, and similar lending institutions.
2. Use Table VI.
3. Find the claimant's age as of last birthday.
4. Multiply the figure in the life estate column for
that age by the current market value of the property
to determine the value of the life estate.
5. If the value of the life estate in conjunction with
any other countable assets exceeds the allowable asset level, close the case or deny the application.
a. Count the value of the life estate even if no market exists to sell it.
6. If the client refutes the above amount, use the
new amount as verified.
F and C Cases
Do not consider the life estate interest as an avail-1
able asset. However, count any income produced by
the life estate.
Life estate: a life estate conveys upon an individual
or individuals for his lifetime certain rights in property. The owner of a life estate has the right of possession, the right to use the property, the right to sell his

297

FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION

life estate interest. He does not have title to the property and he does not have the right to sell the property itself.
B810-304-44L Third Party Liability (TPL) — All
Cases.
Applicants for medical assistance must, as a condition of eligibility, cooperate in the completion of the
Third Party Liability Questionnaire. Recipients of
mfdif*! assistance must report any changes in third
party liability and they must cooperate in the establishment and collection of third party claims. This
includes cooperating in the establishment of paternity so third party claims can be established against
the absent parents.
441.1 Changes in TPL Information
The recipient must report changes in TPL information no later than 30 days after the change. To do
this, the recipient may use the Form 61-B, a monthly
report form, or another method such as a phone call.
When the district receives a report of a change in
TPL information, the district worker must complete a
new TPL Questionnaire and send it to the cost avoidance unit If the district receives the report more than
30 days after the change in TPL, make a note of this
on the TPL questionnaire that is sent to the Cost
Avoidance Unit (CAU) at ORS.
T In addition, whenever the District Office receives
information indicating possible TPL arising from
negligence of others, such as automobile accidents,
public liabilities, homeowners accidents, etc, ORS
should be notified by memo of the following:
a. Recipient name and case number
b. Date of the accident
c Nature of the accident
d\ Any other pertinent information, such as the
company involved, policy holder, and court information.
Remember that money received from a TPL source
is not to be counted as income against medical liability.
Third Party Liability: An individual, institution, corporation, public or private agency that is responsible
or may be responsible to pay all or part of the medical
cost of injury, disease, or disability of an applicant or
recipient Examples of third party liability include
health, accident, and hospital insurances; liability insurance such as auto and homeowner's policies; industrial accident claims; court judgments, and rights
to medical support a child might have from an absent
parent.
^ 441.2 Sanctions for Noncooperation
Noncooperation is refusing to complete the TPL
form or withholding TPL information that is available to the client.
- If a person provides all the TPL information of
which he is aware but doesn't know every detail, this
is cooperation. If a third party, such as an ex-spouse,
refuses to tell the client about insurance information,
this is cooperation.
P Only the CAU in Recovery Services will have the
responsibility for determining noncooperation. If the
client has good cause for noncooperation41, impose no
sanction.
T If the CAU determines that a client is not cooperating, it will notify the district office. After providing
the 10-day advance notice, withhold medical assistance only for the individual who refused to cooperate.
r The CAU will notify the district office when the
client begins cooperating. Restore medical coverage
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for the full month in which notice of cooperation is
received.
Good Cause for Noncooperation: Good Cause for noncooperation includes the reasonable anticipation of
physical or emotional harm to the applicant, recipient, or children.
R810-304-443. Eligible Aliens and Counting The
Assets of Sponsors — All Cases.
Certain aliens who have been legally admitted in
the United States for permanent residence must have
the resources of their sponsors considered in determining eligibility for medical assistance.
443.1 Aliens Who are Not Subject to This Requirement
Aliens who are not subject to this requirement are
those who are:
1. Paroled in the US as refugees
2. Granted Political Asylum
3. Admitted as Cuban/Haitian entrants
4. Other conditional or paroled entrants
5. Not sponsored or who have sponsors that are
organizations or institutions
6. Sponsored by persons who receive medicaid,
AFDC or SSI
7. The dependent child of the sponsor
8. The sponsor's stepchild
There are some permanent resident aliens who
have I-151's or 1-551 (or "green cards") and who were
admitted to this country as refugees. These people are
not subject to this requirement.
443.2 Aliens Who are Subject to this Requirement
Aliens who apply for medical assistance after April
1, 1983 and who have been legally admitted into the
US for permanent residence are subject to this requirement. They are subject to this for 3 years after
their "entry" date into the United States. This entry
date has been defined as the date established by ENS
as the date the alien was admitted for permanent
residence. Time spent in the U.S. under other than
permanent residence is not considered as part of the 3
year period.
Sponsor: any person who has completed an affidavit
or other similar agreement with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) on behalf of an alien as
a condition of the alien's entry into the US for permanent residence.
Aliens who are subject to this requirement will
have either an INS Form 1-151 or INS Form 1-551.
443.3 Reporting Assets of Sponsors
1. The sponsor's assets must be reported each
month. The report must include a written statement
of the sponsor's assets. The statement must be signed
by the sponsor.
2. The sponsor's statement must be received by the
17th of the month or the alien's case must be closed.
443.4 Countable Assets of Sponsors
To determine how much of the sponsor's assets to
count in determining eligibility for the alien, follow
these steps
1. Apply the medical assistance policies (see section 400) to the assets of the sponsor and the sponsor's
spouse.
2. Subtract $1,500 from the countable assets of the
sponsor and sponsor's spouse.
3. Count the remaining asset value in determining
the alien's eligibility.
443.5 Multiple Sponsorships
1. When a person sponsors two or more alien families living together, the countable assets of the sponsor will be divided equally among the aliens.
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2. When a person sponsors two or more alien families who do not live together, the countable assets per
family will depend en the number a/ alien families
who receive medical assistance.
Example: a person sponsors four alien families, but
only one is eligible for medical assistance, the total
countable assets will count against that one alien
family.
Example: a person sponsors four alien families and
three of them are eligible for medical assistance, the
total countable assets would be divided equally
among the three eligible alien families.
443.6 Revocation of Sponsor Agreements
Do not waive these requirements even if the sponsor claims to have revoked his sponsorship agreement.
R810-304-461. Whose Assets to Count — Clients
Who Are Not Residents of Medical Institutions.
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institution. See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a
medical institution.
461.1 For an Emancipated Child
When a child is emancipated*, count only his assets.
461.2 For an Unemancipated Child
1. Count the income and assets of a child's parents
when the child lives with his parents.
For B and D cases, a child is considered living with
his parent until the month after he moves.
For F and C cases, a child is considered living with
his parents while temporarily absent from the home,
for school, vacation, summer employment,
medical treatment, etc. One exception to this rule is a
child in the custody of a State agency, such as a
Youth Corrections detention center or Utah State
Training School. The court order will say that the
child is in the custody of the State.
2. Count only the assets of the child when:
F and C cases — when the child is living away from
his parents and it is not temporary.
a. This includes a child receiving Title IV-E Foster
Care assistance, no matter where he lives.
b. This includes a child in foster care who has not
been placed back in his own home (See Sec. 213.5)
The only exceptions to this are (1) a child voluntarily
placed in foster care and who is not eligible for Title
IV-E Foster Care assistance and (2) a child in the
custody of a state agency. In these cases, the parents'
income and assets must be counted because they have
signed an agreement to provide medical care for the
child.
c. This includes a child living with a specified relative if it is not temporary.
Emancipated: A child becomes emancipated by:
1. Turning_18 years old.
2. Getting married.
3. Obtaining a court order that specifically states
the child is emancipated.
d. This includes a child temporarily placed in an
institution if the state is responsible for the care and
control of that child. The state is responsible for control and care of the child if a court order places the
child in the custody of the state. The state is also
responsible for the child if the parents have voluntarily relinquished parental rights.
461.3 Countable Assets for a Spouse
Count the assets of a spouse as available to his
spouse while the couple lives together.
For A, B, and D, Cases
If a couple separates, and if each spouse gets Medicaid, count the assets of the spouse as available for 6

298

months following the separation. If they get divorced
in the 6 months, quit counting the assets.
^a couple separates, and if only one spouse gets
Medicaid, quit counting the assets of the ineligible
spouse starting the month after they separate.
Fo r F and C Cases
* If * couple separates, and the separation is not temporary, count only the assets of the eligible spouse.
R810-304-465. Whose Assets to Count — Clients
Who Are Residents of Medical Institutions.
See Sec. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institution. See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a
medical institution.
^ m e m b e r that when a person who owns a home
Deco
mes a resident of a medical institution, the home
becomes countable unless:
1- The person's stay in the medical institution will
be 8 hort term. A stay is short term if a doctor says
that th e client is likely to return home within 6
months of admission. Anyone in a medical institution
mor
* than 6 months after admission is long term, or
2- The person states that he intends to return
home, it does not matter whether the person actually
returns home within 6 months. There is no time limit
to his exemption. The statement of intent must be in
wr^ing from the client or his representative, or
3- The person's spouse or dependent chfldren or a
relative* who still live in the home.
465.1 A, B or D Cases
C°unt only the assets of the client. Compare them
to tl\ e asset level for one person.
—S.2 Assets fcr « Chile! w ^ It a Member of an
AFDc Household — F Cases
W^en the child is expected to return to the AFDC
household, continue him as an additional on that
case.
W^ien the child is not expected to return to an
A F D Q household consider another category of coverage for him.
*%.3 Assets for a Parent Who is a Member of an
AFDc Household - F Cases
W^ien the parent is expected to return to the AFDC
household, continue him as an additional or as the
P a v e e on that case.
If Uie parent is not expected to return to the AFDC
household, he is not eligible for F category. Consider
another category of coverage.
Relative: son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter,
stepson, stepdaughter, in-laws, mother, father, stepm
° t W , stepfather, half sister, half brother, niece,
nephew, grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle, sister, brother, stepbrother, or stepsister
4 ^ . 4 Assets for a Child Who is Not a Member of a
F Category Household -— C Cases
Set gee. 209.2 for a definition of a medical institution. See Sec. 365.1 for a definition of a resident of a
medifeai institution.
If the child can be expected to return home, he is
still Considered part of the C case. Do not treat the
child ag a resident of a medical institution. Treat the
entire household as a case involving clients who are
not residents of a medical institution.
" }he child is not expected to return home, do not
consider him a resident of a medical institution for
the inonth he leaves home. For following months,
count only the child's assets.
*&>.5 Assets for a Foster Care Child Who is a — F
or C Cases
C°Unt only the child's assets. Compare them to the
asset level for a one person.
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E-465.6 Accumulated Assets of Residents of Medical
2. Individuals not eligible during the month of apInstitutions — All Categories
plication may still be eligible for any or all of the
£*l.i If a resident of a medical institution accumu- retroactive months.
lates assets in excess of the asset limit, close the case
3. The household must be determined to have been
^ " i if costs of the medical institution are to be paid eligible the month the expenses were incurred.
i these monies. However, do not count as an asset
4. The excess income amount shall be determined
^deposit to savings or checking accounts in the for each requested retroactive month in which a sert month that you count the deposit as income. vice was provided which cost exceeds the excess in^During eligibility determinations and reviews come for the same month.
* *~> personal need accounts. Add any amount in
5. The excess amount for any eligible retroactive
of $30 to other countable assets.
month must be paid before any medical benefit may
26-18
be approved. The applicant pays only for those
months he wishes to be covered.
For AFDC-PG, do not allow retroactive coverage
RglO-305. Medicaid: Program Benefits. for6.the
2 months of eligibility following the termination of the pregnancy. This coverage is allowed only
B810-305-503. Basic Maintenance Standard.
when the client received Medicaid at the time the
5810-305-507. Medical Identification Card.
pregnancy terminated.
R810-305-511. Date of Entitlement.
511.2 Retroactive Assistance for Clients in Medical
R810-305-521. Availability of Medical Services.
Institutions
E810-305-561. Burial Allowance.
Use the same procedure to determine eligibility
and any excess income for a patient in a medical inR810-305-503. Basic Maintenance Standard.
|£The Basic Maintenance Standard shown on Table stitution as for any other applicant. For retroactive
iEGrants, is the base to which countable income is Medicaid after October 1, 1988, the client must pass
compared to determine if a household has excess in- the Gross Test for coverage of nursing homes, Utah
State Hospital, or Utah State Training School. (See
come.
Sec. 361.1)
&»*
511.3 Nursing Home Date of Eligibility
B810-305-507. Medical Identification Card.
Although the date of medical eligibility is estabIgExcept for recipients of the Indigent Medical Program, an identification card shall be issued each lished in the district office, it is only part of the pronftnth listing the eligible members of the household cess necessary to pay a nursing home. The date of
a^d indicating any additional medical insurance cov- medical eligibility (always the first of a month) can
erage available to them which might limit the re- be different from the date of eligibility for payment.
rophsibility of the State for payment for the services. This is because the nursing home stay needs to be
JGEgTo obtain medical services, the individual must authorized as medically necessary. This is done by
present this identification card to the medical pro- the Bureau of Patient Assessment in the Division of
Health Care Financing. HCFA Form 10 (Preadmisvider. of his choice.
~ * 3 J A medical identification card shall only be com- sion Document una ^cntinaed ot&y Transmittal) is
used for this purpose. Since Health Care Financing
puter printed.
will not pay the nursing home for coverage prior to
tf507»l Interim Medical Eligibility
Efmedical services are needed by an approved ap- the date on the Form 10, this may be a different date
gcant before a computer-issued identification card is than the first of a month.
Tell the client or his representative that this two
aved, the District Office shall use Form 695, In* Verification of Medical Eligibility, to inform part eligibility exists, so that when a 228C is received, it is not mistaken for the only factor which
^medical provider of the claim procedure.
influences payment to the nursing home.
810^05-511. Date of Entitlement.
^Assistance shall be effective from the first of the R810-305-521. Availability of Medical Services.
An individual may seek medical care anywhere
aU^oC application if the case is determined to have
ineligible at any time during the month. However, within the State; however, the individual is encour^B^or D Medicaid, when assets held on the first aged to seek the nearest available medical care.
521.1 Out-of-State Medical Services
j|0£a,calendar month exceed allowable limits, the
1. Requests for out-of-state medical services must
old is ineligible for the entire month.
{If the District Assistance Payments Office deter- be made to the State Assistance Payments Office for
ies during the verification process that the appli- prior approval through the Division of Health Care
SujjpSras ineligible on the date of application but Financing.
igter^in the month, became eligible, assistance shall
2. There are 4 areas in Utah where medical seroegin on the first day of the month the application vices may be obtained out-of-state with out prior apwasjmade.
proval.
a. Rich County residents may go to Evanston, WyBfoflf a newborn child is a member of an AFDC financial assistance household, then add him to the oming; Riverton, Wyoming; Preston, Idaho; Paris,
jmnt, after verification requirements are completed, Idaho; or Montpelier, Idaho.
b. San Juan County residents may go to Cortez,
g&ctive the date the birth is reported to the District
*£ However, the child is eligible for medical cov- Del Norte, Dolores, Durango, Grand Junction and
Montrose, Colorado; or to Shiprock or Farmington,
-©^effective the date of the birth.
New Mexico.
SllS" Retroactive Medical Assistance
c. Residents of the Snake Valley area in Millard
ayment of past medical expenses is requested
' ive medical assistance may be approved if the County (Garrison; Gandy, Burbank and Eskdale)
may go to Ely, Nevada and East Ely, Nevada.
Y conditions are met
d. Residents of Grand County may go to Grand
£The Medical expense must have been incurred
Q&rlier than the first day of the third month prior Junction, Colorado.
Note: Long term care can be provided only in Utah.
month of application.

42 USCS § 1382b

§ 1382b. Resources
(a) Exclusions from resources. In determining the resources of an individual (and his eligible spouse, if any) there shall be excluded—
(1) the home (including the land that appertains thereto);
(2)(A) household goods, personal effects, and an automobile, to the
extent that their total value does not exceed such amount as the
Secretary determines to be reasonable; and
(B) the value of any burial space (subject to such limits as to size or
value as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe) held for the
purpose of providing a place for the burial of the individual, his
spouse, or any other member of his immediate family;
(3) other property which, as determined in accordance with and subject
to limitations prescribed by the Secretary, is so essential to the means of
self-support of such individual (and such spouse) as to warrant its
exclusion;
(4) such resources of an individual who is blind or disabled and who has
a plan for achieving self-support approved by the Secretary, as may be
necessary for the fulfillment of such plan;
(5) in the case of Natives of Alaska, shares of stock held in a Regional
or a Village Corporation, during the period of twenty years in which
such stock is inalienable, as provided in section 7(h) and section 8(c) of
113
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the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [43 USCS §§ 1606(h),
1607(c)];
(6) assistance referred to in section 1612(b)(ll) [42 USCS
§ 1382a(b)(l 1)] for the 9-month period beginning on the date such funds
are received (or for such longer period as the Secretary shall by
regulations prescribe in cases where good cause is shown by the
individual concerned for extending such period); and, for purposes of
this paragraph, the term "assistance" includes interest thereon which is
excluded from income under section 1612(b)(12) [42 USCS
§ 1382a(b)(12)]; and
(7) any amount received from the United States which is attributable to
under payments of benefits due for one or more prior months, under this
title [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.] or title II [42 USCS §§401 et seq.] to
such individual (or spouse) or to any other person whose income is
deemed to be included in such individual's (or spouse's) income for
purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.] but the application of
this paragraph in the case of any such individual (and eligible spouse if
any), with respect to any amount so received from the United States,
shall be limited to the first 6 months following the month in which such
amount is received, and written notice of this limitation shall be given to
the recipient concurrently with the payment of such amount.
In determining the resources of an individual (or eligible spouse) an
insurance policy shall be taken into account only to the extent of its cash
surrender value; except that if the total face value of all life insurance
policies on any person is S 1,500 or iess. no part of the value of any such
policy shall be taken into account
(b) Disposition of resources. The Secretary shall prescribe the period or
periods of time within which, and the manner in which, various kinds of
property must be disposed of in order not to be included in determining an
individual's eligibility for benefits. Any portion of the individual's benefits
paid for any such period shall be conditioned upon such disposal; and any
benefits so paid shall (at the time of the disposal) be considered overpayments to the extent they would not have been paid had the disposal
occurred at the beginning of the period for which such benefits were paid.
(c) Resources disposed of for less than fair market value. (1) In determining the resources of an individual (and his eligible spouse, if any) there
shall be included (but subject to the exclusions under subsection (a)) any
resource (or interest therein) owned by such individual or eligible spouse
within the preceding 24 months if such individual or eligible-spouse gave
away or sold such resource or interest at less than fair market value of
such resource or interest for the purpose of establishing eligibility for
benefits or assistance under this Act.
(2) Any transaction described in paragraph (1) shall be presumed to
have b.een for the purpose of establishing eligibility for benefits or
assistance under this Act unless such individual or eligible spouse
114
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furnishes convincing evidence to establish that the transaction was
exclusively for some other purpose.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (1) the value of such a resource or
interest shall be the fair market value of such resource or interest at the
time it was sold or given away, less the amount of compensation
received for such resource or interest, if any.
(d) Funds set aside for burial expenses. (1) In determining the resources of
an individual, there shall be excluded an amount, not in excess of $1,500
each with respect to such individual and his spouse (if any), that is
separately identifiable and has been set aside to meet the burial and
related expenses of such individual or spouse if the inclusion of any
portion of such amount or amounts would cause the resources of such
individual, or of such individual and spouse, to exceed the limits
specified in paragraph (1) or (2) (whichever may be applicable) of
section 1611(a) [42 USCS § 1382(a)(1), (2)].
(2) The amount of S 1,500, referred to in paragraph (1), with respect to
an individual shall be reduced by an amount equal to (A) the total face
value of all insurance policies on his life which are owned by him or his
spouse and the cash surrender value of which has been excluded in
determining the resources of such individual or of such individual and
his spouse, and (B) the total of any amounts in an irrevocable trust (or
clhcr irrevocable arrangement) available to meet the burial and related
expenses of such individual or his spouse.
(3) If the Secretary finds that any part of the amount excluded under
paragraph (1) was used for purposes other than those for which it was
set aside, he shall reduce any future benefits payable to the eligible
individual (or to such individual and his spouse) by an amount equal to
such part.
(4) The Secretary may provide by regulations that whenever an amount
set aside to meet burial and related expenses is excluded under paragraph (1) in determining the resources of an individual, any interest
earned or accrued on such amount (and left to accumulate), and any
appreciation in the value of prepaid burial arrangements for which such
amount was set aside, shall also be excluded (to such extent and subject
to such conditions or limitations as such regulations may prescribe) in
determining the resources (and the income) of such individual.
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XVI, Part A, § 1613, as added Oct. 30, 1972,
P. L. 92-603, Title III, § 301, 86 Stat. 1470.; Oct. 20, 1976, P. L. 94-569,
§ 5, 90 Stat. 2700; Nov. 12, 1977, P. L. 95-171, § 9(a), 91 Stat. 1355; Dec.
28, 1980, P. L. 96-611, § 5(a), 94 Stat. 3567; Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97-248,
Title I, Subtitle F, § 185(a), (b), 96 Stat. 406; July 18, 1984, P. L. 98-369,
Division B, Title VI, Subtitle B, Pan 1, § 2614, 98 Stat. 1132.)
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§ 1382b. Resources
(a) Exclusions from resources. [Introductory matter unchanged]
(1) (Unchanged)
(2XA) [Unchanged]
(B) the value of any burial space or agreement (including any interest accumulated thereon)
representing the purchase of a burial space (subject to such limits as to size or vaiue as the
Secreury may by regulation prescribe) held for the purpose of providing a place for the buriaJ of
the individual, his spouse, or any other member of his immediate family;
(3) other property which is so essential to the means of self-support of such individual (and such
spouse) as to warrant its exclusion, as determined in accordance with and subject to limitations
prescribed by the Secreury, except that the Secreury shall not establish a limitation on property
(including the tools of a tradesperson and the machinery and livestock of a farmer) that is used in a
4rade or business or by such individual as an employee;
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(4), (5) (Unchanged]
(6) assistance referred to in section 16I2(bXll) [42 USCS § 13S2a(bXH)] for the 9-month period
beginning on the date such funds are received (or for such longer period as the Secretary shall by
regulations prescribe in cases where good cause is shown by the individual concerned for extending
such period); and, for purposes of this paragraph, the term "assistance" includes interest thereon
which is excluded from income under section !6!2(bX12) (42 USCS ( 1382a(bX12)];
(7) any amount received from the United States which is attributable to under payments of benefits
due for one or more prior months, under this title [42 USCS §§ 1381 et acq.] or title II [42 USCS
§§401 et seq.] to such individual (or spouse) or to any other person whose income is deemed to be
included in such individual's (or spouse's) income for purposes of this title [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]
but the application of this paragraph in the case of any such individual (and eligible spouse if any),
with respect to any amount so received from the United States, shall be limited to the first 6 months
following the month in which such amount is received (or to the first 9 months following such month
with respect to any amount so received during the period beginning October 1, 1987, and ending
September 30, 1989),.and written notice of this limitation shall be given to the recipient concurrently
with the payment of such amount;
(8) the value of assistance referred to in section 1612(bXH) [42 USCS § 1382a(bXM)). paid with
respect to the dwelling unit occupied by such individual (or such individual and spouse);
(9) for the 9-month period beginning after the month in which received, any amount received by such
individual (or such spouse) from a fund established by a State to aid victims of crime, to the extent
that such individual (or such spouse) demonstrates that such amount was paid as compensation for
expenses incurred or losses suffered as a result of a crime; and
(10) for the 9-month period beginning after the month in which received, relocation assistance
provided by a State or local government to such individual (or such spouse), comparable to assistance
provided under title II of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies
Act of 1970 which is subject to the treatment required by section 216 of such Act [42 USCS § 4636].
[(11)](10) for the month of receipt and the following month, any refund of Federal income taxes
made to such individual (or such spouse) by reason of section 32 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 [26 USCS §32) (relating to earned income tax credit), and any payment made to such
individual (or such spouse) by an employer under section 3507 of such Code [26 USCS § 3507]
(relating to advance payment of earned income credit).
[Concluding matter unchanged]
(b) Disposition of resources. (1) The Secretary shall prescribe the period or periods of time within which,
and the manner in which, various kinds of property must be disposed of in order not to be included
in determining an individual's eligibility for benefits. Any portion of the individual's benefits paid for
- 7 such period shall be conditioned upon such dicpcsi!; and any bCiJitc -c p^:d shril ;*.t the time of
the disposal) be considered overpayments to the extent they would not have been paid had the
disposal occurred at the beginning of the period for which such benefits were paid.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), the Secretary shall not require the disposition of
any real property for so long as it cannot be sold because (A) it is jointly owned (and its sale would
cause undue hardship, due to loss of housing, for the other owner or owners), (6) its sale is barred by
a legal impediment, or ( Q as determined under" regulations issued by the Secretary, the owner's
reasonable efforts to sell it have been unsuccessful.
(c) Notification of Medicaid policy restricting eligibility of institutionalized individuals for benefits based
on disposal of resources for less than fair market value. (1) At the time an individual (and the
individual's eligible spouse, if any) applies for benefits under this title, and at the time the eligibility of
an individual (and such spouse, if any) for such benefits is redetermined, the Secretary shall—
(A) inform such individual of the provisions of section 1917(c) [42 USCS § 1396p(c)] providing
for a period of ineligibility for benefits under title XIX for individuals who make certain
dispositions of resources for less than fair market value, and inform such individual that
information obtained pursuant to subparagraph (B) will be made available to the State agency
administering a State plan under title XIX (as provided in paragraph (2)); and
(B) obtain from such individual information which may be used by the State agency in
determining whether or not a period of ineligibility for such benefits would be required by reason
of section 1917(c) [42 USCS § 1396p(c)] if such individua! (or such spouse, if any) enters a
medical institution or nursing facility.
(2) The Secretary shall make the information obtained under paragraph (1XB) available, on request,
to any State agency administering a State plan approved under title XIX.
(d) Funds §tt aside for burial expenses. (1) In determining the resources of an individual, there shall be
excluded an amount, not in excess of SI,500 each with respect to such individual and his spouse (if
any), that is separately identifiable and has been set aside to meet the burial and related expenses of
such individual or spouse.
(2) [Unchanged]
(3) If the Secretary finds that any part of the amount excluded under paragraph (1) was used for
purposes other than those for which it was set aside in cases where the inclusion of any portion of the
amount would cause the resources of such individual, or of such individual and spouse, to exceed the
limits specified in paragraph (1) or (2) (whichever may be applicable) of section 1611(a) [42 USCS
§ 1382(aXO or (2)], he shall reduce any future benefits payable to the eligible individual (or to such
individual and his spouse) by an amount equal to such part
(4) [Unchanged]
(As amended Dec. 22. 1987, P. L. 100-203, Title IX, Subtitle B, Part 1. §§ 9103(a), 9104(a), 9105(a),
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TITLE XIX.. GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
CROSS REFERENCES
This Title is referred to in 7 USCS §§ 2026, 3178; 8 USCS § 1522 12 USCS
§§ 1715w, 1715z-7: 25 USCS §1622; 38 USCS §§622, 4108. 42 USCS
§§ 242b, 254a-1, 254b, 254c, 254e, 254h, 254n, 300e, 300e-6, 300m-6. 300z-5.
602, 603, 606, 614, 632a, 671, 671, 673, 705, 709, 1301, 1306, BOS, 1309,
1310, 1315, 1316, 1318, 1320a-l, 1320a-2, 1320a-3, 1320a-5, 1320a-7. 1320a7a, 1320a-8, 1320b-2, 1320b-3, 1320b-4, 1320b-5, 1320c-2, 1320c-i0, 1382,
1382e ns?h, 1382:, 1"'8?c, !?95b-l, 1395v, 1395x, 1395y, 1395z I395cc.
1395mm, 1395H, 1395vv, 1395w\v, 1997, 3013, 3026, 3035b, 8624
§ 1396. Appropriations
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help
such families and individuals attain or retain capability for independence or
self-care, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year
a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et
seq.]. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making
payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the
Secretary, State plans for medical assistance.
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, 1965, P. L.
89-97, Title I, Part 2, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343; Dec. 31, 1973, P. L. 93-233,
§ 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, P. L. 98-369, Division B, Title VI,
Subtitle D, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.)
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§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance
(a) Contents. A State plan for medical assistance must—
(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the
State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them;
(2) provide for financial participation by the State equal to not less than
40 per centum of the non-Federal share of the expenditures under the
plan with respect to which payments under section 1903 [42 USCS
§ 1396b] are authorized by this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.]; and,
effective July 1, 1969, provide for financial participation by the State
equal to all of such non-Federal share or provide for distribution of
funds from Federal or State sources, for carrying out the State plan, on
an equalization or other basis which will assure that the lack of
adequate funds from local sources will not result in lowering the
amount, duration, scope, or quality of care and services available under
the plan;
(3) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the
State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under
the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness;
(4) provide (A) such methods of administration (including methods
relating to the establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on
a merit basis, except that the Secretary shall exercise no authority with
respect to the selection, centum uf uffice, and compensati on of any
individual employed in accordance with such methods, and including
provision for utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration and, where administered locally, supervision of administration
of the plan) as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper
and efficient operation of the plan, (B) for the training and effective use
of paid subprofessional staff, with particular emphasis on the full-time or
part-time employment of recipients and other persons of low income, as
community service aides, in the administration of the plan and for the
use of nonpaid or partially paid volunteers in a social service volunteer
program in providing services to applicants and recipients and in
assisting any advisory committees established by the State agency, and
(C) that each State or local officer or employee who is responsible for
the expenditure of substantial amounts of funds under the State plan,
each individual who formerly was such an officer or employee, and each
partner of such an officer or employee shall be prohibited from committing any act, in relation to any activity under the plan, the commission
of which, in connection with any activity concerning the United States
Government, by an officer or employee of the United States Government, an individual who was such an officer or employee, or a partner of
such an officer or employee is prohibited by section 207 or 208 of title
18, United States Code [18 USCS §§ 207, 208];
(5) either provide for the establishment or designation of a single State
agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan; or
provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to
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administer or to supervise the administration of the plan, except that the
determination of eligibility for medical assistance under the plan shall be
made by the State or local agency administering the State plan approved
under title I or XVI [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1381 et seq.] (insofar as it
relates to the aged) if the State is eligible to participate in the State plan
program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.], or by
the agency or agencies administering the supplemental security income
program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.] or the
State Plan approved under part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 601 et seq.] if
the State is not eligible to participate in the State plan program
established under title XVI; [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]
(6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in such form
and containing such information, as the Secretary may from time to
time require, and comply with such provisions as the Secretary may
from time to time find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such reports;
(7) provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of information
concerning applicants and recipients to purposes directly connected with
the administration of the plan;
(8) provide that all individuals wishing to make application for medical
assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such
assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals;
(9) provide—
(A) chat the State nealth agency, or other appropriate State medical
agency (whichever is utilized by the Secretary for the purpose specified in the first sentence of section 1864(a) [42 USCS § 1395aa(a)]),
shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining health standards
for private or public institutions in which recipients of medical
assistance under the plan may receive care or services,
(B) for the establishment or designation of a State authority or
authorities which shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining
standards, other than those relating to health, for such institutions,
and
(C) that any laboratory services paid for under such plan must be
provided by a laboratory which meets the applicable requirements, of
section 1861(e)(9) or paragraphs (11) and (12) of section 1861(s) [42
USCS § 1395x(e)(9), (s)(ll), (12)], or, in the case of a laboratory
which is in a rural health clinic, of section 1861(aa)(2)(G) [42 USCS
§ 1395x(aa)(2)(G)];
(10) provide—
(A) for making"medical assistance available, including at least the
care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through (5) and (17) of
section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(l)-(5), (17)], to—
(i) all individuals—
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(I) who are receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A or part
E of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq.,
1381 et seq., 601 et seq. 670 et seq.] (including individuals
eligible under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.] by reason of
section 402(a)(37) or 406(h) [42 USCS § 602(a)(37), 606(h)], or
considered by the State to be receiving such aid as authorized
under section 414(g) [42 USCS § 614(g)]),
(II) with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits
are being paid under title XVI [42 USCS § 1381 et seq.], or
(III) who are qualified pregnant women or children as defined in
section 1905(n) [42 USCS § 1396d(n)];
(ii) at the option of the State, to any group or groups of individuals
described in section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)] (or, in the case
of individuals described in section 1905(a)(i) [42 USCS
§ 1396d(a)(l)], to any reasonable categories of such individuals)
who are not individuals described in clause (i) of this subparagraph
but—
(I) who meet the income and resources requirements of the
appropriate State plan described in clause (i) or the supplemental
security income program (as the case may be),
(II) who would meet the income and resources requirements of
the appropriate State plan described in clause (i) if their workrelated child care costs were paid from their earnings rather than
by a State agency as a service expenditure,
(III) who would be eligible to receive aid under the appropriate
State plan described in clause (i) if coverage under such plan was
as broad as allowed under Federal law,
(IV) with respect to whom there is being paid, or who are
eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a medical
institution, to have paid with respect to them, aid or assistance
under the appropriate State plan described in clause (i), supplemental security income benefits under title XVI [42 USCS
§§ 1381 et seq.], or a State supplementary payment;[,]
(V) who are in a medical institution, who meet the resource
requirements of the appropriate State plan described in clause (i)
or the supplemental security income program, and whose income
does not exceed a separate income standard established by the
State which is consistent with the limit established under section
1903(f)(4)(C) [42 USCS § 1396b(f)(4)(Q], or
(VI) who would be eligible under the State plan under this title
[42 USCS^§§ 1396 et seq.] if they were in a medical institution,
with respect to whom there has been a determination that but
for the provision of home or community-based services described
in section 1915(c) [42 USCS § 1396n(c)] they would require the
level of care provided in a hospital, skilled nursing facility or
657

42 USCS § 1396a

SOCIAL SECURITY A C T

intermediate care facility the cost of which could be reimbursed
under the State plan, and who will receive home or communitybased services pursuant to a waiver granted by the Secretary
under section 1915(c) [42 USCS § 1396n(c)];
(B) that the medical assistance made available to any individual
described in subparagraph (A)—
(i) shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical
assistance made available to any other such individual, and
(ii) shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical
assistance made available to individuals not described in subparagraph (A);
(C) that if medical assistance is included for any group of individuals
described in section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)] who are not
described in subparagraph (A), then—
(i) the plan must include a description of (I) the criteria for
determining eligibility of individuals in the group for such medical
assistance, (II) the amount, duration, and scope of medical assistance made available to individuals in the group, and (III) the
single standard to be employed in determining income and resource
eligibility for all such groups, and the methodology to be employed
in determining such eligibility, which shall be the same methodology which would be employed under the supplemental security
income program in the case of groups consisting of aged blind, or
disabled individuals in a State in which such program is in effect,
and which shall be the same methodology which would be employed under the appropriate State plan (described in subparagraph
(A)(i)) to which such group is most closely categorically related in
the case of other groups;
(ii) the plan must make available medical assistance—
(I) to individuals under the age of 18 who (but for income and
resources) would be eligible for medical assistance as an individual described in subparagraph (A)(i), and
(II) to pregnant women, during the course of their pregnancy,
who (but for income and resources) would be eligible for medical
assistance as an individual described in subparagraph (A);
(iii) such medical assistance must include (I) with respect to
children under 18 and individuals entitled to institutional services,
ambulatory services, and (II) with respect to pregnant women,
prenatal care and delivery services; and
(iv) if such medical assistance includes services in institutions for
mental diseases or intermediate care facility services for the mentally retarded (or both) for any such group, it also must include for
all groups covered at least the care and services listed in paraj
graphs (1) through (5) and (17) of section 1905(a) [42 USCg
§ 1396d(l)-(5), (17)] or the care and services listed in any 7 of the,
paragraphs numbered (1) through (17) of such section; and
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(D) for the inclusion of home health services for any individual who,
under the State plan, is entitled to skilled nursing facility services;
except that (I) the making available of the services described in paragraph (4), (14), or (16) of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(4), (14),
(16)] to individuals* meeting the age requirements prescribed therein shall
not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available of
any such services, or the making available of such services of the same
amount, duration, and scope, to individuals of any other ages, (II) the
making available of supplementary medical insurance benefits under part
B of title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.] to individuals eligible
therefor (either pursuant to an agreement entered into under section
1843 [42 USCS § 1395v] or by reason of the payment of premiums
under such title [42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq.] by the State agency on behalf
of such individuals), or provision for meeting part or all of the cost of
deductibles, cost sharing, or similar charges under part B of title XVIII
[42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.] for individuals eligible for benefits under
such part [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.], shall not, by reason of this
paragraph (10), require the making available of any such benefits, or the
making available of services of the same amount, duration, and scope, to
any other individuals, (III) the making available of medical assistance
equal in amount, duration, and scope to the medical assistance made
available to individials described in clause (A) to any classification of
individuals approved by the Secretary with respect to whom there is
being paid, or who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a
medical institution, to have paid with respect to them, a State supplementary payment shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the
making available of any such assistance, or the making available of such
assistance of the same amount, duration, and scope, to any other
individuals not described in clause (A)[,] and (IV) the imposition of a
deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge for any item or service
furnished to an individual not eligible for the exemption under section
1916(a)(2) or (b)(2) [42 USCS § 1396o(a)(2), (b)(2)] shall not require the
imposition of a deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge for the same
item or service furnished to an individual who is eligible for such
exemption;
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§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance [Caution: See Other provisions notes for application of
amendments]
(a) Contents. [Introductory matter unchanged]

(10) [Introductory matter unchanged]
(A) for making medical assistance available, including at least the care and services listed in
paragraphs (1) through (5), (17) and (21) of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(aXlM5). 0?),
(21)]. t o CO [Introductory matter unchanged]
(I) who are receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I,
X, XIV, or XVi, or part A or part E of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 12U1 ex seq.,
1351 et seq., or 1381 et seq., or 601 et seq. or 670 et seq.] (including individuals eligible
under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.] by reason of section 402(aX37), 406(h), or 473(b)
[42 USCS § 602(aX37). 606(h), or 673(b)], or considered by the State to be receiving such
aid as authorized under section 482(eX6) [42 USCS § 682(e)(6)]),
(II) with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are being paid under title
XVI [42 USCS § 1381 et seq.] or who are qualified severely impaired individuals (as
defined in section 1905(q) [*2 USCS § 1396d(q)]),
(III) who are qualified pregnant women or children as defined in section 1905(n) [42 USCS
§ I396d(n)],
(IV) who are described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (7X1) and whose family
income does not exceed the minimum income level the State is required to establish under
subsection (7X2XA)*for such a family; [,] or
(V) who are qualified family members as denned in section 1905(m)(l) [42 USCS
§ 1396d(mXD]
(VI) who are described in subparagraph (C) of subsection (7X0 *nd whose family income
does not exceed the income level the State is required to establish under subsection (7X2)
(B) for such a family, or
(VII) who are described in subparagraph (D) of subsection (f)(1) and whose family income
does not exceed the income level the State is required to establish under subsection (I)(2)
( Q for such a family;
(ii) [Introductory matter unchanged]
(IXIV) [Unchanged]
(V) who are in a medical institution for a period of not less than 30 consecutive days (with
eligibility by reason of this subclause beginning on the first day of such period), who meet
the resource requirements of the appropriate State plan described in clause (i) or the
supplemental security income program^ and whose income does not exceed a separate
income standard established by the State which is consistent with the limit established
under section 1903(fX4XQ [42 USCS § 1396b(iX4XQ].
(VI) who would be eligible under the State plan under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et setf]
if they were in a medical institution, with respect to whom there has been a determination
that but for the provision of home or community-based services described in subsection (c),
(d), or (e) of section 1915^42 USCS } 1396n(c), (d)/or to] they would require the level of
care provided.in a hospital, nursing facility or intermediate care^facility for the mentally
retarded the cost of .which could be reimbursed under the State plan, and who will receive
home or community-based services pursuant to a waiver granted by the Secretary under
section 1915(c) [42 USCS § 1396n(c)]f
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(VII) who would be eligible under the State plan under this title if they were in a medical
institution, who are terminally ill, and who will receive hospice care pursuant to a
voluntary election described in section \905(o) [42 USCS § 1396dfbJ];
(VIII) who is a child described in section 1905(aXi) [42 USCS § 1396d(aXD]—
(aa) for whom, there is in effect an adoption assistance agreement (other than an
agreement under part £ of title IV [42 USCS §§671 ct seq.]) between the State and an
adoptive parent or parents,
(bb) who the State agency responsible for adoption assistance has determined cannot be
placed with adoptive ^parents without medical assistance because such child has special
needs for medical or rehabilitative care, and
(cc) who was eligible for medical assistance under the State plan prior to the adoption
assistance agreement being entered into, or who would have been eligible for medical
assistance at such time if the eligibility standards and methodologies of the' State's
foster care program under part £ of title IV [42 USCS §§ 671 et seq.] were applied
rather than the eligibility standards and methodologies of the State's aid to families
with dependent children program under part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 671 et seq.];
(IX) who are described in subsection (7X0 and are not described in clause (iXIV)» clause
(iXVI), or clause (iXVII);
(X) who are described in subsection (mXO; or
(XI) who receive only an optional State supplementary payment based on need and paid on
a regular basis, equal to the difference between the individual's countable income and the
income standard used to determine eligibility for such supplementary payment (with
countable income being the income remaining after deductions as established by the State
pursuant to standards that may be more restrictive than the standards for supplementary
security income benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), which are available to
all individuals in the State (but which may be based on different income standards by
political subdivision according to cost of living differences), and which are paid by a State
that does not have an agreement with the Secretary under section 1616 or 1634 [42 USCS
§1382e or § 1383c];
(B) [Unchanged]
(C) that if medical assistance is included for any group of individuals described in section 1905(a)
[42 USCS § 1396d(a)] who are not described in subparagraph (A) or (E), then—
(i) the plan must include a description of (I) the criteria for determining eligibility of
individuals in the group for such medical assistance, (II) the amount, duration, and scope of
medical assistance made available to individuals in the group, and (III) the single standard to
be employed in determining income and 'resource eligibility for all such groups, and the
meihe-dobgy to b* -mnloyi-d i,. de'i-"-rnining such eligibility, which shall be no more restrictive
than the methodology which would be employed under the supplemental security income
program in the case of groups consisting of aged, blind, or disabled individuals in a State in
which such program is in effect, and which shall be no more restrictive than the methodology
which would be employed under the appropriate State plan (described in subparagraph (A)(i))
to which such group is most closely categorically related in the case of other groups;
(ii), (iii) [Unchanged]
(iv) if such medical assistance includes services in institutions for mental diseases or in an
intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded (or both) for any such group, it also must
include for all groups covered at least the care and services listed in paragraphs (1) through
(5) and (17) of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(l)-(5), (17)] or the care and services listed in
any 7 of the paragraphs numbered (1) through (20) of such section;
(D) for the inclusion of home health services for any individual who, under the State plan, is
entitled to nursing facility services; and
(EXO but, for making medical assistance available for medicare cost-sharing (as defined in section
1905(pX3) [42 USCS § 1396d(pX3)]) for qualified medicare beneficiaries described in section
1905(pXl) [42 USCS § 1396d(pXl)];
(ii) for making medical assistance available for payment of medicare cost-sharing described in
section 1905(pX3XAXi) (42 USCS § 1396d(pX3XAXO] for qualified disabled and working
individuals described in section 1905(s) [42 USCS § 1396d(s)];
(iii) for making medical assistance available for medicare cost sharing described in section
1905(pX3XAXu) [42 USCS § 1396d(pX3XAXii)] subject to section 1905(pX4) [42 USCS
§ 1396d(pX4)], for individuals who would be qualified medicare beneficiaries described in
section 1905(pXl) [42 USCS § 1396d(pXO] but for the fact that their income exceeds the
income level established by the State under section 1905(pX2) [42 USCS § 1396d(pX2)J but is
less than 110 percent in 1993 and 1994, and 120 percent in 1995 and years thereafter of the
official poverty line (referred to in such section) for a family of the size involved; and
(F) at the option of a State, for making medical assistance available for COBRA premiums (as
defined in subsection (uX2)) for qualified COBRA continuation beneficiaries described in section
1902(uXD [subsec 00(1) of this section];

except that (I) the making available of the services described in paragraph (4), (14), or (16) of section
1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(aX4), (14), (16)] to. individuals meeting the age requirements prescribed
therein shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available of any such services,
or the making available of such services of the same amount, duration, and scope, to individuals of
any other ages, (II) the making available of supplementary medical insurance benefits under part B of
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title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.] to individuals eligible therefor (either pursuant to an
agreement entered into under section 1843 [42 USCS § I395v] or by reason of the payment of
premiums under such title (42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq.] by the State agency on behalf of such
individuals), or provision for meeting pan or all of the cost of deductibles, cost sharing, or similar
charges under part JB of title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.] for individuals eligible for benefits
under such part [42 USCS §§ 1395j et seq.], shall not* by reason of this paragraph (10), require the
making available of any such benefits, or the making available of services of the same amount,
duration, and scope, to any other individuals, (III) the making available of medical assistance equal in
amount, duration, and scope to the medical assistance made available to individuals described in
clause (A) to any classification of individuals approved by the Secretary with respect to whom there is
being paid, or who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a medical institution, to have
paid with respect to them, a State supplementary payment shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10),
require the making available of any such assistance, or the making available of such assistance of the
same amount, duration, and scope, to any other individuals not described in clause (A), (IV) the
imposition of a deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge for any item or service furnished to an
individual not eligible for the exemption under section 1916(aX2) or (bX2) [42 USCS § 1396o(a)(2),
(b)(2)) shall not require the imposition of a deductible, cost sharing, or similar charge for the same
item or service furnished to an individual who is eligible for such exemption, (V) the making available
to pregnant women covered under the plan of services relating to pregnancy (including prenatal,
delivery, and postpartum services) or to any other condition which may complicate pregnancy shall
not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available of such services, or the making
available of such services of the same amount, duration, and scope, to any other individuals, provided
such services are made available Cm the same amount, duration, and scope) to all pregnant women
covered under the State plan, (VI) with respect to the making available of medical assistance for
hospice care to terminally ill individuals who have made a voluntary election described in section
1905(o) [42 USCS § 1396d(o)] to receive hospice care instead of medical assistance for certain other
services, such assistance may not be made available in an amount, duration, or scope less than that
provided under title XVIII [42 USCS §§ 1395 et seq.], and the making available of such assistance
shall not, by reason of this paragraph (10), require the making available of medical assistance for
hospice care to other individuals or the making available of medical assistance for services waived by
such terminally ill individuals, (VII) the medical assistance made available to an individual described
in subsection 0X1XA) who is eligible for medical assistance only because of subparagraph (A)(i)(rv£
or (AXiiXIX) shall be limited to medical assistance for services related to pregnancy (including
prenatal, delivery, postpartum, and family planning services) and to other conditions which may?
complicate pregnancy, (VIII) the medical assistance made available to a qualified medicare benefidary|
described in section 1905(p)(0 [42 USCS § 1396d(pXO] shall be limited to medical assistanceifog
medicare cost-sharing (described in section 1905(p)(3) [42 USCS § 1396d(pX3)]), subject to;tb|j
provisions of subjection (n) jr.d 5^tion 19160)) [42 USCS § 1396o(b)], (IX) the making available*j>d
respiratory care services in accordance with subsection (eX9) shall not, by reason of this paragraph
(10), require the making available of such services, or the making available of such services of*the?
same amount, duration, and scope, to any individuals not included under subsection (eX^X^Xj
provided such services are made available (in the same amount, duration, and scope) to aiy
individuals described in such subsection, (X) if the plan provides for any fixed durational limit ooq
medical assistance for inpatient hospital services (whether or not such a limit varies by medkiL?
condition or diagnosis), the plan must establish exceptions to such a limit for medically necessary^
inpatient hospital services furnished *ith respect to individuals under one year of age in a hospital^
denned under the State plan, pursuant to section 1923(a)OXA) [42 USCS § 1396r-4], as a dispropqftionate share hospital and subparagraph (B) (relating to comparability) shall not be construed" as*
requiring such an exception for other individuals, services, or hospitals; (XI) the making availabiejifj
medical assistance to cover the costs of premiums, deductibles, coinsurance, and other cost-sharing*
obligations for certain individuals for private health coverage as described in section 1906 [42 USCS?
§ 1396e] shall not, by reason of paragraph (10), require the making available of any such benefits*6rj
the making available of services of the same amount, duration, and scope of such private coverage to.
any other individuals!;], and [(XII)](XI) the medical assistance made available to an individual^
described in subsection (uXO who is eligible for medical assistance only because of subparagraph (F)
shall be limited to medical assistance for COBRA continuation premiums (as defined in subsection
(u)(2));
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(17) include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all
groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary, differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of
applicants or recipients of assist^nrp un.Her the plan who are not
receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq.,
1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to
whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid under
title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.], based on the variations between
shelter costs in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility
for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which (A) are
consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B)
provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are,
as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,
available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any applicant
or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for
aid or -assistance in the form of money payments under any plan of the
State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title IV [42
USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et seq., 601 et seq.],
or to have paid with respect to him supplemental security income
benefits under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]) as would not be
disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his eligibility
for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation of any such income or resources, and (D) do not take into account
the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant or
recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient
is such individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or
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(with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program
established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]), is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in
section 1614 [42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States which are not
eligible to participate in such program); and provide forflexibilityin the
application of such standards with respect to income by taking into
account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs
(whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for
medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under
State law;
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(17) except as provided in subsections 0X3), and (mX4)[,J include reasonable standards (which shall
be comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary,
differ with respect to income levels, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under
the plan who are not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under title I,
X, XIV, or XVI. or part A of tide IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 1381 et
seq., 601 et seq.], and with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are not being paid
under title XVI [42 USCS §§1381 et seq.], based on the variations between shelter costs in urban
areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the
plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], (B) provide
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for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordance with
standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of any
applicant or recipient who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance 12
the form of money payments under any plan of the State approved under title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or
part A of title IV [42 USCS §§ 301 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq., 13S1 et seq., 601 et seq.], or tq
have paid with respect to him supplemental security income benefits under title XVI [42 USCS
($ 1381 et seq.]) as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his
eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, < Q provide for reasonable evaluation of any such
income or resources, and (D) do not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual
for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the plan unless such applicant or recipient is sucH
individual's spouse or such individual's child who is under 21 or (with respect to States eligible to
participate in the State program established under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]), is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS $ 1382c]
(with respect to Sutes which are not eligible to participate in such program); and provide for
flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except
to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums;
payments made to the State under section 1903(f)(2)(B) [42 USCS § 1396b(0(2)(B)]. or otherwise and
regardless of whether such costs are reimbursed under another public program of the State or
political subdivision thereof) incurred for medical care or for any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law;
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(34) provide that in the case of any individual who has been determined
to be eligible for medical assistance under the plan, such assistance will
be made available to him for care and services included under the plan
and furnished in or after the third month before the month in which he
made application (or application was made on his behalf in the case of a
deceased individual) for such assistance if such individual was (or upon
application would have been) eligible for such assistance at the time
such care and services were furnished;
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care in an institution, -there shall be deducted from the monthly income (in addition to other'
allowances otherwise provided under the State plan) a monthly personal needs allowance—
j
(i) which is reasonable in amount for clothing and other personal needs of the individual (or!
couple) while in an institution, and
<3
(ii) which is not less (and may be greater) than the minimum monthly personal needs
allowance described in paragraph (2).
(B) In this subsection, the term "institutionalized individual or couple" means an individual otl
married couple—
(i) who is an inpatient (or who are inpatients) in a medical institution or nursing facility for
which payments are made under this title throughout a month, and
(ii) who is or are determined to be eligible for medical assistance under the State plan.
(2) The minimum monthly personal needs allowance described in this paragraph is $30 for an
institutionalized individual and $60 for an institutionalized couple (if both are aged, blind, or
disabled, and their incomes are considered available to each other in determining eligibility). • ''
^
(r) Disregarding payments for certain medical expenses by institutionalized individuals. (1) For purposes
of sections 1902(aX17) andi924(dXlXD) [subsec. (aX17) of this section and 42 USCS § !396r-5(d)(fy
(D)] and for purposes of a; waiverunder section 1915 [42 USCS § 1396n], with respect to^the posg
eligibility treatment bfincome^of individuals who are institutionalized or recerving^home^
c^imnuiih^basecl sfivicerbiWJef&cha "Waiver^here shall be disregarded reparation ^ y m e c
by the Federal ^ u b l k ^ < 3 c r m ^
be taken'mto^account amounts 1br3
expenses fo&heclical or remedial care that are "not subject to payment by a third party; includinfc~£
(i) medicare and other health insurance premiums, deductibles, or coinsurance, and
0i) necessary medical or remedial care recognized under State law but not covered under the Stat?
plan under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq ], subject to reasonable limits the State may establish
on the amount of these expenses.
(2X*) The methodology to be employed in determining income and resource eligibility for individuals^
under subsection (aX10XA)(i)(III), (aXlOXAXiXIV), (aXl0XAX0(VI), (aXlOXAXiXVII), W O t f
(AXii), (aXlOXCXiXIfl). or (f) or under section 1905(p) [1396d(p)] may be less restrictive, and'
shall be no more restrictive, than the methodology—
(i) in the case of groups consisting of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, under the*
suppkoicuuu aciuucv income program under title XVI [42 USCS 55 i3Si et seq.}, or
(ii) in the case of other groups, under the State plan most closely categorically related/: *jsnsf]
(B) For purposes of this subsection and subsection (aX10), methodology h considered to be-***
more restrictive"4f, using the'methodology, additional individuals may be eligible for medkd
assistance and no individuals who are otherwise eligible are made ineligible for such assistance^
(s) Adjustment in payment for hospital services furnished to low-uKome* ckfldrea undef the'%£ <*:1
years. In order to meet the requirements of sobsectkra (aX55), the State plan must provide that payment
to hospitals under the'j>lan for inpatient hospital services furnished to infants who have not attained 5rhj|
age of I year, and to chilclren who* hive dot -attained the age of 6 years aiKl who wove^sucli^rrices jE
a disprc^ortionate share hospital described in section 1923(bXl) [42 U S C S $ t 3 9 6 r ^ X l ) f c * M h n ^ r i |
(1) if made ori:a% prdspecdve fassb (whether per diem, per case, or.otherwise) provide for an outfia
adjustment in payment amounts for medically necessary inpatient hospital services involving execo*
tjohafly high costs orjdxcepdonally long lengths of stay,
<2) cot be limited ^.thelmposition. of day UmiU with respect to the delivery of such services to so<£
individuals, and
(3) not be limited by the impositioa of dollar limits (other than such limits resulting from prospetfijjl]
payments as adjusted pursuant to paragraph (1)) with respect to the delivery of such services to anysuch individual who has not attained their first birthday (or in the case of soch^n- individual who m]
an inpatient on his first birthday until such individual is discharged).
(t) Stat* tax contribution. Except as provided in section 1903(i) [42 USCS 5 1396b(i)], nothing in that*
title [42 USCS « 1396 et seq.] fmcluding sections 1903(a) and 1905(a) [42 USCS §§ 19366(a), 1396d(a)D<
shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary to deny or limit payments to a Sute for expenditures, fori
medical assistance for items or services, attributable to taxes (whether or not of general applicability)^
imposed with respect to the provision of such items or services,
(n) Federal assistance for payments for COBRA continuation coverage. (1) Individuals described in this;
paragraph are individual^
(A) who are entitled to elect COBRA continuation coverage (as defined in paragraph (3)),
(B) whose income {as determined under section 1612 [42 USCS $ 1383] for purposes of tiaf
supplemental security income program) does not exceed 100 percent of the official poverty line ( « '
defined by the Office of Management and Budget, and revised annually in accordance with section
673(2) of the Ommbus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 [42 USCS { 9902 (2)D applicable to a
family of the size involved,
( Q whose resources (as determined under section 1613 [42 USCS {1384] for purposes of the"
supplemental security income program) do not exceed twice the maximum amount of resources
that an individual may have and obtain benefits under that program, and
(D) with'respect to whose enrollment for COBRA continuation coverage the State has determined
that the savings in expenditures under this title [42 USCS {§ 1396 et seq.] resulting from suck
enrollment is likely to exceed the amount of payments for COBRA premiums made.
(2) For purposes of subsection (aXlOXF) and this subsection, the term "COBRA premiums- means
the applicable premium imposed with respect to COBRA continuation coverage.
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ARTICLE 3
TESTS OF NEWBORN INFANTS
26-17-21. PKU tests of newborn infants — Board of Health
to establish rules and regulations.
The Board of Health shall establish rules and regulations requiring each
newborn infant to be tested for the presence of phenylketonuria (PKU) and
other metabolic diseases which may result in mental retardation or brain
damage and for which a preventive measure or treatment is available and for
which a laboratory diagnostic test method has been found reliable.
History: L. 1965, ch. 49, § 1; 1967, ch, 174,
§ 36.

Cross-References. — Fees for and restriction on testing, § 26-10-6.

26-17-22. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 26-17-22 (L. 1965, ch.
49, § 2), relating to the penalty for violations

of regulations relating to PKU tests, was repealed by Laws 1967, ch. 174, § 162.

CHAPTER 18
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Sunset Act. — See Section 63-55-7 for the termination date of the Medical Assistance Act.
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Enforcement of public assistance
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of Recovery Services.
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26-18-1. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance
Act."
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1981,
ch. 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1 to

26-18-4 (L. 1963, ch. 38, §§ 1 to 4; 1969, ch.
197, §§ 64, 65; 1971, ch. 53, § 1), relating to
use of confidential information in research.
Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted
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by § 17 of the act. For present provisions relating to confidential information, see Chapter 25
of this title.

26-18-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the
medical programs of the state.
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1.
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10.
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assistance for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant
to Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act.
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or payments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance
under state medical programs.
(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance
Program established under Section 26-18-10.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, added present
Subsections (2) and (3), designated former Subsections (2) and (3) as Subsections (5) and (6),
and, in Subsection (6), substituted "has received medical or hospital assistance under the

Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance Program established under Section
26-1«-10" for "the 'Wrfctm^it ha* determined
to be eligible for medical of hospital assistance
under the medical programs of the state."
Social Security A c t — Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

26-18-2.1. Division — Creation.
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care Financing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and applicable federal law.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 2.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities.
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of
the department. The director of the division may employ other employees as
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall:
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this
chapter;
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in
compliance with federal law and regulations.
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History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 3.

26-18-3

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Periodic assessment.
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economical manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, excessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that
fail to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with
regard to both publicly and privately provided services.
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods,
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to:
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utilization is reasonable and necessary;
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions;
(c) mandatory outpatient, rather than inpatient, surgery in appropriate cases;
(d) second surgical opinions;
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services;
(fKcobrdination of benefits; and
(g) review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures
and provisions of federal law and regulation.
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effectiveness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreasonable utilization.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 4.
Social Security Act — Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 21, § 10
makes the act effective July 1, 1988.

26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by department.
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the
Social Security Act.
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations.
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(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of
Social Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permitted by law and quality control services.
(4) The department may provide by rule for disciplinary measures and
sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively shall
not extend beyond termination from the program or recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, eh. 21, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, in Subsection (2)
substituted "this chapter, the requirements of
Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations"
for "the requirements of Title XIX and with

regulations adopted pursuant thereto by the
federal agency" and made various minor phraseology and stylistic changes,
Social Security A c t — Title XIX of the fede ral Social Security Act is compiled as 42
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 126
Key Numbers. — Social Security «=> 241.

26-18-3.5. Copayments by health
spouses, and parents.

service

recipients,

The department shall selectively provide for enrollment fees, premiums,
deductions, cost sharing or other similar charges to be paid by recipients, their
spouses, and parents, within the limitations of federal law and regulation.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3.5, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 135, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Legislative
Survey — 1983, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 169.

26-18-4. Department standards for eligibility under Medicaid — Funds for abortions.
(1) The department may develop standards and administer policies relating
to eligibility under the Medicaid program. An applicant receiving Medicaid
assistance may be limited to particular types of care or services or to payment
of part or all costs of care determined to be medically necessary.
(2) The department shall not provide any funds for medical, hospital, or
other medical expenditures or medical services to^otherwise eligible persons
where the purpose of the assistance is to perform an abortion, unless the life of
the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not performed.
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(3) Any employee of the department who authorizes payment for an abortion contrary to the provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor and subject to forfeiture of office.
(4) Any person or organization that, under the guise of other medical treatment, provides an abortion under auspices of the Medicaid program is guilty
of a third degree felony and subject to forfeiture of license to practice medicine
or authority to provide medical services and treatment.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-4, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, 5 17; 1987, ch. 181, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment deleted former Subsection (1), relating to
the responsibility of counties, redesignated the
subsequent subsections accordingly and made

minor changes in phraseology throughout the
section.
Cross-References. — Penalties for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for felonies, §§76-3-201,
76-3-203, 76-3-301.

26-18-5. Contracts for provision of medical services —
Federal provisions modifying department rules
— Compliance with Social Security Act.
(1) The department may contract with other public or private agencies to
purchase or provide medical services in connection with the programs of the
division. Where these programs are used by other state agencies, contracts
shall provide that other state agencies transfer the state matching funds to
the department in amounts sufficient to satisfy needs of the specified program.
(2) All contracts for the provision or purchase of medical services shall be
established on the basis of the__state's fiscal year and shall remain uniform
during tEe fiscal year insofar a3 possible. Contract terms shall include"provi
sions for maintenance, administration, and service costs.
(3) If a federal legislative or executive provision requires modifications or
revisions in an eligibility factor established under this chapter as a condition
for participation in medical assistance, the department may modify or change
its rules as necessary to qualify for participation; providing, the provisions of
this section shall not apply to department rules governing abortion.
(4) The department shall comply with all pertinent requirements of the
Social Security Act and all orders, rules, and regulations adopted thereunder
when required as a condition of participation in benefits under the Social
Security Act.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sentence of Subsection (1) substituted "division"
for "department" and in Subsection (3) substi-

tuted "its rules as necessary" for "department
rules necessary."
Social Security A c t — The federal Social
Security Act is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 301 et
g^
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26-18-6. Federal aid — Authority of executive director.
The executive director, with the approval of the governor, may bind the
state to any executive or legislative provisions promulgated or enacted by the
federal government which invite the state to participate in the distribution,
disbursement or administration of any fund or service advanced, oflFered or
contributed in whole or in part by the federal government for purposes consistent with the powers and duties of the department. Such funds shall be used
as provided in this chapter and be administered by the department for purposes related to medical assistance programs.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17.

26-18-7. Medical vendor rates.
Medical vendor payments made to providers of services for and in behalf of
recipient households shall be based upon predetermined rates from standards
developed by the division in cooperation with providers of services for each
type of service purchased by the division. As far as possible, the rates paid for
services shall be established in advance of the fiscal year for which ftinds are
to be requested.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-7, enacted by L.
1981,, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1988, in the first sentence twice substituted "division" for "department."

26-18-8. Enforcement of public assistance statutes — Contract with Office of Recovery Services,
(1) The department shall enforce or contract for the enforcement of the
provisions of Sections 62A-9-121, 62A-9-129, 62A-9-131 through 62A-9-133,
and 62A-9-135 insofar as these sections pertain to benefits conferred or administered by the division under this chapter.
(2) The department may contract for services covered in Part 1, Chapter 11,
Title 62A insofar as that chapter pertains to benefits conferred or administered by the division under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-8, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch* 1, § 2; 1988, ch.
21^1 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by Chapter 1, effective January 19,1988,
substituted the present statutory references for
"Sections 55-15a-24, and 55-15a-29 through
55-15a-33" in Subsection (1) and "Chapter 15c
of Title 55" in Subsection (2).

The 1988 amendment by Chapter 21, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "division" for
"department" throughout the section.
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
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26-18-9. Prohibited acts of state or local employees of
Medicaid program — Violation a misdemeanor.
Each state or local employee responsible for the expenditure of funds under
the state Medicaid program, each individual who formerly was such an officer
or employee, and each partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited for
a period of one year after termination of such responsibility from committing
any act, the commission of which by an officer or employee of the United
States Government, an individual who was such an officer or employee, or a
partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited by Section 207 or Section
208 of Title 18, United States Code. Violation of this section is a class A
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-9, enacted by L.
1981, eh* 126, § 17.
Compiler's Notes. — 18 U.S.C. §§ 207 and
208 deal respectively with participation by former federal officers or employees in matters
involving the government and with involve-

ment by federal officers or employees in their
official capacity in matters in which they have
a personal financial interest.
Cross-References. — Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies
and standards.
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be
known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income persons who
are not eligible under the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVm of that act.
(2) Persons in the custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses, and other nonmedical government institutions are not eligible for services provided under
this section.
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relating to eligibility requirements for participation in the program, and for payment of medical claims for eligible persons.
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before assistance is rendered the division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the
spouse, father, mother, and adult children of the person making application.
(5) The department shall determine what medically necessary care or services are covered under the program, including duration of care, and method
of payment, which may be partial or in full.
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for medical, hospital, or other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible
persons where the purpose of the assistance is for the performance of an
abortion, unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an abortion
were not performed.
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this
section.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. § 17), relating to duties of the department, and
1982, ch- 26, § 1; 1985, ch. 165, § 38; 1987, enacted present § 26-18-10.
ch. 181, S 3; 1988, ch. 21, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendRepeaJs and Reenactments. — Laws 1982, ment substituted "equivalent of .00005" for
cL 26, § 1 repealed former § 26-18-10 (C. "equivalent of lU mill" in two places in Subsec1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 126, tion (6).
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The 1987 amendment, effective July J, 1987,
in Subsection (1), substituted "Medicare under
Title XVm of that act" for "Medicare under
Title XVII of said act," deleted former Subsection (6), which provided for relief of the obligation of counties to provide medical care to the
indigent, and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation throughout the section.
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988,
substituted "division" for "department" in Sub-

sections (l) and (4) and in Subsection (1) inverted "which shall be known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program."
Social Security A c t — Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act, cited in Subsection
(1), appears as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 to 1396s. Title XVm of the act appears as 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395 to 1395CCC.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Utah's
Medicaid Program: A Senior's Eligibility

Guide for Private Practitioners, 14 J. Contemp.
L. 1 (1988).

26-18-11. Rural hospitals.
(1) For purposes of this section "rural hospital" means a hospital located
outside of a standard metropolitan statistical area, as designated by the
United States Bureau of the Census.
(2) For purposes of the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance
Program, the Division of Health Care Financing shall not discriminate among
rural hospitals on the basis of size.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-11, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 12, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 12, § 2
makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.
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Section
26-19-1.
26-19-2.
26-19-3.
26-19-4.
26-19-5.

26-19-6.
26-19-7.

26-19-8.

Section
Short title.
Definitions.
Program established by depart- 26-19-9 to
ment — Promulgation of rules. 26-19-13.
Repealed.
Recovery of medical assistance
from third party liable for payment — Notice — Action — 26-19-14.
Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to action protected — Limit on payment for
liability.
26-19-15.
Action by department — Notice to
recipient.
26-19-16.
Action or claim by recipient —
Consent of department required 26-19-17.
— Department's right to intervene — Department's interests 26-19-18.
protected — Attorney's fees and
costs.
Statute of limitations — Survival
of right of action — Insurance
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policy not to limit time allowed
for recovery.
26-19-12. Repealed.
Recovery of medical assistance
payments from recipient —
Lien against estate — Recovery
of incorrectly paid amounts.
Insurance policies not to deny or
reduce benefits of persons eligible for state medical assistance
— Exemptions.
Attorney general or county attorney to represent department.
Department's right to attorney's
fees and costs.
Application of provisions contrary
to federal law prohibited
Release of medical billing information by provider restricted —
Liability for violation.
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(Repealed by Laws 1967, ch. 174, § 162; 1969, ch. 197, § 187; 1971, ch. 172, § 27;
1988, ch. 1, § 407; 1989, ch. 22, § 51.)

26-17-1 to 26-17-22. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 22, § 51 repeals
this chapter, as enacted by Laws 1961, ch. 54
and by Laws 1987, ch. 180, § 1; 1987, ch. 179,
§ 8; and 1967, ch/174, § 153 and as amended
by Laws 1969, ch 197, §§ 60 and 63; 1979, ch.
233, § 1; 1987, ch. 141, § 1; 1987, ch. 179, §§ 1,

3 to 7, and 9; 1967, ch. 174, §§ 36 and 147;
1980, ch. 30, § 1; 1979, ch. 97, § 3; and 1981,
ch. 120, § 3, effective April 24, 1989. For
present comparable provisions, see Chapter 12
0 f Title 62A.

CHAPTER 18
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE ACT
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-226 provides that the Medical Assistance Act is repealed July 1,
1994.
Section
26-18-3.

Administration of Medicaid program by department — Disci-

plinary measures and sanctions
— Funds collected,

26-18-2.1. Division — Creation.
-Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-226 provides
that the Division of Health Care Financing is
repealed July 1, 1994.

26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by department — Disciplinary measures and sanctions —
Funds collected.
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the
Social Security Act.
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations.
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent permitted by law and quality control services.
(4) The depariment shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and procedures
43
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of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively may not
extend beyond:
(a) termination from the program;
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social
Security Act.
(5) Funds collected as a result of a sanction imposed under Section 1919 oi
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the General
Fund as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance
with the requirements of that section.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5; 1989,
ch. 165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, added the (a)
and (b) designations in Subsection (4); substituted "shall provide, by rule" for "may provide
by rule for" and "may not extend" for "shall not
extend" in the introductory language of Subsection (4); deleted "or" from the end of Subsection (4)(a); added "and" to the end of Subsec-

tion (4)(b); added Subsection (4)(c); made punctuation changes throughout Subsection (4);
and added Subsection (5).
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Subsection (3).
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal
Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42
U.S.C. § 1396r.

CHAPTER 19
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT
Section
26-19-2.
26-19-5.

26-19-7.

Section
Definitions
Recovery of medical assistance
from third party liable for payment — Lien — Notice — Action — Compromise or waiver
— Recipient's right to action
protected.
Action or claim by recipient —
Consent of department required

26-19-18

— Department's right to intervene — Department's interests
protected — Attorney's fees and
costs.
Release of medical billing information by provider restricted —
Exception — Liability for violation.

26-19-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Medical assistance" means any funds expended by the state under
Chapter 18, Title 26, and under Titles XVm and XIX of the Social Security Act.
(2) "Property" includes the homestead and all other property, personal
or real, in which the recipient has a legal interest.
(3) "Provider" means a person or entity receiving compensation from
any public medical assistance program for goods or services provided to a
recipient.
(4) "Recipient" means a person who has applied for or received medical
assistance from the state; his guardian, conservator, or other personal
representative, if he is a minor or incapacitated person; and his estate and
survivors if he is deceased.
(5) "Third party" means:
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Dry: C. 1953,63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub7, ch. 161, § 272? 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate apaendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for 'Utah Rules of Appellate Pro; effective April 25,1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b).
ided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
t of Appeals" for "The Supreme Court or § 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1,
• appellate court designated by statute in ^ggg
don (1); inserted "with the appropriate
NOTES TO DECISIONS
action of district court
tion (1) provides that all final agency
dons through formal'adjudicative proceedwill be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
; or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis-

trict court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicate proceeding* de novo pursuant to
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

•l3-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
" district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i)_ order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) eiyoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are renewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.

i

History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
[987, ch. 161, § 273.
1988.
{Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under iKia
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except
that final agency action from informal actfudicative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

according to the standards of Subsection
63-46b-16(4)" at the end in Subsection 1(1X3
and made minor stylistic changes.
CtS§8j
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 16l!
§ 315 m a kes the act effective on January 1<
i9gg

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as ii
termediate appellate court except to review i
formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursi
ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. Ini
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)". i

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro
ceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellat^crjurtr^ ~'*-~
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
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"where not inconsistent with the law" following "chief justice" and added "as consistent
with the law" at the end of Subsection (6).
Cross-References. — Chief justice, Utah
Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 2.
Disqualification in particular case, Utah
Const., Art. VIE, Sec. 2.
Judicial
nomination
and
selection,
§ 20-1-7.1 et seq.
Membership on state law library board,
§ 37-1-1.
Proceedings
unaffected
by
vacancy,
§ 78-7-21.
Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art.
Vm, Sec. 7.
Retirement, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 15;
§ 49-6-101 et seq., §§ 78-7-29, 78-7-30.
Salary, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 14.

History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, ch.
47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2), rewrote the second sentence which read
Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the
Supreme Court is ten years and until his successor is appointed and approved in accordance
with Section 20-1-7.1" and, in Subsection (6),
substituted "determines" for "decides" at the
end of the fourth sentence.
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, deleted "next" after "January" and made
punctuation changes in Subsection (2); deleted
"not" following "chief justice may" in the third
sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "additional"
before "duties" in Subsection (5); deleted

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts
§§ 67, 68.
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.; 48A
C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85.

Key Numbers. — Courts *=> 101, 248;
Judges «=» 1, 7 to 12.

78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch.
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182,
§ 4.

Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981,
ch. 1GC, lj.}j relating to salaries of justices,
was repealed by~Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effective July 1, 1982.

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
8
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(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appealsfromany court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appealsfromthe district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of-the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L.
1986,.ch^47^^41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303; 1988,
ch. 248, § "5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch.47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, relating to original
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and
enacts the above section.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "formal adjudicative proceedings" for "cases" in
Subsection (3)(e); added Subsection (3)(f); redesignated former Subsections (3)(f) to (3)(i) accordingly, substituted M(i)" for "(h)" at the end
of Subsection (4)(g); and made minor stylistic
changes. rTThe 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, added wand Forestry" at the end of Subsection (3)(e)(iii); rewrote Subsection (4)(a)
which read "first degree and capital felony con-

victions"; substituted "(f)" for "(i)" at the^end of
Subsection (4)(g), ar.J made minor scyiistic
changes.
Cross-References. — Appeals from juvenile courts, § 78-3a-51.
Appeals in criminal cases, UR.Cr.P. 26.
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of
governor, § 77-5-2.
Election contest appeals, §§ 20-3-35,
20-15-14.
Extraordinary writs, Utah Const. Art. VTQ,
Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B.
Industrial commission orders, review of,
§ 35-1-36.
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 3.
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19.
Unemployment compensation decisions, review of, § 35-4-10.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Post-conviction review.
- Post-conviction review may be used to attack
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook,
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

ANALYSIS

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Post-conviction review.
Scope.
—Sentence reduction.
Cited.
Habeas corpus proceedings.
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is sufficiently broad to include those cases where a
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging extradition.
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 PM 993 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
- •
The Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to
his underlying criminal conviction, except that
"but for" the conviction, he would not have
been incarcerated in Arizona and then transferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Appeal from the denial of a petition for writ
of habeas corpus was properly before the Court
of Appeals, where the writ challenged the postconviction actions of the board of pardon* n'»?
did not challenge the conviction in the trial
court or the sentence, and the fact that defendant was serving a sentence for a first-degree
felony did not require a transfer to the Supreme Court under the circumstances. Northern v. Barnes, 814 P.2d 1148 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

Scope.
This statute defines the outermost limits of
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of
Appeals to review agency decisions only when
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of
review. It is not a catchall provision authorizing the court to review the orders of every administrative agency for which there is no statute specifically creating a right to judicial review. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
—Sentence reduction.
When a conviction is reduced under
§ 76-3-402, the appeal lies in the court having
jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in
the judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of
crime charged in the information or found in
the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 PJ2d 1168
(Utah 1991).
Cited in Scientific Academy of Hair Design,
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); State v. Humphrey, 794 R2d 496 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d
1083 (Utah 1991); Heinecke v. Department of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of Appeals shall
be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-4, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, S 47.
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For text of Act see p. SOS
House Report (Ways and Means Committee) No. 213, Mar. 29, 1965
[To accompany H.R. 6675]
Senate Report (Finance Committee) No. 404, June 30, 1965
[To accompany H.R. 6675]
Conference Report No. 682, July 26,1965 [To accompany H.R. 6675]
Cong. Record Vol. I l l (1965)
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE
House Apr. 8, July 27, 1965
Senate July 9, July 28,1965
The Senate Report and the Conference Report are set out.
SENATE REPORT NO. 404
% HE Committee on Finance, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 6675)
to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social
Security Act with a supplementary health benefits program and an expanded program of medical assistance, to increase benefits under the oldage, survivors, and disability insurance system, to improve the FederalState public assistance programs, and for other purposes, having considered the same, icport favorably thereon with amendments and recommend
that the bill do pass.

PART I
I.

BRIEF SUMMARY

The overall purpose of H.R. 6675 is as follows:
First, to provide a coordinated approach for health insurance and medical
care for the aged under the Social Security Act by establishing three new
health care programs: (1) a compulsory hospital-based program for the
aged; (2) a voluntary supplementary plan to provide physicians' and other
supplementary health services for the aged; and (3) an expanded medical
assistance program for the needy and medically needy aged, blind, disabled,
and families with dependent children.
Second, to expand the services for maternal and child health, crippled
children, child welfare, and the mentally retarded, and to establish a 5-year
program of "special project grants" to provide comprehensive health care
and services for needy children (including those who are emotionally disturbed) oi school age or preschool age.
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6. I M P R O V E M E N T AND E X T E N S I O N O F KERR-MILLS
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(a) Background
The provision of medical care for the needy has long been a responsibility of the State and local public welfare agencies. In recent years,
the Federal Government has assisted the States and localities in carrying this responsibility by participating in the cost of the care provided.
Under the original Social Security Act, it was possible for the States,
with Federal help, to furnish money to the needy with which they could
buy the medical care they needed. Since 1950, the Social Security Act
has authorized participation in the cost of medical care provided in behalf of the needy aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children—the socalled vendor payments.
Several times since 1950, the Congress has liberalized the provisions
of law under which the States administer the State-Federal program of
medical assistance for the needy. The most significant enactment was
in 1960 when the Kerr-Mills medical assistance for the aged program
was authorized. This legislation oflers generous Federal matching to
enable the States to provide medical care in behalf of aged persons who
have enough income for their basic maintenance but not enough for
medical care costs. This program has grown to the point where 40 States
and 4 other jurisdictions have such a program and over 246,000 aged
were aided in March 1965. Furthermore, medical care as a part of the
cash maintenance assistance programs has also grown through the years
until, at this time, nearly all the States make vendor payments for some
items of medical care for at least some of the needy.
The committee bill is designed to liberalize the Federal law under which
States o^eiatc LVIi medical assistance programs so as to make medial
services for the needy more generally available. To accomplish this objective, the committee bill would establish, effective January 1, 1966, a
new title in the Social Security Act—"Title X I X : Grants to the States
for Medical Assistance Programs."
Under the House bill, after an interim period ending June 30, 1967,
all States would have to adopt the new program or lose Federal matching
as to vendor medical payments since the current provisions of law would
expire at that time. Under the committee bill the States will have the
option of participating under the new program or continuing to operate
under the vendor payment provisions of title I (old-age assistance and
medical assistance for the aged), title IV (aid to families with dependent
children), title X (aid to the blind), title X I V (aid to the permanently
and totally disabled), and title XVI (the combined adult program). Programs of vendor payments for medical care will continue, as now, to be
optional with the States.
(b) State plan requirements
(1) Standard provisions
The provisions in the proposed title XIX contain a number of requirements for State plans which are either identical to the existing provisions of law or are merely conforming changes. These a r e :
That a plan shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the
State.
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That there shall be provided an opportunity for a fair hearing for
any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or not acted
upon with reasonable promptness.
That the State agency will make such reports as the Secretary
may from time to time require.
That there shall be safeguards provided which restrict the use or
disclosure of information concerning applicants or recipients to purposes directly connected with the administration of the plan.
That all individuals wishing to make application for assistance
under the plan shall have an opportunity to do so and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness.
That in determining whether an individual is blind there shall be
an examination by a physician skilled in the diseases of the eye or
by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select
That medical assistance will be furnished to individuals who are
residents of the State but who are absent therefrom.
(2) Additions to standard provisions
In addition to the requirements for State plans mentioned above, the
committee bill contains several other.plan requirements which are either
new or changed over provisions currently in the law.
The bill provides that there shall be financial participation by the State
equal to not less than 40 percent of the non-Federal share of the expenditures under the plan and that, effective July 1, 1970, the financial participation by the State shall equal all the non-Federal share. This provision was included to make certain that the lack of availability of local
funds for financing of any part of the program not affect the amount,
scope, or duration of benefits or the level of administration set by the
State. Prior to the 1970 date, the committee will be willing to consider
other legislative alternatives to the provisions making the entire nonFederal share a responsibility of the State so long as these alternatives,
in maintaining the concept of local participation, assure a consistent
statewide program at a reasonable level of adequacy.
The bill contains a provision found in the other public assistance titles
of the Social Security Act that the State plan must include such methods
of administration as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the
proper and efficient operation of the plan, with the addition of the requirement that such methods must include provisions for utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration of the plan. It is important that State utilize a sufficient number of trained and qualified personnel in the administration of the program including both medical and
other professional staff.
The committee's bill would add a requirement that the State plan include a description of the standards, methods, and administrative arrangements which affect quality of medical care that a State will use in
administering medical assistance. This amendment would give no authority to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with respect
to the content of such standards and methods. In this respect it is somewhat analogous to the requirement, which has been in the public assistance titles since 1950 and which is included in the new title XIX, requiring States to have an authority or authorities responsible for establish-
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ing and maintaining standards for private or public institutions in which
recipients may receive care or services.
The committee also added an amendment to require that, after June
30, 1967, private and public medical institutions must meet standards
(which may be in addition to the standards prescribed by the State) relating to protection against firt and other hazards to the health and safety of individuals, which are established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, The committee assumes that the standards prescribed by many States at the present time will meet or exceed those prescribed by the Secretary.
The House bill provided that the State or local agency administering
the State plan under title XIX shall be the same agency which is currently administering either title I (old-age assistance) or that part of
title XVI (assistance for the aged, blind, and the disabled, and medical
assistance for the aged) relating to the aged. Where the program relating to the aged is State supervised, the same State agency shall supervise the administration of title XIX.
The committee believes that the States should be given the opportunity to select the agency they wish to administer the program. A number
of witnesses appearing before the committee have expressed the belief
that the State health agency should be given the primary responsibility
under this program. The committee bill leaves this decision wholly to
the States with the sole requirement that the determination of eligibility
for medical assistance be made by the State or local agency administering State plans approved under title I or XVI. The committee agrees
with the statement in the House report that the welfare agencies have
"long experience and skill in determination of eligibility."
The committee bill also provides that if, on January 1, 1965, and on
the date a State submits its title XIX plan, the State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State plan for the blind under title X or title XVI of the Social Security Act is different from the
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the new
program, such blind agency may be designated to administer or supervise the administration of the portion .of the title XIX plan which relates to blind individuals. This would include the eligibility determining
function. In such case, the portion of the title XIX plan administered
or supervised by each agency shall be regarded as a separate plan.
Current provisions of law requiring States to have an agency or agencies responsible for establishing and maintaining standards for the types
of institutions included under the State plan have been continued under
the bill. Your committee expects that these provisions will be used to
bring about progressive improvement in the level of institutional care
and services provided to recipients of medical assistance. Standards of
care in many medical institutions are not now at a satisfactory level and
it is hoped that current standards applicable to medical institutions will
be improved by the State's standard-setting agency and that these standards will be enforced by the appropriate State body.
Under provisions of the committee bill, the State plan must include
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for care
and services under the plan will be determined, and that such care and
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of ad-
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ministration and the best interests of the recipient. This provision was
included in order to provide some assurance that the States will not use
unduly complicated methods of determining eligibility which have the effect of delaying in an unwarranted fashion the decision on eligibility for
medical assistance or that the States will not administer the provisions
for services in a way which adversely affects the availability or the quality of the care to be provided. The committee expects that under this
provision, the States will be eliminating unrewarding and unproductive
policies and methods of investigation and that they will develop such procedures as will assure the most effective working relationships with medical facilities, practitioners, and suppliers of care and service in order to
encourage their full cooperation and participation in the provision of
services under the State plan.
The committee hopes that there will be continuing evaluation of all State
plan requirements in relation to the basic objectives of the legislation.
(c) Eligibility for medical assistance
Under the committee bill, a State plan to be approved must include
provision for medical assistance for all individuals receiving aid or assistance under State plans approved under titles I, IV, X / X I V , and XVI.
It is only if this group is provided for that States may include medical
assistance to the less needy.
Under the committee bill, medical assistance made available to persons
receiving assistance under title I, IV, X, XIV, or XVI must not be less
in amount, duration, or scope than that provided for persons receiving aid
under any other of those titles. In other words, the amount, duration,
and scope of medical assistance made available must be the same for all
such persons. This will assure comparable treatment for ail of the needy
aided under the federally aided categories of assistance.
The bill provides furthermore that as States extend their programs to
include assistance for persons who come within the various categories of
assistance except that their income and resources are sufficient to meet
their needs for maintenance, the medical assistance given such individuals
shall not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than that made available for persons who are recipients of money payments. This was included in order to make sure that the most needy in a State receive no
less comprehensive care than those who-are not as needy.
Under the bill, if a State extends the program to those persons not receiving assistance under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI, the determination of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among
the people who, except for their income and resources, would be recipients of money for maintenance under the other public assistance programs. Thus, the income and resources limitation for the aged must be
comparable to that set for the disabled and blind and must also have a
comparability for that set for families with children who, except for
their income and resources, would be eligible for AFDC. The scope,
amount, and duration of medical assistance available to each of these
groups must be equal.
The committee has amended the House bill, however, so that this provision as to comparability does not apply in the case of services in institutions for tuberculosis or mental diseases. Federal financial participaU.S.Cong. & Admin.News '65—127
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tion is authorized only with respect to recipients aged 65 and over in
mental and tuberculosis institutions so it would not be appropriate to
include them within the scope of this provision.
(d) Determination of need for medical assistance
The committee bill would make more specific a provision now in the
law that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the
plan, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources
which individuals may hold and be eligible JOT aid, they must do so by
maintaining a comparability among the various categorical groups of needy
people. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines to be
that which is applicable for the eligibility of the needy aged, for example,
shall be comparable to that which the State sets to determine the eligibility for the needy blind and disabled; and must also have a comparability
to the standards used to determine the eligibility of those who are to receive medical assistance as needy children and the parents or other relatives caring for them.
Another provision is included that requires States to take into account
only such income and resources as (determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary), are actually available to the applicant
or recipient and as would not be disregarded (or set aside for future
needs) in determining the eligibility for and the amount of the aid or assistance in the form of money payments for any such applicant or recipient under the title of the Social Security Act most appropriately applicable to him. Income and resources taken into account, furthermore,
must be reasonably evaluated by the States. These provisions are designed so that the States will not assume the availability of income which
may nol, in fact, be available or overevaluate incem-0 and resources which
are available. Examples of income assumed include support orders from
absent fathers, which have not been paid or contributions from relatives
which are not in reality received by the needy individual.
The committee has heard of hardships on certain individuals by requiring them to provide support and to pay for the medical care needed
by relatives. The committee believes it is proper to expect spouses to support each other and parents to be held accountable for the support of their
minor children and their blind or permanently and totally disabled children even though 21 years of age or older. Such requirements for support may reasonably include the payment by such relative, if able, for
medical care. Beyond such degree of relationship, however, requirements
imposed are often destructive and harmful to the relationships among
members of the family group. Thus, States may not include in their
plans provisions for requiring contributions from relatives other than
a spouse or the parent of a minor child or children over 21 who are blind
or permanently and totally disabled. Any contributions actually made
by relatives or friends, or from other sources, will be taken into account
by the State in determining whether the individual applying for medical
assistance is, in fact, in need of such assistance.
The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under
the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted pro-
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grams which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income
just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided under the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the
limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical assistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the
individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the
medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the consideration of an individual's income, the committee bill requires that the
State's standards for determining eligibility for and extent of medical
assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the
Secretary, the cost—whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise—incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care
recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligible for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be
sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both
the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the
medical care he requires.
This determination must be made by the agency administering the oldage assistance or combined adult program; i.e., the welfare agency.
The State may require the use of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount
In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that described below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items
of medical service, may a State require the use of income or resources
whichi would bring the individual's income below the amount established
as the test of eligibility under the State plan. Such action would reduce
the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for
his maintenance.
The bill contains several interrelated provisions which prohibit or limit
the imposition of any deduction, cost sharing, or similar charge, or of any
enrollment fee, premium, or similar charge, under the plan.
No deduction, cost sharing or similar charge may be imposed with respect to inpatient hospital services furnished under the plan. This provision is related to another provision in the bill which requires States
to pay reasonable costs for inpatient hospital services provided under
the plan. Taken together, these provisions give assurance that the hospital bill incurred by a needy individual shall be paid in full under the
provisions of the State plan for the number of days covered and that
States may not expect to require the individual to use his income or resources (except such income as exceeds the State's maintenance level)
toward that bill. The reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services shall
be determined in accordance with standards approved by the Secretary
and included in the State plan.
For any other items of medical assistance furnished under the plan, a
charge of any kind may be imposed only if the State so chooses, and the
charge must be reasonably related to the recipient's income or his income
and resources. The same limitations apply in the case of any enrollment
fee, premium, or similar charge imposed with respect to inpatient hospital
services. The Secretary is given authority to issue standards under this
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provision, which it is expected will protect the income and resources an
individual has which are necessary for his nonmedical needs.
The hospital insurance benefit program included under other provisions
of the bill provides for a deductible which must be paid in connection
with the individual's claim for hospitalization benefits. The committee is
concerned that hospitalization be readily available to needy persons and
that the necessity of their paying deductibles or cost sharing shall not be
a hardship on them or a factor which may prevent their receiving the
hospitalization they need. For this reason, the committee's bill provides
that the States make provisions, for individuals 65 years or older who
are included in the new plan, of the cost of any deductible or cost sharing
imposed with respect to individuals under the program established by the
hospital insurance provisions of the bill.
A State medical assistance plan may provide for the payment in full
of any deductibles or cost sharing under the insurance program established by part B of title XVIII. In the event, however, the State plan provides for the individual to assume a portion of such costs, such portion
shall be determined on a basis reasonably related to the individual's income, or income and resources and in conformity with standards issued
by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized to issue standards—under
nhis^provision- which, it is expected, will protect the income and resources
of the individual needed for his maintenance—to guide the States, buch
standards shall protect the income and resources of the individual needed
for his maintenance and provide assurance that the responsibility placed
on individuals to share in the cost shall not be an undue burden on them.
Titles I and XVI authorizing the medical assistance for the aged program now provide that the States may not impose a lien against the
property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical assistance payments except pursuant to a court judgment concerning incorrect payments, and prohibit adjustment or recovery for amounts correctly paid except from the estate of an aged person after his death and
that of his surviving spouse. This provision, under the committee bill,
has been broadened so that such an adjustment or recovery would be
made only at a time when there is no surviving child who is, under the
age of 21 or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled.
(e) Scope and definition of medical services
"Medical assistance" is defined under the bill to mean payment of all
or part of the cost of care and services for individuals who would if
needy, be dependent under title IV, except for section 406(a)(2), and
are under the age of 21, or who are relatives specified in section 406(b)
(1) with whom the child is living, or who are 65 years of age and older,
blind, or permanently and totally disabled, but whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all their medical care costs. The bill, as
do current provisions of law, permits Federal sharing in the cost of medical care provided up to 3 months before the month in which the individual makes application for assistance. Thus, the scope of the program
includes not only the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent children as
defined in State plans, but also children under the age of 21 (and their
caretaker relatives) who come within the scope of title IV, except for

2020

